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vPreface
In its most basic form, the dissertation has been written as a collection of papers. Each of 
the three papers is to be considered as an independent work situated within the overall 
purpose of the dissertation. Since the paper format only offers limited space for 
substantial discussions of theoretical and methodological considerations, the function of 
this introduction is to locate them within the overall agenda of the dissertation. The 
papers have been submitted for review to academic journals and are presented in the 
order they have been written. Minor changes of typographical character have been made 
to the papers to make them fit the overall layout of the dissertation. 
The papers have been submitted for consideration to different academic journals: 
- Paper one, “The historicity of political institutions and practices – democratic 
consolidation and political continuity in Mali”, has been submitted to the Review of 
African Political Economy
- Paper two, “The politics of decentralisation in Mali: the democratic potential of 
decentralisation”, has been published in Forum for Development Studies no. 1-2007, 
p. 91-119. The title of the paper has been changed to: “The politics of decentralisation 
in Mali: the prospects for local democracy” 
- Paper three, “Decentralisation and territorial reorganisation in Mali: power and the 
institutionalisation of local politics” has been accepted for publication in Norsk
Geografisk Tidsskrift
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Introduction
Decentralisation became increasingly popular in many developing countries during the 
1990s. According to Work (2002), it has been estimated that 80 % of developing 
countries are involved in some kind of decentralisation.1 The rise in decentralisation 
initiatives coincides in time with the democratic wave of the 1990s and the increased 
interest in local democratic governance within the international development community. 
The UNCDF’s Local Development Programmes for instance states the potential of 
democratic governance like this: 
There is a growing consensus that democratic governance creates the conditions for 
sustainable development and poverty reduction. Local governments can play a 
major role in this effort by ensuring more effective and accountable local 
infrastructure and service delivery for the poor and by improving the dialogue 
between the state, citizens and their communities, and the private sector2
According to Samoff (1990), decentralisation represented a new turn in development 
thinking in the 1990s. Centralisation of political power had since the 1960s focused on 
the efficient use of limited resources as well as fears that decentralisation would lead to 
ethnic, religious and regional cleavages. The belief in decentralisation as a mechanism to 
promote democratisation and to foster development broke with earlier decades’ focus on 
state-led development. Even though local government reforms have been undertaken in 
Africa since early colonialism, it was not until the 1990s that the association between 
decentralisation and democratisation became explicit. Since colonialism, the relative shift 
between decentralisation and centralisation may be divided into four phases (Olowu 
2001). A policy shift caused by increased focus on decolonisation during the first phase 
1 Ninety-six out of 126 countries included in the World Development Report in 1999 had at least one 
elected sub-national level of government (Work 2002). The numbers also include Eastern and Central 
Europe.
2 http://www.uncdf.org/english/local_development/LDBrochure_English.pdf. Downloaded 5 December 
2006. 
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(1945 – early 1960s) led to the establishment of local government systems with elected 
councils, local tax systems and the involvement of local government in infrastructure 
services. During the early post-colonial second phase (early 1960s – late 1970s), local 
autonomy was reduced in favour of increased centralisation due to new development 
strategies based on socialist ideas. Attempts to consolidate the nation state within the one-
party state also made local governments into instruments of control. During the third 
phase (late 1970s – late 1980s), caused by the economic crises and the adoption of 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), decentralisation came to be seen as a means to 
reduce state expenditure. These reforms did however not pay much attention to the nature 
of the decentralised system and local governments often remained under central national 
control. It was not until the start of the democratic era in Africa in phase four (1990s – 
present) that decentralisation was associated with democratisation. 
The dissertation is first and foremost concerned with the association between 
decentralisation and democratisation in Olowu’s (2001) phase four. It is written as a 
collection of three papers that each discusses the Malian experience in decentralisation 
and democratisation from a particular perspective. The papers are presented in the order 
they have been written. Since the paper format only offers limited space for substantial 
discussions of theoretical and methodological considerations, the function of this 
introduction is to locate them within the overall agenda of the dissertation. Therefore, in 
the next chapter, I discuss the research questions upon which the papers are based and 
how they relate to the overall purpose of the dissertation and to each other with regard to 
analytical focus. In the following chapter, I elaborate on the research design and 
methodological approach that has guided the study as well as methodological challenges 
related to conducting fieldwork in Mali. This is followed by a presentation of the overall 
theoretical framework upon which the dissertation is based. In the last chapter, I outline 
the main case-based conclusions and the theoretical implications of the dissertation. In 
short, the introduction seeks to discuss three main themes; The analytical focus of the 
dissertation (the remainder of this chapter and chapter 2); The analytical approach upon 
which the dissertation is based (chapter 3 and 4); and The analytical findings learned 
from the Malian case (chapter 5).  
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State crisis, democratisation and decentralisation 
The current decentralisation wave is often associated with the economic crises many 
African states encountered from the late 1980s. In a recent review of the factors that 
contributed to a renewed interest in decentralisation in Africa, Olowu (2001) points to the  
increased demands from both non-state domestic actors and from external donors for 
institutional and political reforms that surfaced after the economic and political crises of 
the state in the 1980s. Thus, the recent interest in decentralisation is in many ways linked 
to the increased critique raised against the African state since the beginning of the 1980s 
by development agencies, NGOs, international financial institutions, and from 
researchers (Degnbol 1999).
In more general terms, Harriss, Stokke and Törnquist (2004) points to how glocalisation, 
i.e. simultaneous processes of globalisation and localisation, has reconfigured politics and 
turned the local into a prime site of development. This has reduced state power in favour 
of the market and supranational organisations, but also increased localisation of state 
power. It has among other things brought about institutional reforms based on good 
governance principles (such as decentralisation) articulated through development 
discourses on participation and civil society that aim to strengthen democratisation 
locally. But even though increased focus on decentralisation and democratisation enters 
what Gaudusson and Médard (2001) calls a global ideological movement, they are also 
compatible with local dynamics and demands. Rather than being in opposition to each 
other, the global and the local interact and the global is present in the local. It is in this 
regard they state that “decentralisation…correspond at the same time to both local 
demands… and to global ideological representations” (Gaudusson and Médard 2001, p. 
5, my translation). Furthermore, they argue that the global is transformed by the local and 
that the state has the capacity to instrumentalise both global and local pressure to its own 
benefit. It is this line of reasoning that allow de Sardan to claim that participatory 
development is neither a “miracle solution nor a neo-liberal complot” (2001, p. 146). The 
focus on civil society and local democracy is not solely the result of the ideology of the 
World Bank, but also caused by the crisis of the African state. Thus, democratic 
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decentralisation has at the same time become both a key element in the good governance 
agenda of donors (Olowu 2001) and a possible strategy for African regimes to solve their 
political and economic crises (Mback 2001). 
According to some authors, the reconfiguration of politics has presented particular 
challenges for the post-colonial state in Africa. Gaudusson and Médard (2001) for 
instance, argue that while it has brought about a crisis in the welfare state in Western 
countries, it has led to a double crises in an African context. The first crisis is that of the 
neo-patrimonial state.3 Based on redistribution as a mode of governance, the neo-
patrimonial state constituted an economically efficient mechanism to uphold political 
control. As a result of the economic crises in the 1980s, the fundament of the neo-
patrimonial state was undermined because there were not enough resources to 
redistribute. The second crisis is caused by the conditionalities for political reforms, and 
in particular the good governance agenda, emanating from institutions like the World 
Bank. These reforms seek to dismantle the neo-patrimonial state (depatrimonialisation)
and to reinforce the state’s capacity to act through the implementation of principles based 
on good governance, rule of law and democracy. Increased focus on NGOs, privatisation, 
decentralisation and reforms of public management are all supposed to make the state 
more efficient.
Democratic good governance was at the core of the new orthodoxy that dominated 
Western aid policy in the early 1990s (Leftwich 1993). This represented a new turn in 
development thinking because democracy came to be seen as a precondition for 
development and not, as modernisation theorists argued, an outcome of it. The concept of 
good governance is closely connected to the World Bank and refers to the  
minimum institutional, legal and political conditions of liberal democracy [that] 
from a narrow administrative point of view… means an efficient, open, 
accountable and audited public service which has the bureaucratic competence to 
3 In a neo-patrimonial state, a formal separation between the private and the public spheres exists, but it is 
to a low degree internalised and respected (Médard 1997). Access to the state is the most important factor 
for accumulation of economic resources and political power. As a result, political competition is not solely 
about political power, but also for the access to wealth. The concept will be discussed more in more detail 
in the theoretical framework.  
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help design and implement appropriate policies and manage whatever public sector 
there is (Leftwich 1993, p. 165). 
Even though decentralisation has been popular in Africa since the 1990s, a large body of 
literature that is more critical to its potential benefits is emerging. The good governance 
concept has been criticised for employing a narrow technocratic definition of governance 
that presupposes that there are institutions present to implement and sustain it (Leftwich 
1993). As such, good governance is based on underlying assumptions about the nature of 
the state that does not take questions of power into the account. It is in this line of 
reasoning that Pierre and Peters’ (2000) make the call to go beyond a sterile view of 
political institutions and their relation to the surrounding society. They argue that the 
concept of governance should reorient the attention from the formal politico-
administrative system at the national level towards informal political processes within the 
state and in state-society relations at different levels. This position is in line with 
Harbeson’s (2001) general observation that contemporary democratisation theory focuses 
almost exclusively on horizontal relations at national level at the expense of local 
political processes. Furthermore, Mohan and Stokke’s (2000) warning against the 
“dangers of localism” points to a tendency to romanticise the local and downplay local 
social inequalities and power relations within development theory and practice. Rather 
than isolating the local from broader economic and political structures, focus should be 
directed to the politics of the local and how the local is produced and understood. As 
mentioned in the 3rd paper, there are, according to Harriss et al. (2004), few critical 
studies that focus on the outcome of decentralisation, and when they do, local politics is 
often downplayed. It is based on this line of argument that I in this dissertation seek to 
conduct an intensive qualitative case-study of decentralisation and democratisation in 
Mali that is sensitive to both national and context-specific local level political processes. 
The focus on decentralisation merges elements of development geography and political 
geography and is such placed within an agenda of studies on politics and development in 
human geography. 
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Democratisation and decentralisation in Mali 
The Malian experience in decentralisation and democratisation represents an interesting 
case in an African context. Since the democratic transition in 1991-92 and the 
establishment of the multi-party democratic system Mali is, as mentioned in the 2nd
paper, only one of ten countries in Africa that is classified as free.4 In addition to the 
relative macro-political stability the country has experienced for the last 15 years, 
decentralisation came to play an important role in the democratic project of the first post-
transition regime led by Alpha Oumar Konaré. Constructed as a symbol of the extension 
of democratisation to the local level, it ultimately resulted in the introduction of a 
comprehensive decentralised governance structure in 1999 that brought about important 
reforms of the politico-administrative structures at the local level. Before discussing the 
purpose of the dissertation, I will briefly describe the major lines in the political and 
administrative development in Mali in order to contextualise the subsequent discussion. 
A brief political history of democratisation and decentralisation 
My initial interest for politics in Mali was first directed towards the Tuareg rebellion that 
broke out in 1990 in Northern Mali. It started as an insurgence against the regime of 
Traoré, president of the 2nd Malian Republic5 from 1968 to 1991, led by Malian Tuaregs 
that had spent time in Libya. The peace negotiations between the interim regime and the 
Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l'Azawad (MFUA), the umbrella organisation of the 
rebel movements, resulted in the signing of the Pacte National on 11 April 1992 (Poulton 
and ag Youssouf 1998). The Pacte accorded the three northern regions6 of the country a 
4 According to the Freedom House 2005 report, Mali is accorded a rating of 2 in both political rights and 
civil liberties. The Freedom House “measures freedom according to two broad categories: political rights 
and civil liberties… Each country is assigned a numerical rating…on a scale of 1 to 7. A rating of 1 
indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the least amount of freedom” (Source: www.freedomhouse-
org – downloaded 18 March 2006). 
5 The main époques in Malian political history may be divided according to regime change: 1) The 1st
Republic under the presidency of Modibo Keita lasted from independence in 1960 to his overthrow in a 
military coup led by Moussa Traoré in 1968; 2) The 2nd Republic under the presidency of Moussa Traoré 
lasted from 1968 until his overthrow in a military coup in 1991; 3) The democratic transition lasted for 
approximately 14 months and was governed by a military-civilian interim regime under the presidency of 
Amadou Toumani Touré; and 4) The 3rd Malian Republic was installed after the first democratic elections 
in the country on 8 June 1992. 
6 Mali is administratively divided into 8 regions; Kayes, Sikasso, Koulikoro, Ségou, Mopti, Gao, Timbuktu 
and Kidal. The last three are usually referred to as the three northern regions. 
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particular status, which meant, among other things, the establishment of the 
Commissariat au Nord. A parallel informal peace process supported by Norway that took 
place in the aftermath of the rebellion was the theme for a smaller undergraduate thesis 
presented at the University of Bergen in 1996 (Hetland 1996).
The rebellion had important impacts upon Malian politics. The combined effect of the 
rebellion and the pro-democratic movement that emerged in the capital Bamako 
weakened the regime of Traoré and led, ultimately, to his overthrow in a military coup 
d’état led by Amadou Toumani Touré on 26 March 1991. The election of Alpha Oumar 
Konaré, a prominent figure in the pro-democratic movement, as president of the 3rd
Malian Republic on 8 June 1992 followed a 14 month long democratic transition that 
marked the beginning of a new era in the political history of the country. Furthermore, 
the absolute majority won by Konaré’s party ADEMA in the National Assembly in the 
1992 legislative elections meant that elements of the opposition had gained control of the 
state. Since the democratic transition, there have been three rounds of presidential and 
legislative elections. Alpha Oumar Konaré was re-elected in 1997, but he could not run 
for the 2002 elections due to Malian law limiting the number of periods of a presidential 
mandate to two terms. Power was handed over to the 2002 election winner Amadou 
Toumani Touré. Touré had previously served as interim president during the democratic 
transition. This was the first time that one elected president replaced another elected 
president in Mali.  
The fall of Traoré prior to the transition made it possible to manage it without the 
presence of the previous power holders. In addition to the military coup-makers, the 
interim regime included members from the pro-democratic movement in Bamako and the 
Tuareg rebel movements in the Northern parts of the country. The interim regime was 
consequently rooted in a broad-based military-civilian anti-Traoré coalition and was 
institutionalised in the Comité de Transition pour le Salut du Peuple (CTSP). The 
composition of the CTSP gave both legitimacy to the transition and created the necessary 
political space for demands for political reforms and decentralisation to emerge. These 
demands were expressed on numerous arenas during the democratic transition of which 
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the National Conference (29 July to 12 August 1991) and the Estates-General of the 
Rural World (December 1991) were the most important. As a result of the political 
negotiations during the transition, decentralisation came to be included as a basic 
principle in the new constitution7 elaborated at the National Conference and approved by 
referendum on 12 January 1992. 
After the transition, decentralisation came to constitute a major component in the 
democratic project of the Konaré regime and has consequently played a significant role in 
national politics in Mali. The following passage from a speech given by Konaré 
underlines the importance given to decentralisation as way for the regime to advance 
democratisation: 
I think I may say that for Mali, the last large reform at the end of this century is the 
decentralisation… [It] remains the greatest political justification of 
democratisation, [and] the 701 municipalities of Mali [constitute] as many forums 
and laboratories to the services of democracy and development (MDRI 1998a, p. 
12, my translation). 
The importance accorded to decentralisation in the democratic project of the Konaré 
regime emphasises its political character as a symbol of the extension of the 
democratisation process to the local level. The delegation of the responsibility of the 
elaboration and implementation of the reform to the Mission de Décentralisation et 
Reformes Institutionnelles (MDRI) was of particular importance in this regard because it 
assured top political control over the process. The MDRI was set up as a semi-
autonomous agency with institutional independence from the traditional state apparatus. 
It was initially attached to the prime ministers office, but was later placed directly under 
the presidency. This gave the MDRI the necessary manoeuvring space to fulfil its 
mandate and it assured that particular interests in the traditional state apparatus could not 
influence the process.8 The MDRI was established in 1993 with the mandate to elaborate, 
conceptualise and implement the decentralisation reform. Initially, its initial five-member 
7 Article 97 and 98 
8 Of particular importance in this regard was its independence from the Ministère d’Administration 
Territorial et Collectvités Locale, the ministry responsible for state administration on regional, cercle 
(district) and arrondissement levels. 
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team was given a one-year mandate to explore the possibilities to carry out such a reform 
(Diarra 1998, pers. comm. 9). Its mandate was later prolonged and its area of 
responsibility was expanded to include institutional reforms in general. The MDRI also 
played an important role for the regime in the justification of the decentralisation reform 
as an extension of the democratisation process. According to Sy for instance, the first 
leader of the MDRI, the democratisation project in Mali:
comprise an ambitious reform program for territorial decentralisation […] Rising 
from the recommendations of the National Conference…this reform seek to deepen 
the multi-party democracy by adapting the administration to the objective of a new 
development framework based on the preoccupations, resources and know-how of 
the local population. In order to concretise this political will, the government has 
instituted an ad hoc structure named Mission de Décentralisation with the overall 
goal of assisting the implementation of the decentralisation reform by defining the 
legal framework and determining the conditions of its feasibility (MDRI 1997a, p. 
4, my translation). 
Ultimately, the reform crystallised into concrete politico-administrative change after the 
1999 municipal elections whit the establishment of 682 new rural municipalities. For 
many, it held the promise of a more inclusive and democratic governance system than 
under the post-colonial one-party regimes. 
The decentralisation reform replaced in many ways the Pacte National for the northern 
parts of the country. This directed my field of interest from the Tuareg rebellion to the 
decentralisation reform in general and became the subject for my M. phil-thesis (Hetland 
2000). During the initial phase of the PhD dissertation, the interest turned towards state 
reform in general and in particular the relation between democratisation and 
decentralisation. This was inspired by the increased interest in the link between 
democratisation and decentralisation in Africa, but also the centrality accorded to 
decentralisation in the democratic project of the Konaré regime. The relative stability of 
the macro-political democratic regime that was introduced in 1992 and the introduction 
of the extensive decentralisation reform in 1999 added further to the image of Mali as a 
successful case in an African context and was an important reason why I wanted to 
9 Nöel Diarra, Deputy manager of the MDRI, interview on 7 September 1998. 
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examine this theme more thoroughly. Another reason for the interest in state reform was 
related to the various power-abuse practices on the part of the state that had characterised 
the Traoré regime. This ranged from the personal wealth of the president and his family, 
the Drought Palaces financed through emergency relief funds in Bamako to the 
corruption within state agencies like the Forest Services at the local level. An important 
fundamental question that caught my attention concerned the possibilities to overcome 
these practices through reforms based on decentralisation and democratisation. However, 
before I outline the purpose of the dissertation and the particular research questions that 
are asked, it is necessary to outline the institutional characteristics of the new 
decentralised local government system in Mali. 
Local government and decentralisation: the reform 
The introduction of the decentralised government system after the 1999 local elections 
led to an extensive spatial and scalar reconfiguration of the institutional and political 
landscape in Mali. Of particular importance in this regard was the preparatory work made 
by the MDRI; the large-scale participatory territorial reorganisation of the political-
administrative subdivision of the country that led to the establishment of a new municipal 
structure; and the elaboration of decentralisation laws that define the institutional design 
of the local government system. 
The large-scale participatory territorial reorganisation carried out in the mid-1990s 
represented an important innovation when it comes to local government reforms in Mali. 
Based on the idea that the existing administrative structure was incongruent with local 
political and social realities, the main objective was to break up the political-
administrative boundaries of the former lowest administrative level of the 
arrondissement. The process is best understood as a bottom-up reform controlled from 
above that started with the creation of the municipality. The territorial reorganisation of 
the cercle and region was carried out in a second phase and was conditioned by the 
creation of the new municipal structure. To a certain degree, the new municipalities could 
choose themselves which cercle and region they wanted to be part of (if they were 
located in a border zone). In order to create the new municipalities, village and nomadic 
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community leaders country-wide were mobilised by the MDRI-initiated support 
structures to participate in negotiations over the composition of the new municipalities, 
that is, which villages and fractions that should constitute a new municipality. This meant 
that it was not territory in itself, but social membership in a village or a fraction that was 
the point of departure for the process. The new political-administrative system replaced 
the former three-tier administrative system on regional, cercle and arrondissement level 
that had been introduced during the 1st Malian Republic (1960-68) under the presidency 
of Modibo Keita. The territorial reorganisation led to the abolishment of the 
arrondissement and the construction of the municipality as a local politico-administrative 
unit that should be based on existing community solidarity. The overall goal was to create 
municipalities that were homogenous, coherent and functional territorial units of a 
suitable size for local democracy and the management of local affairs that had legitimacy 
among those who were to inhabit them (MDRI 1994). It was seen, by the MDRI, as a 
necessary precondition for the devolution of authority to the decentralised institutions.  
Since local government reforms have often coincided with regime change in Mali, it is 
not possible to understand these reforms without reference to the wider political context 
in which they were undertaken. The reforms undertaken by Keita led to the abolishment 
of the colonial cantons as administrative units because the regime sought to marginalise 
the political opposition that had been supported by the canton chiefs prior to 
independence and because the regime sought to extend the reach of the state locally. As 
discussed in the 2nd paper, the post-colonial state sought in a much larger degree than the 
French colonisers to micro-manage local political process through both the one-party 
state and the state administration. It is in this context that the three-tier administrative 
structure in place until the 1999 reform was implemented by the Keita regime. The 
administrative units on regional, cercle and arrondissement levels were all headed by 
state appointed bureaucrats that were upwardly accountable to the central state. During 
the 2nd Republic (1968-1991), under the presidency of Moussa Traoré, there was a large 
degree of continuity in the basic administrative structures except for the decentralisation 
reform undertaken in 1977. This reform established partly elected local councils and 
development committees with civil servants as members (République du Mali 1992). The 
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devolution aspect of the reform was however undermined because the local councils, 
which were supposed to make decisions, were dominated by the development committees 
and by the state administration representative in the circumscription (who was appointed 
by central state authority). As a result, this reform did not bring about any new power-
sharing arrangements in the form of devolution or increased participation. The 
introduction of the 1999 decentralisation reform, which corresponds to Olowu’s fourth 
wave, represents a qualitative change compared to these earlier systems. The 
establishment of elected and partly autonomous decentralised institutions at the local 
level and the beginning of devolution of authority have generated new relation between 
the central state and local government institutions based on power-sharing and, at least in 
theory, the creation of downwardly accountable local decision-making bodies. As such, it 
has opened up for increased participation locally. 
The institutional set-up of the new decentralisation arrangement in Mali is defined in two 
main decentralisation laws. The first of these is law 93-008 “déterminant les conditions 
de la libre administration des collectivités territoriales” approved on 11 February 1993. It 
describes the fundamental principles of the local government system and is the guiding 
principles for national decentralisation policy (MDRI 1998a). The decentralised units are 
defined, in French, as “collectivité territoriale” (CT) on four different levels; the region, 
the cercle10 (district), the municipality (urban and rural) and the District de Bamako. The 
concept of CT refers to a political-administrative entity that is given a juridical 
personality (as a public corporation) that, under the conditions envisaged by the law, 
enjoys certain rights and obligations. Among these is the principle of free administration 
(called libre administration in French) by elected assemblies or councils that select its 
own executive organ. There are no hierarchical relations between the different levels of 
CT and each of them has their own budget and staff. The law also states another 
important principle that is supposed to assure the independence and autonomy of the 
CTs; when the state devolves functions to the CTs, it has to transfer the concomitant 
10 I have throughout the dissertation referred to this administrative and political level with the French 
denomination cercle (rather than the English term district) for two reasons; because it is a widely used term 
in Mali; and to avoid confusion with the denomination of the District de Bamako (which has a particular 
juridical status within the local government system).  
  Introduction 
13
amount of resources and means to fulfil these functions. This was by the MDRI 
considered as essential to assure that the CTs would be capable to fulfil the functions they 
are transferred from the state.  
The second decentralisation law, no. 95-034 “portant code des collectivités territoriales 
en République du Mali”, delineates more precisely the jurisdiction of the CTs. Of 
particular importance in this regard is the possibility of the CT to elaborate its own 
Economic, Social and Cultural Development Program. The municipal council (which 
consist of 11 to 45 members depending on the size of the municipality) is furthermore to 
be elected in universal suffrage. The representatives at the cercle council are selected 
among the municipal councils within the cercle, while the regional assembly 
representatives are chosen from the cercle councils. The law also specify the devolution 
of responsibility to assure specific functions and decision-making power. The MDRI 
publication “La stratégie des transferts de compétence”, underlines the importance of this 
principle: “in order to go from a formal decentralisation to a real decentralisation, it is 
necessary to confer to the local community the concrete prerogatives in matters that 
concerns local affairs” (MDRI 1997b, p. 4). An important characteristic of the new 
decentralised governance system in terms of devolution of functions is that the 
municipality is supposed to fulfil a more important role than the CTs at cercle and 
regional level. Two types of functions are devolved to the municipalities. The first 
concerns functions that, because of their nature, were automatically transferred after the 
local elections in 1999. These included administrative tasks related to marital status, 
censuses, archives and documentation and public hygiene. The second concerns more 
complex and important functions that demands extensive preparation on the part of the 
authorities and that are subject to the principle of progressive transfer. In the above-
mentioned MDRI publication, a 32-page list of possible functions to transfer to the 
municipalities from 6 line ministries was identified.11 Other competencies to be 
11 The following ministries were included: Ministry of Health, Solidarity and Old People; Ministry of 
Public Work and Transport; Ministry of Urbanism and Habitat; Ministry of Rural Development and 
Environment; Ministry of Mines, Energy and Hydraulics; and the Ministry of Primary Education. 
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transferred are extensive and include general functions12 and sector specific functions 
within the areas of education13, health14, and transport and public work15  (MDRI 1998b). 
This step-by-step approach to devolution is chosen, according to Malian authorities, to 
assure that decentralised institutions have the necessary capacity to fulfil these functions 
before the functions are transferred. Following the implementation of the reform in 1999, 
the devolution of authority and functions to the municipal institutions began. The 
municipalities took immediately over several functions from the state administration that 
previously had been the highest administrative and political authority locally. Currently, 
the transfer of functions from line ministries to the decentralised institutions is a process 
that still is underway. The limited progress in devolving functions to the CTs, as 
discussed in the papers, represents one of the most important institutional challenges for 
the whole decentralised governance system at this moment. 
The establishment of the decentralised governance system has been accompanied by the 
reforms of the state administrative system (MDRI 1998b). At each of the three 
decentralised levels there will be a state appointee that represent the national interest and 
that monitor the application of laws, rules, and decisions of the central government. The 
tutelary role implies that the state is supposed to control the legality of the activities and 
deliberations taken by the decentralised units (that is, the Municipal council, the Cercle 
council or the Regional Assembly). In certain cases the control is exercised before the 
decisions are executed, particularly if the state is implicated (the municipal budget, the 
establishment of municipal enterprises, town or country planning, fixation of municipal 
taxes and loans).16 The system is organised in such a way that the Ministry of Territorial 
Administration and Local Collectives (MATCL) assures the tutelage on the Regional 
12 Such as the elaboration of the economic, social and cultural development plan, the municipal budget, 
municipal services, natural resource management, administrative police, socio-economic infrastructure and 
environment. 
13 Pre-scholar education, alphabetisation and primary education. 
14 Dispensaries, maternity centres, community health centres and cleansing. 
15 Road infrastructure, municipal communication and public transport, urban and rural hydraulic work as 
well as sport, art and culture. 
16 In exceptional cases, the tutelage might also be directed towards the deliberating organs themselves. If 
the Mayor and the municipal council no longer are capable of assuming their responsibilities, measures of 
suspension, dismissal or dissolution might be necessary. Dissolution of the municipal council is only 
possible when it is reduced to 2/3 of its origin members. In this case the council is replaced by a special 
delegation of seven members appointed in Conseil de Ministre. 
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Assembly, the High Commissionaire  (former governor) assure the same functions vis-à-
vis the cercle council, while the préfet (former commandant de cercle) at the cercle level 
assure tutelage vis-à-vis the municipal council. The role of the sous-préfet (former chef
d’arrondissement) is to report irregularities that might occur in the municipality to the 
préfet. The state representative is also responsible for providing the CTs with support and 
advice, which means that the state is obliged to put its technical services at the disposition 
of the CT. 
The introduction of the decentralisation reform and the simultaneous reforms of various 
state agencies has moved the centre of power locally away from state administration 
towards the elected municipal council. As such it has led to a scalar and spatial 
reconfiguration of the state in Mali and it has opened up the local political space for 
participation and political competition. The decentralisation reform introduced in 1999 
will be at the centre of analysis in the remainder of the dissertation.  
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Purpose and research questions 
The important role accorded to decentralisation in the democratic project of the Konaré 
regime constituted the initial motivation for this dissertation. Not only did the 
commitment to decentralisation represent a rupture with the centralising tendencies of the 
previous one-party regimes in Mali, but it also reflects current international discourses on 
democracy and decentralisation. However, as referred to in the 2nd paper, there are often 
large discrepancies between reform rhetoric and the administrative and political benefits 
of such reforms (Boone 2003). It is therefore necessary to focus on what she calls “the 
politics of decentralisation”, that is to say, the events and processes that influence the 
outcome of the reform rather than reform rhetoric per se. Based on this initial 
observation, the overall purpose of the dissertation has been formulated as follows; 
The main purpose of the dissertation is to examine the politics of the 
decentralisation reform in Mali and the outcome of decentralisation in terms of local 
democratic governance 
In order to accomplish this purpose, the analysis has been organised in three main papers 
that discusses decentralisation in Mali from a particular perspective. Each of the papers is 
placed thematically within the overall purpose of the dissertation, but they are all to be 
considered as independent works based on their proper research questions. In the 
following discussion, I will present the rationale upon which the three papers is based, 
and how they relate to the overall purpose of the dissertation and to each other with 
regard to analytical focus. The research questions have developed as the theoretical and 
empirical knowledge of the subject has become more extensive and are related to both the 
nature of the Malian case and to recent theoretical debates on decentralisation and 
democratisation in an African context.  
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The 1st paper is called “The historicity of political institutions and practices – democratic 
consolidation and political continuity in Mali”. It is concerned with the question of 
democratic consolidation, a theme that became a central issue regarding the survival of 
the African regimes that went through democratic transitions in the early 1990s. After 
several decades of one-party rule in many African countries, the democratic wave raised 
expectations in terms of development and rising living standards for the many poor on the 
continent. This was also the case in Mali. After some 30 years of one-party rule, Mali 
was still one of the poorest countries in the world. The democratic transition brought a lot 
of enthusiasm to the country due to the prospects for democratic reforms. The 
implementation of the decentralised governance system in 1999 added to the rising 
expectations of bringing decision-making power closer to the people. Furthermore, the 
Malian democratic experience has been applauded internationally and the democratic 
regime seems to be relatively institutionally and politically stable. But despite the relative 
stability, the regime faces a wide range of challenges regarding democratic consolidation. 
Based on these initial observations, the research question that guides the first paper is:
What are the prospects for democratic consolidation in Mali after the democratic 
transition in the early 1990s?  
In this paper I seek to go beyond a simple institutional and cultural approach to 
consolidation. Although studies of macro-political structures (the institutional 
perspective) or on whether or not democracy has any meaning to people (the cultural 
approach) are important, I want in this paper to bring the historicity of and the mutual 
interdependence between political institutions and political practices into the discussion 
of democratic consolidation. The main argument in the paper is that a particular focus on 
the historicity of institutions and practices with particular emphasis on institution-
building strategies, state-society relations and informal political processes will allow for a 
more context-specific analysis of democratic consolidation.
The paper takes the democratic transition and the following democratisation process in 
Mali as point of departure. The fall of Traoré prior to the transition and the rise to power 
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of elements of the pro-democratic movement, held the promise of far-reaching 
democratic reforms. Furthermore, decentralisation was, in the official discourse of the 
new democratic regime, explicitly forwarded as an important mechanism to obtain both 
democratisation and development. However, local government reforms have also 
previously been carried through during regime change in Mali and have played an 
important strategic role in regime’s attempts to build and maintain hegemonic control 
over the state. Thus, in the first paper, I discuss the role of local government reforms as 
part of larger national political strategies in order to put the present decentralisation 
reform, and in particular the prospects for democratic consolidation, in a historical-
political context.  
The historical and political aspects of local government reforms are of course 
interweaved but may be separated analytically. The historical aspect refers to already 
existing local government institutions and previous reforms of these structures, the 
relative opening and closure of the local political space that result from these reforms and 
existing state-society relations that have been created and transformed in this process. 
The political aspects refer to the close connection between regime change and local 
government reforms as well as transformations of and continuity in political practices that 
characterises the internal functioning of state institutions. The paper traces the 
transformation of and mutual interdependence between political institutions and political 
practices as a result of administrative reforms under French colonial rule, during the post-
colonial era and in the post-transition phase.
While the 1st paper is concerned with the democratic consolidation and the historicity of 
institutions and practices, the 2nd paper directs attention to the democratic transition and 
the centrality of decentralisation in the democratic project of the Konaré regime. It is 
called “The politics of decentralisation in Mali: the democratic potential of 
decentralisation”, and is based on the following research questions: 
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Why and how did decentralisation gain such a pre-dominant place in the 
democratic project of the Konaré regime and what is the democratic potential of 
decentralisation? 
This question originates from the observation that widespread demands for 
decentralisation were raised during the democratic transition. The paper examines first 
why these demands for decentralisation were appropriated and turned into a major 
component of the democratic project of the Konaré regime. The main argument is that the 
portrayal of decentralisation as an extension of democratisation to the local level 
constituted an important strategy for the new regime to consolidate its power. Since the 
anti-Traoré coalition, of which Konaré was part, had based its opposition on claims for 
democracy, the portrayal of decentralisation as an extension of the democratisation 
process served to build legitimacy for the new regime. At the same time it served as an 
important strategy to maintain its alliances with the other groups from the pro-democratic 
movement and in particular the rebel movements. The subsequent discussion of how 
decentralisation came to play an important role in the political project of the Konaré 
regime directs attention to the nature of democratic transition and in particular the 
political manoeuvring space created by the absence of the former power holders from the 
transition. In short, the argument is that the nature of the transition made it possible to set 
up a semi-autonomous agency that was independent of the traditional state structure, the 
Mission de décentralisation et réformes institutionnelles (MDRI). This establishment of 
this agency made it possible to elaborate and implement a comprehensive decentralised 
governance structure that led to extensive spatial and scalar reconfiguration of the state. 
At the same time, the reform was legitimised through an active construction of 
decentralisation as a symbol of and a revitalisation of an idealised pre-colonial 
decentralised Mali that would serve as a mechanism through which to democratise the 
state.
Secondly, the paper discusses the democratic potential of decentralisation in a long-term 
perspective based on the observation that it was an important component of the regime’s 
democratic project. The paper discusses major challenges in the spatial and scalar 
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reconfiguration of the state with particular attention accorded to institutional bottlenecks 
(lack of devolution) and politicisation of local relations (clientelism and exclusion). In a 
long term perspective, I argue, these challenges may lead to a dislocation of the centre of 
power away from the municipal institutions towards a recentralisation in favour of the 
state administration or an increased informalisation of politics that may shift the centre of 
power towards groups outside the formal political arena.  
The 3rd paper is entitled “Decentralisation and territorial reorganisation in Mali: power 
and the institutionalisation of local politics” and is based on the following research 
question:
What is the outcome of decentralisation in terms of local democratic governance? 
While the 2nd paper is mostly concerned with decentralisation and its role in national 
politics, this paper examines the top-down introduction of municipal institutions in local 
political contexts. The paper discusses first how local political relations and identities 
influenced the outcome of the large-scale participatory territorial reorganisation carried 
through in the mid-1990s. Even though the reorganisation sought to establish 
circumscriptions suitable for local democratic governance, the argument runs, the new 
municipalities were the result of the reconstruction of the political space from below. 
Secondly, the paper proceeds to discuss the institutionalisation of the local governance 
structure from a local point of view with particular emphasise on natural resource 
management. The main argument is that the institutionalisation is the function of both 
local struggles over leadership and authority and political processes at national level. 
In short, the division of labour between the papers is as follows. In the 1st paper focus is 
on continuity in political institutions and political practices with particular attention 
accorded to local government reforms from the colonial era, through the post-colonial 
one-party state and to the multi-party political era that followed the democratic transition 
in the early 1990s. In the 2nd paper, focus is directed to the role of decentralisation as a 
political strategy in the democratic project of the Konaré regime. In the 3rd paper, the 
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prospect for local democracy as a result of decentralisation is analysed from a local point 
of view. Thus, the 1st and 2nd papers seek primarily to discuss the first part of the overall 
purpose of the dissertation, that is, the politics of the decentralisation reform in Mali. The 
3rd paper seeks first and foremost to examine the second part of the overall purpose, that 
is, the outcome of decentralisation in terms of local democratic governance.
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Research design and methodology 
This chapter outlines the research design and the methodological approach upon which the 
dissertation is based. In its most basic form, it has been designed as an intensive qualitative 
single-case study inspired by critical realist methodology. The choice of research design is 
closely connected to the overall purpose of the dissertation and has made it possible to 
examine the politics of the decentralisation reform in Mali and the outcome of 
decentralisation in terms of local democratic governance. In this chapter, I will discuss the 
qualitative case-study design, methodological challenges related to the use of realist concepts 
and methodologies in doing research on decentralisation, the collection of primary data during 
fieldworks, the use of secondary sources of information, and particular challenges related to 
doing fieldwork in Mali based on theories of positionality.
Research design: qualitative case-study 
Designing the dissertation as an intensive qualitative case-study has been necessary to 
examine the complexity of the relation between democratisation and decentralisation. As such 
it complies with Ragin’s definition of qualitative research: 
Almost all qualitative research seeks to construct representations based on in-depth, 
detailed knowledge of cases, often to correct misrepresentations or to offer new 
representations of the research subject. Thus, qualitative researchers share an interest in 
procedures that clarify key aspects of research subjects – procedures that make it 
possible to see aspects of cases that might otherwise be missed (Ragin 1994, p. 92). 
Combined with a case-study approach, the qualitative research design allows for a detailed 
examination of the complex ways in which decentralisation and democratisation are knit 
together. Case-studies are generally the preferred strategy when “how” and “why” questions 
are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on 
a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context (Yin 1994). As a consequence, the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not always distinguishable. When it comes 
to decentralisation in Mali, several aspects of the reform have changed during the course of 
Research design and methodology 
24
the study. This is for instance the case with regard to the institutionalisation of the reform in 
local political contexts and political processes within ministries that affect the transfer of 
functions to the municipalities. Because there is a range of factors that influence the reform in 
a long-term perspective, and that it is not always the same factors that dominate, it is difficult 
to differentiate between the reform in itself and contextual influence. This has, along the 
development of a more profound understanding of the case as the project has moved forward, 
allowed reinterpretations of both the reform itself as well as the relative importance of 
changes in contextual factors. Therefore, the study has been designed in order to make it 
possible to examine changes that influence the reform over time. In addition, a case-study also 
has to cope with situations when there will be more new leads to follow than there will be 
available data, and, as result, findings have to rely on multiple sources that need to converge 
in what Yin (1994) calls a triangulation fashion. This is for instance the reason why fieldwork 
has been conducted both at national, regional and local level over a long period of time.  
Theory has also played a part in the development of the research design. In particular two 
roles identified by Yin (1994) as relevant within a case-study approach have been important. 
Firstly, theories have contributed to the design of the research strategy that took place prior to 
fieldwork. The intensive case-study approach to studying decentralisation in an African 
context is inspired by Bilgin and Morton’s (2002) focus on the historical and contemporary 
factors that influence state formation, and Bayart’s (1991) call to take into account the 
political trajectory of the state over a long durée. This has in turn directed attention to the 
historicity of the post-colonial state, the state’s institution-building strategies and 
transformation of state-society relations over time. The lack of focus on local politics in 
studies of decentralisation, identified by Harriss et al. (2004), has inspired the analysis of the 
outcome of decentralisation in different localities in Mali (these localities are presented in the 
next section). Focus on local level politics is furthermore legitimised by the observation that 
decentralisation in itself involves the introduction of local government institutions. Thus, the 
selection of multiple cases within the overarching single case has made it possible to compare 
the outcome of decentralisation in different local contexts.  
Secondly, theory has been used to elaborate analytical generalisations based on the case. It is 
important to underline that these generalisations should not be confused with statistical 
generalisations that seek to draw conclusions from empirical data collected from a population. 
Rather, theory serves as a point of reference for the analysis of the findings that emerge from 
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the case-study. As such, the single-case study is complementary to what Ragin (1994) calls 
analytical induction. Analytical induction is a research strategy that points to information that 
challenges the image a researcher is constructing of a case and as such is concerned with the 
refinement and elaboration of the research subject. Conceptual refinement that provides 
deeper understanding of the subject will make it possible to develop an in-depth 
understanding of the case. Another important methodological question to consider in this 
regard is what can be said on the basis of a single case. At one level, the dissertation seeks to 
oppose a too simplified vision of the relation between democratisation and decentralisation by 
entering a detailed study of one case. At a more theoretical level, the findings from this case 
may inform wider debates within political geography concerning themes such as the 
transformation of the post-colonial African state, state-society relations, state formation, and 
democratisation. In order to contextualise these questions more thoroughly I will, in the next 
section, present the methodological considerations that have influenced this case-study. 
Critical realism – methodological considerations 
At the beginning of this project I became inspired by elements of critical realist methodology. 
This was partly the result of a PhD course I attended at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the 
University of Oslo called the “Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences”. The 
course led to the presentation of a paper called “Neo-Kantianism, Weber’s ideal type and 
critical realism - some methodological implications for studying decentralisation” (Hetland 
2002). The paper constitutes the point of departure for the presentation of critical realism in 
this chapter, but has been modified during the course of the study.
My interest in critical realism has also been influenced by the attention it has received within 
human geography. Since the early 1980s, realism came to serve as a philosophical guide to 
research in human geography (Cloke, Philo and Sadler 1991). The reason for this popularity 
has been ascribed to different factors; it offered a philosophy of science for an anti-positivist 
post-quantitative geography; it was possible to combine with calls for research on local 
specificities; and it was a way to connect geography closer to general social theory (Mäki and 
Oinas 2004). In particular the point about research on local specificities has had an important 
influence on this project and is closely connected to the case-study argument made above. 
Critical realism has in addition offered a conceptual framework that has facilitated reflection 
upon the subject of the dissertation and it has offered methodological tools with regard to how 
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I have approached my field of study. However, before I elaborate in more detail how it has 
influenced this dissertation, I will outline some of the main characteristics of critical realism 
as a philosophy of science. 
In short, critical realism can be described as a “philosophy of science based on the use of 
abstraction to identify the (necessary) causal powers and liabilities of specific structures,
which are realised under specific (contingent) conditions” (Gregory 1986 in Cloke et al. 
1991). According to Bhaskar, realism should be a mix of a non-atomistic ontology (allowing 
for the existence of structures, processes and mechanisms that can be revealed at different 
levels of reality), and a non-empiricist epistemology (it challenges the empiricist conception 
of causality). Following Bhaskar (1975), it may be useful to position critical realism as part of 
three main positions identified within the history of the philosophy of sciences. In classical 
empiricism, the objects of knowledge are, in the last instance, no more than singular events. 
The other position attained its classical formulation in Kant’s transcendental idealism. Within 
this position, the objects of scientific knowledge are, for instance, models and patterns of the 
natural order. These objects are artificial constructions, and even though they may be 
independent of particular human beings, they are not independent of human activity generally. 
The third position, which is that of Bhaskar, may be labelled transcendental realism. The 
objects of knowledge are considered to be the structures and mechanisms that generate 
phenomena, as well as knowledge produced within scientific communities. These objects are 
neither phenomena (empiricism) nor human constructs placed on the phenomena (idealism), 
but real structures that endures over time and operates without our knowledge of them, 
independent of our experiences as well as the conditions that gives us access to them. Thus, in 
opposition to empiricism, the objects of knowledge are seen as structures and not events, and 
in contrast to idealism, they are intransitive.17
One of the basic ideas of critical realism is that the world exists largely independent of 
thought, and our knowledge of it is always theory-laden (Sayer 1992). The idealist asks the 
question: “What are the conditions of possibility of experience?”, and the answer is that 
people use mental constructs to organise complex evidence, to give it shape and to identify 
connections and patterns (Smith 1998). Realists also accept that we organise our experience 
17 Intransitive objects of knowledge are independent of human activity (for instance, the weight of a particular 
metal) (Bhaskar 1975). Transitive objects of knowledge are the raw material of science – the artificial objects 
that the science in question has formed to be objects of analysis. This includes recognized facts and theories, 
paradigms and models, research methods and techniques available to a scientific community. 
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imaginatively, but asks another transcendental question: “What are the conditions of 
possibility of science (or rather the scientific method)”. Therefore, the transcendental realism 
of Bhaskar is different from Kant’s transcendental idealism in two ways (Danermark, 
Ekström, Jakobsen and Karlsson 1997, p. 153); 1. Bhaskar disagrees with idealism, and 
argues that our knowledge about the reality is possible only because the reality is constituted 
in a certain way. He suggests that we should seek the transcendental preconditions not in the 
mind (as idealists do) but in reality as it exists independent of our search for knowledge (the 
intransitive domain); and 2. Bhaskar does not, as Kant, seek to describe universal 
preconditions for our knowledge about reality. The transcendental knowledge is, as all 
knowledge, fallible. This is because the structures we try to understand through a 
transcendental argumentation are themselves in transformation. It is useful to contrast these 
perspectives by introducing their view of causality.
Causality
Within empiricism, causal laws are identified as empirical regularities18 between two or more 
variables that take place at the same time (Smith 1998). Hence, the perceptions we have of 
events and the events themselves are not distinguished within empiricism. Consequently, a 
scientific explanation can be based upon two or more things happening in a regular way. 
Empiricists also assume that facts and values are separate, observation is separate from 
theory, and those explanations are symmetrical with predictions. This is often referred to as 
regularity determinism. Idealists have a different conception of causality. An empirical 
regularity is a useful starting point and a necessary part of any causal explanation, but is not 
itself sufficient for establishing a causal law (Smith 1998). This acknowledges the complexity 
of causal factors in any empirical situation but raises problems in terms of making accurate 
predictions. This view of causality is labelled intelligibility determinism. The neo-Kantian 
branch of idealism has a different view of the relationship between theory and observation 
than empiricism. For them, theoretical statements identify relationships between variables and 
organise complex empirical evidence in ideal types as devices for comparison. 
The realist view of causality is labelled ubiquity determinism (Smith 1998). It is argued that 
an empirical regularity is neither sufficient nor necessary for establishing a causal law. The 
realist view of causality is closely linked to their ontology. For a realist, reality consists of 
three levels (empirical, actual and real or deep), which are to be distinguished if we are to 
18 A constant conjunction of events between two variables; that is: if x then y.
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understand how things work. The empirical level of perceptions, impressions and sensations 
is distinguished from the actual level of events and states of affairs, which are the products of 
the imaginative practices of people making sense of the world. Realists accept that the 
empirical and actual levels are out of phase with each other, but they also pose the existence 
of a third deeper level upon which the other two levels are based, that is, the empirical and the 
actual are not possible without the underlying realm of structures, mechanisms and 
powers/liabilities. Structures, which exist independently of our knowledge of them, are 
defined as relations between the parts of an object and give the objects their characteristic 
properties. Mechanisms portray the way in which the structure of an object can, within 
definite conditions, generate an observable event. The powers/liabilities of the structure of an 
object will ensure that the object has the capacity to do certain things in certain conditions and 
that it is susceptible to effects from the same or different conditions; these conditions are 
themselves made up of other structures and their mechanisms. 
Therefore, the core of realist epistemology is the search for causal mechanisms rather than 
empirical regularities. This conception of causality differs from that of positivism (Cloke et 
al. 1991). In realism, causality (the real) does not necessarily follow pattern (the actual), nor 
does it necessarily follow experience (the empirical). The positivist conception of causality on 
the other hand collapses the real, the actual and the empirical into one level. In consequence, 
an empirical regularity is neither sufficient nor necessary for establishing a causal law for 
realists (Smith 1998). The structures at work in a given situation, which can generate 
mechanisms in certain conditions, are not always producing events for us to experience. Sayer 
(1992) distinguishes subsequently between necessary causal relations and contingent 
conditions. The necessary causal powers are mutually constituted internal relations of an 
object. Contingent conditions refer to the time- and place-specific context within which the 
necessary relations operate. These conditions determine whether and how the necessary 
causal relations are activated. Hence, the causal powers are activated under specific 
contingent conditions and manifested in concrete events. 
The use of critical realism in human geography has however recently been debated (in a series 
of four articles in Environment and Planning A, volume 36, 2004). In particular the article 
written by Mäki and Oinas (2004) provide the most general criticism. Their critic refers first 
and foremost to the gap between realism as it has been conceptualised in human geography 
(or GeoRealism as they call it) and how philosophers of science have used it (which they label 
  Research design and methodology
   
29
CoreRealism). In short, they state, GeoRealism has moved away from CoreRealism in two 
respects. First, GeoRealism has ignored many conceptual and argumentative resources of 
CoreRealism resulting in what they call resource narrowness.19 Secondly, GeoRealism has 
added three components that have resulted in what they call domain narrowness, that is, the 
use of a smaller domain of theories and methodologies than CoreRealism.20 Their argument is 
however not that GeoRealism is incompatible with CoreRealism, but that it “represents 
specific and narrow conceptualisations that appear to rule out other views that are equally 
consistent with realism” (Mäki and Oinas 2004). In his answer to the criticism, Sayer (2004) 
points out that the thin version (i.e. CoreRealism) that Mäki and Oinas (2004) favours does 
not much to help social scientists. Although he agrees that the thin version of realism is 
necessary, thicker versions (GeoRealism) are more helpful: 
Minimalist realism therefore fails to offer the critical insight which thicker versions 
provide – about causation, closed and open systems, stratification and emergence, 
interpretative understanding, critique, and so on (Sayer 2004, p. 1781). 
With this criticism in mind, I will in the next section develop in more detail some elements of 
critical realism based on Sayer (1992) that are relevant for the methodology and research 
strategies that have influenced this study. 
Critical realism and decentralisation: research questions and strategies
Critical realism has inspired the dissertation when it comes to the type of questions that have 
been asked as well as research strategies. One central question that has guided the study is 
whether or not it is possible to identify any general underlying structures and mechanisms that 
influence the outcome of decentralisation in terms of democratisation in the Malian case. This 
question may refer to whether it is possible to identify variations or similarities in the 
underlying structures between localities that may affect spatial variations with regard to the 
outcome of decentralisation in different local contexts. In more concrete terms this may refer 
19 GeoRealism has ignored three key questions in CoreRealism which include: 1) A too strong focus on the 
nature of existents rather than the nature of existence (their particular view on necessary and contingent 
conditions); 2) It has dropped the nonepistemic view of truth (the view that truth is not dependent on how we 
recognise it) by either ignoring questions or truth or, as Sayer does, introducing the concept of practical 
adequacy; and 3) It has ignored aspects of epistemological realism (underdetermination is an example Mäki and 
Oinas (2004) give). 
20 It has adopted a particular understanding of causation (the conceptualisation of necessary and contingent 
conditions for instance) which is only one form of causal realism); 2) It adheres often to a particular view of 
society (structuration theory); and 3) The employment of a particular realist methodology of research (their critic 
of critical realist methodology is first and foremost directed towards the identification of necessary relations 
(through abstract research) and contingent relations (through concrete research)). 
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to, as discussed in the 3rd paper, questions of identity based on autochthony or the influence of 
existing natural resource management systems. This type of questions may not be possible to 
answer fully, but it has nevertheless served as a guide for the examination of the purpose of 
the thesis and the research questions that are posed in the papers. Even though it is not likely 
that it is possible to find one overall explanatory factor, the attempt to identify structures 
through abstraction has served as a guide to identify tendencies regarding the relation between 
decentralisation and democratisation. 
In research inspired by critical realism, events are, according to Sayer (1992), causally 
explained by retroducing and confirming the existence of mechanisms. The existence of 
mechanisms is in turn explained with reference to the structure and constitution of the objects 
that possess them. Social science is often concerned with explaining complex social 
phenomena as wars, or, as in my case, the relation between decentralisation and 
democratisation. The different kinds of research strategies identified within critical realism 
constitute guidelines for dealing with complex phenomena and have been employed at 
different stages throughout the study. They are composed of a different mix of theoretical and 
empirical research on one side and abstract and concrete research on the other. Abstract 
theoretical research is concerned “with the constitution and possible ways of acting of social 
objects” (Sayer 1992, p. 236). It is concerned with the structures and mechanisms of objects, 
while events are only considered as possible outcomes. It implies the isolation in thought of a 
one-sided or partial aspect of an object and refers to a particular relationship between causal 
powers and an object of study. Concrete practical research deals with actual events and 
objects, treating them as phenomena that have been brought about by specific mechanisms 
and structures (each of which will have been identified and examined through abstract 
research). As such, concrete research implies the empirical study of contingent relations and 
is required in order to discover the actual time- and place-specific conditions under which the 
causal mechanisms of interest are triggered. This must be contrasted with empirical 
generalisation, which merely seeks regularities at the level of events. Synthesis implies 
research that attempts to explain major parts of whole systems by combining abstract and 
concrete research findings with analytical generalisations. Figure 1 provides a summary of the 
relationship between the different types of research that may be conducted within a realist 
approach identified by Sayer (1992).  
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Figure 1. Types of research (Sayer 1992). 
Abstract theoretical research has been employed in this study to examine the theories and 
concepts presented in the next chapter. This includes, for instance, theoretical discussions of 
the concept of decentralisation, theories about the state, state-society-relations, and 
institution-building strategies. Based on concrete practical research during fieldworks 
(discussed below), I have sought to explore events related to decentralisation and 
democratisation in Mali both at national and local level. With regard to questions about the 
outcome of decentralisation, a guiding principle has been to identify contingent conditions 
that in some way influence decentralisation in a long-term perspective. Relating to political 
processes at national level, it has been important to consider the influence of the MDRI and 
its close connection to top political authorities during the initial years of the 3rd Malian 
Republic, the long-term influence of ministries on the future of the decentralised governance 
system (regarding devolution for instance), the influence of the existing institutional 
structures and political practices, and shifting political constellations that take after elections. 
With regard to local level processes, it has been important to examine the influence of 
political struggles over authority, political relations based on identity, and natural resource 
management systems on the functioning of the decentralised institutions in a local political 
context. The writing of the three papers as well as this introduction may be seen as an attempt 
to form a synthesis that take into account the relation between decentralisation and 
democratisation based on both the abstract theoretical research as well as the concrete 
practical research done during fieldwork. 
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Methods in critical realism 
The distinction Sayer (1992) makes between extensive and intensive research designs may 
further inform the research strategy and methods employed in this dissertation. The two types 
of design ask different sorts of questions, use different techniques and define their objects of 
inquiry differently. Extensive research is concerned with discovering some of the common 
properties and general patterns of a population as a whole. In intensive research, which has 
been most suitable to use within my project, the primary questions concern how causal 
processes work out in a particular case or in a limited number of cases. Intensive research 
uses mainly qualitative methods such as participant observation and informal and interactive 
interviews.  
In addition to the reflections concerning abstract/concrete and intensive/extensive research, 
other authors have suggested different methodological options that may be used within a 
critical realist framework. The propositions of Yeung (1997, p. 56) are interesting in this 
regard. He begins by arguing “that method in critical realism is underdeveloped and 
misunderstood, resulting in a methodologically handicapped philosophy”. Even though the 
importance of abstraction of causal powers and generative mechanisms of objects in 
explanations is understood, he claims that some basic methodological questions remain; how 
can things be abstracted? What is the starting point of abstraction in the first place? Realist 
philosophers provide no readily answers to these questions, because critical realism originates 
from a philosophical concern with transcendental ontology. 
Even though a mixed method of qualitative and quantitative research techniques has been 
advocated, Yeung (1997) does not contend with such methodological pragmatism by arguing 
that in practise of critical realism, certain methodological guidelines are more relevant and 
useful than others. The ways in which these guidelines are employed are dependent upon, but 
not necessarily determined by, different research topics and contexts. Qualitative methods 
such as interactive interviews and ethnography are necessary to abstract the causal 
mechanisms of which quantitative methods are unaware. Quantitative methods, on the other 
hand, are particularly useful to establish the empirical regularities between objects. Although 
these regularities are not causal relations, they can inform the abstraction of causal 
mechanisms. Furthermore, Yeung (1997) argues that the realist method is a posteriori in that 
given the social reproduction of knowledge, a critical realist seeks to reconstruct causal 
structures and their properties. Therefore, causal mechanisms are seen to be both historical 
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and contextual in their realisation. He identifies three possible methodological avenues within 
a critical realist framework that in varying degrees have informed the work presented in this 
dissertation.
Iterative abstraction is used in critical realism in order to discover and conceptualise 
generative mechanisms (Yeung 1997). As Sayer argues, 
knowledge must grasp the differentiation of the world; we need a way of individuating 
objects; and of characterizing their attributes and relationships. To be adequate for a 
particular purpose, it must “abstract” from particular conditions, excluding those which 
have no significant effect in order to focus on those which do (1992, p. 86). 
Abstraction means the isolation in thought of a one-sided or partial aspect of an object and 
involves a double movement from the concrete to the abstract and from the abstract to the 
concrete (Sayer 1992). Thus, a realist starts an empirical problem and proceeds to abstract the 
necessary relation between the concrete phenomenon and deeper causal structures to form 
generative mechanisms. This implies moving from the abstract and simple (defining the 
internally necessary relations of the structures involved), towards building a more concrete 
and complex view of reality. As more empirical evidence is collected, it is possible to revise 
and reaffirm the abstraction. The process of iteration continues until a point where theoretical 
saturation is reached. This occurs when further abstraction brings no significant additional 
theoretical rigour to the generative mechanism and when the empirical evidence is strong 
enough to support the practical adequacy of the postulated mechanism in explaining a 
concrete phenomenon. Thus, as a research strategy, iterative abstraction corresponds to what 
Ragin (1994) calls analytical induction in case-studies. The broader realist method in which 
iterative abstraction is embedded is known as retroduction in which an argument moves from 
a description of some phenomenon to a description of something that produces it or is a 
condition for it (Yeung 1997). The use of iterative abstraction has been useful with regard to 
the pursuit of information about different aspects related to decentralisation during fieldwork. 
It has for instance helped to determine when the exploration of certain aspects of 
decentralisation reached a point when it was no longer necessary to pursue it because it would 
not add any new information. Interviewing high-level bureaucrats in the capital Bamako 
about the most important challenges related to the implementation of a decentralised 
governance structure for instance reached such a point after not so long time because most 
presented quite similar views about the theme. Thinking in terms of iterative abstraction has 
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also served to interpret information in periods between fieldworks, in particular with regard to 
existing theories on the field. 
Another contribution to critical realism identified by Yeung (1997) has to some degree 
informed the research strategy in the dissertation. Grounded theory is a mode of doing 
analysis for generating and testing theory: “a qualitative research method that uses a 
systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively derived grounded theory about a 
phenomenon” (Strauss and Corbin 1990, in Yeung 1997). This method has been particular 
useful with regard to pursuing ideas that have occurred during fieldworks. When new 
interesting information about a phenomenon that concerns decentralisation has come about, it 
has contributed to decide the next step in the process of data collection. It may for instance be 
that a new informant has had to be contacted or that a new fieldwork location has to be 
visited. Since I have conducted multiple fieldworks in Mali, this way of thinking has also 
informed the process that has taken place between fieldworks as well as the planning of a new 
fieldwork. Grounded theory may reinforce the iterative abstraction in realist research by 
grounding abstract causal mechanisms in empirical data (Yeung 1997).21 However, it is 
important to be cautious in applying the grounded theory method because it may simply lead 
to another form of empiricism hidden behind a qualitative mask. One possible way to avoid 
falling into such a trap is to use the method in close connection with iterative abstraction. In 
applying both methods, it should be possible to reveal the causal mechanisms of concrete 
phenomena through empirical research in its intensive and extensive variants.
The triangulation method is a third methodological path identified by Yeung (1997). 
Triangulation is inherently a call for multi-method in social scientific research, and is based 
on the conviction that there is no fundamental opposition between the purposes and capacities 
of qualitative and quantitative methods or data. One of the strengths of employing a case-
study approach is the use of multiple sources of evidence (Yin 1994). This may include 
different types of documentation, like administrative documents or other studies of the same 
case, archival records, direct observations or participant observations. The use of multiple 
21 Certain pitfalls exist in employing grounded theory within a critical realist framework (Yeung 1997). First, 
grounded theory is essentially inductive and of phenomenological character, and therefore antithetical to realism. 
This may lead to a tendency of eclectic empiricism in which too many empirical categories are combined in an 
atheoretical framework. Causal relations between the referents of these categories and the phenomenon at hand 
are thus lost. The realist method for theory construction on the other hand is neither purely deductive nor 
inductive, but operates in a deductive-inductive dialectic. Secondly, grounded theory method relies too much on 
the subject’s narrative of concrete social phenomena, postulating that both substantive and formal theories can be 
generated directly from concrete data, implying that generative mechanisms can also emerge directly from data. 
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sources of evidence makes it possible to gather different kinds of information that may be put 
together in order to achieve a higher degree of precision in exploring a phenomenon. Different 
forms of triangulation may be employed in order to assure this. Within data triangulation for 
instance, both interviews (open-ended and focused interviews) and different kinds of 
documentation (official government reports or academic studies) may be used. Investigator 
triangulation may corroborate statements made by different actors through the use of several 
independent informants and interview objects. Combining different sources of information in 
a triangular fashion may contribute to improve the validity and reliability of the information 
collected (Yeung 1997). This contribution is based on the assumptions that different data 
complement each other in revealing different facets of the object of study. The use of 
triangulation and iterative abstraction has constituted an important guideline for the collection 
of information during fieldwork and the use of secondary sources. 
Employing critical realism – an illustration 
An illustrative example of a realist approach to decentralisation is presented in figure 2. It 
presents a idealised analysis of the possible transformation of patron-client structures that may 
result from the introduction of municipal institutions in a local political context. It is meant to 
give an idea of how an approach based on abstract theoretical research may be combined with 
concrete practical research based on experiences from fieldwork in Mali. It is not the intention 
to create an explanatory model used to fit a complex reality into. Rather, it is meant to 
exemplify how a critical realist methodology may provide thinking tools for research on 
decentralisation. The patron-client relation can be considered to be a structure that is similar 
to the example given by Sayer (1992, p. 92) of the landlord-tenant relation. The patron and 
the client may be said to constitute internally related elements of a structure, that is to say that 
one could not exist without the other. Furthermore, in a Malian context, this relation could not 
exist without the existence of for instance a common property system (which also is part of 
the structure).  
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Figure 2. A realist approach to decentralisation and patron-client relations. 
A patron-client relation may exist on an intra-village level. A village chief may be responsible 
for the distribution of land rights and as such considered to be a patron. Other families in the 
village may depend upon him to get access to land for agriculture and may thus be considered 
as the clients. The necessary internal relations of this patron-client structure may produce 
different events because they are mediated through different practices at the level of 
mechanisms. This may for instance be social organisation (who can marry who, what are the 
social obligations of patrons and clients respectively), political position (who may participate 
in decision-making) and elite culture (the naturalisation of this relationship through common 
ancestral history for instance). The implementation of a municipality that includes several 
villages opens up for the renegotiation of the patron-client relations that exist within each of 
these villages. The municipality should in this regard be seen as a contingent external relation 
because the existence of a patron-client relation is not dependent on the existence of this 
institution. However, this does not mean that the municipality is without influence on the 
patron-client relation. It may contribute to new forms of patron-client relations through the 
creation of new political positions within the municipality. The implementation of municipal 
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institutions may in this case be interpreted as a contingent condition triggering the particular 
necessary relations of the patron-client structure through the mechanisms of social 
organisation, political positions and elite culture, and generate events such as political and 
economic exclusion or the rise to power of new political elites (social transformation in more 
general terms).
Figure 2 provides an illustration of how to analyse structures within the research project. 
However, it is important to underline that it is a very simplified representation of patron-client 
relations. A range of other contingent conditions, which themselves are made up of structures, 
is also at work within the context of local politics and decentralisation in Mali, for instance 
within both central and local state agencies. The intrinsic properties of the structure of these 
objects also influence the outcome of decentralisation in a local context.  
This methodological approach may be better understood if contrasted to a hypothetical 
alternative approach based on empirical generalisations. In order to illustrate, it may be useful 
to consider how the two approaches would explain the number of problems related to the 
implementation of the decentralisation reform after the local elections in 1999. A point of 
departure for an empirical generalisation could be to gather information about all the cases 
and try to identify one or more common denominators that would produce an explanation. A 
common explanation from state bureaucrats in Bamako for instance built on this kind of 
approach and refers most often to institutional problems related to the implementation phase, 
the lack of understanding of the process among the municipal actors or more generally to an 
immature political culture. A case-study approach inspired by critical realism that focuses on 
an intensive research strategy would concentrate on one or more cases and try to identify the 
causal mechanisms and underlying structures that would explain each case. The explanation 
of one case, referred to in the 3rd paper, identified the historical competition between two 
villages within a municipality as the cause of the political impasse. The result was that the 
municipality had one formal elected mayor and an informal mayor that was not recognised by 
the state authorities. In other cases, political impasse may be explained with reference to 
political competition between different elite groups within the same village, or the co-optation 
of all formal political positions by one elite group. This kind of approach reveals another 
explanation of the problem than approaches based on empirical generalisations. Designing the 
study as an intensive qualitative case-study inspired by critical realism has constituted the 
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guiding principle for the collection of information during fieldwork as well as the collection 
of secondary sources of information.  
Fieldwork and secondary sources of information 
The study is primarily based on the collection of primary information collected during 
fieldworks in Mali. The main fieldwork, carried out in 2003 in the Koro and Bankass cercles 
in the Mopti region, complements a previous fieldwork carried out in 1998-1999 and has been 
followed up during other missions to Mali. The primary information is to a large degree 
collected during interviews, but the collection of written primary information, as official 
government reports, law texts and policy documents, has also been a part of this process. The 
collection of secondary sources has been based on the idea that it should complement the 
information obtained during fieldwork. This may be academic articles and studies, conference 
proceedings or evaluation reports prepared by NGOs.
Fieldwork over time 
As mentioned in the introduction, the implementation of the decentralised governance system 
in 1999 led to the establishment of new decision-making institutions at the local level and it 
brought about both a scalar and spatial reconfiguration of the state. The institutional design of 
the reform was conditioned by national level political processes and the outcome of the 
reform has had important effects upon local level political relations. Since decentralisation is 
related to political processes and structures at multiple scales, it has been necessary to conduct 
fieldwork both on national, regional and local level. 
The main fieldwork for the dissertation was conducted during two months in 2003 in the Koro 
and Bankass cercles in the Mopti region in collaboration with the NGO CARE Mali. The 
main purpose of this fieldwork was to gain insight into various aspects related to the 
implementation of and political practices surrounding the decentralised governance 
institutions in a local context. The choice of this area was partly based on a short visit to the 
village of Koro in 2001 when I worked for CARE Mali in the Diré cercle in the Timbuktu 
region. CARE had since 1999 run a project in the Koro and Bankass cercles, the Programme
d’Accompagnement des Communes Rurales dans le Cercle de Koro et Bankass (PACKOB). 
The project, designed to support and consolidate the implementation of the decentralisation 
reform, sought to strengthen the relation between three main groups of actors in the municipal 
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space (CARE International au Mali 1999). As a result, particular programmes were 
established to strengthen the capacity of the municipal councillors, civil society organisations 
and the private sector in selected municipalities. In addition to the PACKOB project, CARE 
has been delegated by the Malian government to run the Centre de Conceil Communal (CCC) 
in the Bankass cercle. The CCC is one of two axes in the Programme National d’Appui aux
Collectivités Territoriales (PNACT)22, a scheme set up by the Malian government to support 
the decentralised governance institutions. While the Agence Nationale d’Investissement des 
Collectivités Locales (ANICT) provides the municipalities with financial support, the CCCs 
are set up to provide them with technical support23 (République du Mali 2002). The 
establishment of the CCC represents an innovative structure for development assistance in 
Mali; institutionally it is part of the state apparatus24, but its operation is delegated to an 
NGO25 in each of the 42 cercles in Mali. The CCCs are among other things supposed to 
provide the municipalities the necessary assistance so that they can apply for financing from 
the ANICT. The experience of the CARE staff within the field of decentralisation in general 
and the study area in particular was particular helpful for me during the fieldwork. In addition 
to providing information as informants on certain matters, they also assisted in the 
establishment of contact with other interview subjects. Among these were the mayor in the 
city of Koro, state civil servants and forest dwellers.
The choice of Koro and Bankass as site for fieldwork was furthermore made in order to 
complement experience, information and knowledge acquired during a fieldwork conducted 
in 1998-99 (6 months) as part of the writing of my M.Phil.-thesis. This fieldwork was carried 
out in the capital Bamako, the regional capital Timbuktu and in the Arrondissement de Gossi
located in the Cercle de Gourma Rharous in the Timbuktu region (which now is the 
Municipality of Gossi). In Bamako, I conducted a series of interviews with high ranked 
officials within the MDRI and ministries as well as with various politicians, researchers and 
other informants with particular know-how about themes related to decentralisation. The 
22 The most important laws and conventions are: Law no. 00-042 of July 7 2000 on the creation of ANICT, 
decree no. 00-386/P-R M of August 10 2000 on the organisation and functioning of the ANICT as well as 
conventions signed with the program partners (the European Union, the Fonds d’Equippement des Nations Unies 
and the Agence Francais de Développement). 
23 The ANICT support primarily the municipalities, but also the CT at cercle and regional levels. The CCC only 
supports the municipalities.  
24 The ANICT is a permanent institution defined as a National Public Establishment (Etablissement Public 
National) with financial and administrative autonomy placed under the authority of the Ministère de 
l’Administration Territoriale et des Collectivités Locales (MATCL). 
25 The NGOs have been chosen, among other factors, on the basis of the period they have been present in the 
area, as well as on their experience of working within the domain of decentralisation. 
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overall purpose was to provide information about the democratic transition, the role of 
decentralisation in national political processes, as well as the elaboration and implementation 
of the reform. In Timbuktu, interviews were conducted with public servants, politicians and 
local leaders. It provided information about the territorial reorganisation and the preparation 
for the implementation of the reform in a regional and a local context. In the village of Gossi, 
interviews were conducted with informants with intimate local political knowledge, as well as 
political actors that had engaged themselves politically in the period running up to the 1999 
local elections. The most important findings from the visit to Gossi concerned the local 
political processes that emerged as part of political strategies to control the future municipal 
institutions. The information from Gossi has also served as case against which it has been 
possible to compare the findings obtained during the 2003 fieldwork. 
The 2003 fieldwork, in addition to the time spent in Koro and Bankass, was also used to 
follow up and complement information collected during the 1998-99 fieldwork. Of particular 
interest in this regard was information about the progress in the implementation of the reform 
(the reform was implemented after the 1998-99 fieldwork). Follow-up was also conducted 
during other missions to Mali: in 2001 as part of an internship for CARE Mali in the Cercle 
de Diré in the Timbuktu region, and in 2002 and 2005 as part of consultancy work for the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). During the SIDA 
consultancy missions, interviews were conducted in Bamako and served to bring me up to 
date on issues concerning the democratic process and the political landscape on national level 
as well as the political and institutional processes at work regarding the transfer of functions 
to the decentralised governance institutions. The CARE internship was carried out before I 
started to work on this dissertation, but has nevertheless provided background information on 
for instance how an NGO support decentralisation locally. The combined effect of multiple 
fieldworks and working experience over a long period of time offer an additional benefit to 
the dissertation because it has given the necessary time to develop a more profound 
understanding of various aspects of the Malian case. This has not only provided contextual 
knowledge that has been important to interpret findings, but it has also functioned as a guide 
concerning strategic choices that has been made as part of the dissertation. It has furthermore 
provided cultural and practical knowledge that has been beneficial with regard to fieldwork 
organisation and challenges met during fieldwork (discussed in more detail below). In order 
to complement information gained during interviews, I have, whenever possible, sought to 
find written primary material as well as secondary sources of information. 
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Documents and secondary sources of information 
The collection of various kind of official documents as well as secondary sources of 
information has been an important aspect of the fieldworks because much of the written 
material concerning decentralisation in Mali is scarcely available outside the country (law 
texts, evaluations, public journals and official strategy documents for instance). Strategy 
documents published by the MDRI have been an important source for the analysis of the role 
of decentralisation in the democratic project of the Konaré regime in the 2nd paper. 
Furthermore, secondary sources in the form of academic journal articles published during the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s have been crucial for the historical analysis of local government 
structures in Mali in the 1st paper. The use of journal articles in this paper presents some 
methodological challenges because the empirical information available from these sources has 
already been interpreted into a theoretical framework that is different from the one relied on in 
this dissertation. To the extent that it has been possible, I have sought to overcome this 
challenge by way of triangulation of different sources. Recent case-studies on decentralisation 
in Mali has for the last few years grown in number and has proven to be a valuable addition to 
the analysis of decentralisation and local politics in the 3rd paper.
Doing multiple fieldworks in Mali has offered a number of advantages for this study in terms 
of collection of information. But it also presents a series of challenges that goes beyond 
questions of data collection. In the next section I will discuss some of these from a 
perspective of positionality.
Positionality, local knowledge and fieldwork 
Apart from the practical problems related to conducting fieldwork in a country with limited 
financial services, poor infrastructure and long distances, doing research in another social, 
political and cultural setting have presented particular challenges. During both informal social 
meetings and fieldwork interactions in Mali, I have become increasingly aware of what 
Skelton (2001) refers to as the role of positionality in research. The interest in a reflexive 
social science that acknowledges positionality has generated two different strands of thought 
(Allen 2005). Inter-subjective approaches focus on the positionality of the researcher within 
the field and “how qualitative data are the product of a series of social interactions between 
the fieldwork self and the subjects of investigation in the field” (Allen 2005, p. 992). The 
objectivist approaches on the other hand directs attention to the positionality that the 
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researcher bring into the field, that is, the background thinking of researchers that result from 
social position as gender and class and the subsequent consequences for knowledge 
production. In this section I want to draw attention to some aspects of positionality raised by 
an inter-subjectivist approach in order to discuss challenges in doing fieldwork in another 
cultural context.  
Positionality, local knowledge and fieldwork 
The influence of positionality in this research project is to a large degree shaped by my own 
personal history in Mali. As a child, I lived two years in the country (1986-1988 from the age 
of 13). My parents worked in a Norwegian Church Aid project in the village of Gossi in the 
Timbuktu region in the northern parts of the country where I attended a Norwegian school. 
During this period, I got several Malian friends that I would meet again during fieldwork for 
the M. Phil.-thesis in 1998-99. It was during this fieldwork that the question of positionality 
first became evident for me. The major parts of this fieldwork were carried out in the capital 
Bamako where I lived with the childhood friends from the Northern parts of the country in a 
small rented house. On many occasions, people arrived at the house to live there for a day or 
two; it could be distant relatives of some of my friends, villagers from Northern Mali on 
missions to Bamako, or university student colleges of my friends. When these people arrived, 
they were always placed into an existing social hierarchy, sometimes in quite explicit terms, 
in relation to the other people living there according to criteria as family ties, ethnic 
background, age, education and wealth. As part of micro-scale social interaction, this was 
important for defining roles and responsibilities within the group and made up quite a large 
part of everyday conversation. As I was both white, had high education and was relatively 
wealthy (compared to several of my friends who had barely gone to school and were 
unemployed), I was placed at the top of the hierarchy and given the nickname “le Boss”. I 
was not allowed to do domestic tasks such as shopping, cleaning, making tea, and so on. In 
return, I was supposed to provide them with the most basic things, such as food and shelter. 
Organising fieldwork in this manner made it possible to gain social, political and cultural 
knowledge that is important for understanding the field of study.
The kind of social interaction described above may be seen as the continuation of the codes 
and rules that surround the extended family and is part of continuous negotiation of social 
relations and hierarchy that is an integrated part of daily life. Since there is little state social 
infrastructure in Mali, the extended family (which may also include non-relatives from the 
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same village or area in the country) constitutes an important informal safety network that 
imply providing services and favours if someone are in trouble. This system is also 
manifested in non-family encounters and may extend into the work-place, political life and 
state-society relations. One example could illustrate this. The father of a friend of mine, who 
had worked as a teacher, had reached the age of retirement. In order to arrange his pension, he 
had to get in touch with the agency responsible for pensions in order to arrange the necessary 
formalities. He resided normally in the village of Gossi in Northern Mali some 1000 km from 
Bamako, but had to go the capital in order to do this. After trying 6 months without success, 
he finally got in touch with some distant relatives working in a completely different state 
agency that could speed up the process through channels based on informal friendship. This is 
not a singular case when it comes to the day-to-day functioning of the state in Mali. I often 
asked people what they would do if they needed for example official papers. Most people 
answered that they would first get in touch with people they knew from before (a distant 
relative or a person from the same part of the country for instance) in order to get access to the 
relevant state agency through informal channels. A common explanation was that this would 
speed up the process and it was a manner to avoid paying too much bribery.  
This knowledge has made it easier to understand things observed during fieldwork and that 
was said during interviews. It also made it possible to interpret the concrete context in which 
the fieldwork was conducted and it provided background knowledge that made it possible to 
understand politics in general, particularly with regard to informal political relations. It was 
most practically useful with regard to the collection of information in the 3rd paper. 
Knowledge about the distinction between first-comers and late-comers (autochthones vs. 
allochthones) was in this regard an insight it was important to examine further during local-
level fieldwork. As discussed in the 3rd paper, the notion of autochthony is an important 
dimension of belonging in Africa (Geschière 2005). It implies claims that the first-settled 
people in an area have superior rights based on rootedness to the territory. In a West African 
context, claims of belonging from the first-comers groups is the most wide-spread strategy to 
legitimate land rights (Lentz 2006). The fear of being outnumbered in local elections on the 
part of the first-comers is real in many areas, and the discourse of autochthony may be used to 
legitimise control over natural resources. In an interview with the Mayor of the municipality 
of Koro, referred to in the 3rd paper, social relations based on autochthony was clearly a part 
of local politics; in explaining the reason why people do not pay taxes, he refers to parental 
relations: “The people say that ‘the mayor, he is our cousin, our parent. We are not afraid of 
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him, so we do not pay the taxes’” (Anaye Niangaly, Mayor of Koro, interview on 30 October 
2003).
A particular important and widespread system of identity formation in Mali is joking 
relationships (in French called parenté à plaisanterie or cousinage). According to Diallo 
(Diallo 2001), joking relationships constitute certain social rules between community 
members, neighbouring clans and ethnic groups. This system applies, for instance, in the 
relations between Dogons (farmers, mainly living in the Mopti region) and Bozos (fishers 
mainly living along the Niger River). A friend of mine, Dogon of origin, while living in the 
Niger River town of Diré, experienced this every day while going to market place to buy fish 
from Bozo women. They could for instance charge him extra money for the fish, because the 
rules of the joking relationship prohibited him from refusing this. In joking relationships, 
certain rules for behaviour exist. It is for instance allowed to throw jokes about the members 
of a group you are in joking relationship with, no matter how old or powerful they might be. 
There are also taboos related to offend or hurt one’s cousin. If taboos are broken, it is 
necessary to apologise and compensate the damage in order to avoid a disaster in the 
community of the taboo violator. In everyday social interaction among Malians, joking 
relationships are often subject of communication and discussion, and as such an important 
part of defining social relations. Knowledge about this particular system of social relations 
may in certain situations serve as a door opener. On one occasion, while doing fieldwork for 
my M. Phil.-thesis, I tried for almost a week to get an appointment with representatives of the 
World Bank in Bamako. But every time I showed up for an interview, it was postponed for 
some reason. This took place at least 4 or 5 times, and was becoming more and more 
frustrating. But when the receptionist asked me for my Malian name (foreigners are often 
asked for their Malian name), and realised that we were in fact in a joking relationship 
(theoretically at least), he was more than willing to fix me an appointment on the spot. Even 
more important, this knowledge is important in everyday social meetings and informal social 
and fieldwork interactions because it offers a way to get to know people. In addition to be a 
door opener, it serves as a reference point for informal discussions on political issues of both 
local and national range. These discussions are most of the time of little importance with 
regard to the overall purpose of the fieldwork, but may in certain circumstances make it 
possible to comprehend and interpret events that are not often easily understandable. It may 
also give indications of new topics that may be of interest for further exploration.
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An advantage in doing fieldwork over a long period of time with close connection with 
Malians has been the possibility to get in touch with informants through informal and 
personal channels. Of particular importance as a door opener in this regard has been a 
childhood friend of mine from northern Mali. He has himself been a student at the university 
in Bamako and has a large network of connection both in the capital Bamako and in northern 
Mali. He arranged for instance an interview with one of his teachers at the university that for a 
long time has been a prominent politician in Bamako and that today is minister of education. 
Our neighbour in Bamako was also a well-known politician that provided useful information 
for the fieldwork. Another neighbour had himself written a PhD on decentralisation in Mali in 
France in 1986 and was of very much help both as an informant, but also as an adviser during 
fieldwork. Furthermore, while doing fieldwork in Timbuktu in 1998-99, I was assisted with 
transportation to the city by a close relative of his who worked in a local office of a ministry 
in Timbuktu that often travelled to Bamako on missions. I was also provided accommodation 
during my visit at the guest house of the Commissariat du Nord, where her husband worked. 
He also became an important informant because the agency was implemented as part of the 
Pact National and it was delegated a key role in the territorial reorganisation in the region by 
the MDRI.
Positionality and fieldwork interactions 
Local social and political knowledge made it possible to a certain degree to influence and 
understand the relations in which I as a researcher entered during fieldwork. In fieldwork 
interaction, I was to a certain degree defined in relation to the social and political hierarchy in 
which I participated. The way in which this influenced the fieldwork varied however quite 
much depending upon the setting in which interviews were conducted as well as who was 
interviewed. Because the fieldwork involved interviews on multiple scales, my positionality 
may be considered to be relative with regard to each particular setting. Interviews with high-
level politicians and bureaucrats in the capital Bamako was not so much influenced because 
these informants were used to this kind of situations and because I was often seen as a 
student. The result was that it was often difficult to get beyond the official version of themes 
related to decentralisation (as described in the laws). I experienced for instance more than 
once that interviewees consciously did not answer my questions, even though they knew I 
understood this. The reasons for this may have been different. One explanation may have 
been insecurity on the part of the official about what could be said or the need to adhere to a 
particular version of the story because of the political role of the institution. In some of the 
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interviews conducted with officials in the MDRI this was clearly the case. Since the MDRI 
was the institution responsible for the elaboration of the decentralisation reform, the 
interviewees were not willing to talk about possible problems related to the institutional 
design of the reform and referred mostly to law texts and strategy documents when 
answering. In another interview, conducted with a leading politician from the transition 
period, answers were also to a large degree flavoured by political rhetoric supporting the 
reform. The refusal to talk about potential problems may be explained by the fact that the 
politician had spotted me on a television news broadcast the night before about a 
decentralisation conference organised by a leader of another political party. Scepticism about 
my relation with this politician may have led to caution with regard to the interview situation. 
Another example is from the period when I was working as an intern for CARE in the village 
of Diré in the Timbuktu region and had made an appointment for an interview with a highly 
placed official in the state in the city of Timbuktu. Once he learned that I was “only an 
intern”, as he said, he refused categorically to take any of my questions seriously. He 
answered with one-sentence words, made phone-calls during the interview and refused to 
answer some questions altogether. This example is in clear contrast to interviews carried out 
in Timbuktu during the 1998-99 fieldwork. Before leaving Bamako for Timbuktu, I was able 
to get a letter of recommendation from the political advisor of the Ministry of territorial 
administration who I interviewed not so long after arriving in Mali. The letter of 
recommendation had been faxed to the governor of the region before my arrival, and 
appointments had already been done with several state officials in the city, among these the 
official occupying the same position as I later should interview as a CARE intern in 2001. 
This gave me status as a researcher approved by the political leadership in Bamako, and 
facilitated my program in Timbuktu to a very large degree. The officials speared ample time 
for the interviews and went into great detail in the answers. Also during other missions in 
Mali, the positionality explanation seems at least to account for some of the outcome. During 
missions to Bamako carried through for the Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA), I experienced that it was not only much easier to make appointments, but also that it 
was easier to openly discuss political controversial themes related to decentralisation. In an 
interview with a leader of one of the most influential parties in Bamako, corruption in the 
state apparatus and the legal system was a theme that the leader talked about in great detail.
However, when conducting interviews in rural areas, identity factors were more predominant. 
It was not unusual to be met by suspicion and hesitation from possible interviewees and 
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informants. This may be explained in several ways. Since the introduction of municipal 
institutions in many cases was subject to struggles over authority, it was considered by several 
informants not politically wise to discuss political events, strategies or goals with an outsider. 
Sharing information about political issues and relations about a locality may furthermore be 
difficult because local politics is in some regards transparent and it could be quite easy to 
identify the source of information. Since sources of information in general is scarce in rural 
areas (no newspapers for instance), knowledge constitutes an important political asset that 
may be used actively as part of political strategies. I experienced myself several times that 
information obtained during interviews was very much biased, and in many cases incorrect, to 
the advantage of certain views and to the detriment of others. To avoid being trapped in this 
“web of confusion” it was not only necessary to interview different groups of actors but also 
to engage in long-term relations with people that did not have any particular political 
engagement or interest in the matters and that through informal conversations could function 
as discussion partners. While doing fieldwork in Gossi, it was unproblematic to corroborate 
information since I had well established relations that date back a long time with people with 
thorough local knowledge. In other situations, in Koro and Bankass for instance, this was 
more difficult. But after spending some time in the area, it was possible to engage in a certain 
number of informal conversations that made it possible to assure, at least with a relatively 
large degree of certainty, the quality of information. Furthermore, it is also easier to get in 
touch with people that are in some kind of political or social inferior position. On one 
occasion, in Gossi, I was approached in covert by a local nomadic fraction leader that 
previously did not openly wanted to discuss the problems their group met as a result of the 
decentralisation reform. This was a person I had known since childhood, and it was clear for 
me that he wanted to convey the message that he feared that the decentralisation reform would 
lead to political tensions and problems in the area.  
A part of doing fieldwork in a local context also means that many people in the area know 
about your presence and the reason why you are there. This may have influenced the kind of 
information that I obtained during interviews, but it also affected the whole fieldwork 
situation. I was often confronted with the observation that I am a white male with high 
education and other aspects commonly associated with these characteristics in Mali, such as 
wealth and the ability to solve problems. This was sometimes a theme that surfaced after an 
interview or in other fieldwork interactions, and materialised often in questions for economic 
support or provision of luxury goods like digital cameras or computers. These requests have 
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to be understood in light of the discussion above about the extended family network. As such, 
as a researcher but also as an outsider with financial means, I was to a certain degree 
integrated in these social networks and was seen as a potential source of assistance. The fact 
that the demands and requests to a large degree exceed my economic resources is one thing, 
but more importantly, it makes fieldwork relations difficult to handle. 
Conclusion
The dissertation has been designed as an intensive qualitative single case-study inspired by 
critical realism methodology. Critical realism has inspired the underlying methodology used 
in the dissertation and the issue of positionality has allowed for a critical discussion of the 
fieldwork. The research design has developed dialectally in relation to the nature of the 
purpose of the dissertation, the research questions upon which the three papers are based and 
the theoretical framework presented in the next chapter. It is to the theoretical framework that 
the discussion now turns. 
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Theoretical framework 
This chapter expands the theoretical framework upon which the dissertation is based. Its main 
role will be to locate each of the three papers within a more coherent theoretical framework, 
to contextualise the findings and conclusions from the papers and allow for a final detailed 
discussion of the main purpose of the dissertation in the next chapter. It takes as point of 
departure the normative assumption that often motivates decentralisation and the main types 
of institutional change that may result from such reforms. This initial discussion is followed 
by an elaboration of two idealised theoretical views on what decentralisation is and should be. 
The administrative and political decentralisation perspectives are discussed with regard to 
how they differ in their views on the nature of the state and state reform, politics, policy 
reforms, governance, democracy and institution-building strategies. This distinction is then 
brought into the discussion of state-society relations in Africa. It constitutes the basis for the 
elaboration of an analytical framework that focuses on context-specific analyses of 
decentralisation and state-society relations. It will allow for an analysis of the politics of 
decentralisation and the outcome in terms of local democratic governance as mediated by 
political processes within the state, within society and in state-society interaction. The final 
discussion of the geography of decentralisation brings the concepts of space, place and scale 
into the analytical framework. 
Deconstructing decentralisation: normative assumptions and 
institutional reforms 
Decentralisation is a complex phenomenon both to design and to study (Smoke 2003). This is 
so because there are great variations between countries when it comes to institutional 
decentralisation arrangements and because it takes a lot of time to implement. To enter the 
discussion of the concept, it may be useful to take as point of departure Olowu’s definition of 
decentralisation as a “relative, complex and multidimensional process” (2001, p. 2, italics in 
original). Its relativity is linked to the normative distribution of state resources between 
institutional actors within both state and society. The complexity of decentralisation relates to 
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its simultaneous incorporation of and impact upon political, economic, institutional and 
cultural relations. The multidimensional aspect of decentralisation refers to the distribution of 
power and resources within the state (between the executive and other branches of the 
government; between central government and their field administration as well as local 
governments) and between state and non-governmental entities. Based on this definition, it is 
difficult to identify any criteria against which it is possible to assess the success of 
decentralisation. To initiate a conceptual discussion of decentralisation, it may be useful to 
distinguish between the assumptions on which decisions to decentralise are made on one side 
and decentralisation as an institutional reform on the other. In short, the latter refers to the 
concrete institutional changes that decentralisation bring about. They may be described with 
regard to the division of labour within the state apparatus (intra-government relations), 
between the state and local government (inter-government relations) and between the state 
and non-state actors (state-society relations). The assumptions on which decisions to 
decentralise are made are of very different origin and is to a large degree based on the 
assumed positive benefits of decentralisation. There are not necessarily any apparent links 
between these assumptions and the actual institutional changes that results from a 
decentralisation reform.  
The benefits of decentralisation 
Decisions to decentralise are often based on assumptions about the potential benefits of such 
reforms. Kulipossa (2004) for instance identifies three broad categories of decentralisation 
benefits: political values (decentralisation is a mechanism to spread political power among the 
population and thereby increase their influence); governance values (decentralisation increase 
responsiveness, accountability and political participation); and efficiency values (economic 
arguments related to provision of public goods, revenue mobilisation and size of jurisdiction). 
In addition to improved efficiency and governance as a potential advantage of 
decentralisation, Smoke (2003) also points to the possibility that decentralisation may 
improve equity. This advantage is related to the argument that local governments have local 
knowledge and therefore are in a position to distribute resources and target poverty.
Decentralisation as an institutional reform 
The concept of decentralisation is used to describe a variety of institutional reforms including 
delegation, deconcentration, devolution, privatisation, deregulation and market 
decentralisation (Olowu 2001). According to Børhaug (1994), the classification developed by 
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Rondinelli is most common. It differs between deconcentration, devolution, delegation and 
privatisation. In a general way, these concepts are used to describe the transfer of planning, 
decision-making power or administrative tasks from central government to its organisations in 
the regions, districts or municipalities (deconcentration), to semi-autonomous or state-
controlled organisations (delegation) or local governments (devolution) (Adamolekun 1999, 
Cheema and Rondinelli 1983). 
Deconcentration implies the redistribution of administrative tasks within central government 
(Adamolekun 1999, Cheema and Rondinelli 1983). This normally involves the strengthening 
of central state institutions at lower levels of the administrative echelon (Crook and Manor 
1998). A certain degree of deconcentration may be achieved through the establishment of a 
system of field administration (Cheema and Rondinelli 1983). This implies the transfer of 
some decision-making power regarding routine administration to lower levels in the 
administrative hierarchy. A useful distinction may also be made between field administration 
and local administration. The local administration system constitutes a certain form of 
deconcentration where the civil servants at all subordinate levels are central government 
agents. Executive officers, appointed by and responsible vis-à-vis central government, 
normally the ministry of internal affairs, govern regions, districts and municipalities. Two 
systems of local administration exist in most developing countries. Integrated local 
administration is a form of deconcentration where field officers work under the auspices of 
the highest administrative leader of their jurisdiction. In some countries, the central 
government representative has the power to coordinate the work of central ministries within 
the given jurisdiction. Un-integrated local administration means that central ministry staff 
and administrative staff are working independently of each other. Everyone is responsible to 
central government, but they have no or little formal control over each other. Coordination, if 
it exists, is often informal.  
Another form of decentralisation involves the delegation of decision-making power and 
management responsibility to organisations outside central government structures which are 
not directly responsible to central government (Adamolekun 1999, Cheema and Rondinelli 
1983). This is a more far-reaching form of decentralisation than deconcentration because 
important functions are transferred and executed without the direct control of a higher 
administrative level. Sometimes, decentralisation also refers to privatisation, that is, the 
transfer of functions from state institutions to the private sector (Manor 1995). It is argued 
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that this implies decentralisation (power is transferred from central government to private 
enterprises) and democratisation (the choice of customers is increased). However, this use of 
the concept has been strongly criticised, partly because private sector enterprises may 
themselves be big and powerful. Instead of decentralising, power is transferred from one 
power centre to another. 
Devolution implies the transfer of the responsibility of executive organs to political actors and 
institutions on a lower administrative level (Adamolekun 1999, Crook and Manor 1998). 
According to Manor (1995), this involves the transfer of resources, functions and decision-
making power from central government to local authorities that are a) partly or entirely 
independent of central government, and b) democratically elected. Local authorities often 
consist of regional or local executive offices or municipalities (Adamolekun 1999). In the last 
case, they are given a juridical personality, and juridical defined areas of competence with 
autonomy to tax and elaborate budgets. The concept of juridical personality implies the right 
to make decisions with a relatively important autonomy, and the right to govern its own 
resources (MDRI 1998b). In the French literature, the concept of collectivité territoriale is 
used to denominate the units that are at the receiving end of devolution (for instance the new 
municipalities in Mali). These units are localised on a well-defined fraction of a country's 
territory, they are given a juridical personality by the state, and have the financial autonomy 
to be governed by locally elected authorities. The free administration (libre administration) of 
the collectivités implies an administration free from hierarchical bonds to the central 
government or other authorities on a superior level, and is as such in theory directly 
accountable towards the population. 
Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) have elaborated some basic characteristics that define 
devolution: 1. The executive organs are autonomous and independent units, perceived as 
separate levels, with little or no direct control from central government structures; 2. Local 
government have undisputed and juridical defined geographical limits within which they can 
exercise authority; 3. Local authority have the necessary power to raise resources for the 
execution of their functions; 4. Local governments have to be developed as institutions in the 
sense that they are perceived by the population as a service provider, and that the population 
feel they may influence the decisions-making process; and 5. An organisation form with 
mutual strengthening and coordinating relations between central and local authorities, i.e. that 
local government may interact with other parts of the system. The basic characteristics of 
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decentralisation are often less rigorous in most developing countries. Devolution is most often 
seen as a form of decentralisation where local governments are given the responsibility for 
some functions, but where central government establishes control mechanisms and continue 
to play an important financial role. 
Two schools: administrative and political decentralisation 
According to Smoke(2003), decentralisation seems to be popular among policy makers even 
though there is limited evidence that support positive effects. The interest in decentralisation 
as a solution to the crisis of the African state in the 1990s may, according to Mohan and 
Stokke (2000), be explained by a convergence between the political right (revisionist 
neoliberalism) and the political left (postmarxism). However, the apparent consensus conceals 
important differences between them. This is for instance evident in their view on the role civil 
society may play. For neo-liberalists, civil society may put organised pressure on the state and 
in this way support democratic stability and good governance. Civil society may also assure 
participation in development programmes and empower target groups of poor people. For 
post-marxists on the other hand, empowerment of civil society involves the mobilisation of 
marginalised groups against disempowering actions of both the state and the market. So while 
neo-liberalists have a top-down view on institutional reform with the aim at making 
institutions more efficient, post-marxists advocate bottom-up mobilisation to challenge the 
interests of the state. 
This division between the political right and left is echoed in the decentralisation literature. It 
was clearly reflected in a debate on decentralisation in the journal Development & Change in 
the early 1990s between Rondinelli (Rondinelli 1990, Rondinelli, McCullough and Johnson 
1989), Slater (1989, 1990) and Samoff (1990). 26 Samoff’s distinction between administrative 
26 1. Rondinelli, D. 1990. Decentralisation, territorial power and the state: A critical response. Development and 
Change, vol. 21, pp. 491-500. 
2. Rondinelli, D., J. S. McCullough and R. W. Johnson 1989. Analysing decentralisation policies in developing 
countries: a political-economy framework. Development and Change, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 57-88. 
3. Samoff, J. 1990. Decentralisation: the politics of interventionism. Development and Change, vol. 21, pp. 513-
530. 
4. Slater, D. 1989. Territorial power and the peripheral state: the issue of decentralisation. Development and 
Change, vol. 20, pp. 501-531. 
5. Slater, D. 1990. Debating decentralisation - a reply to Rondinelli. Development and Change, vol. 21, pp. 501-
512. 
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and political decentralisation sums up two idealised perspectives on decentralisation that 
correspond to the division between the political right and left. This distinction helps to reveal 
important divergences in the apparent consensus on the need to decentralise the state. While 
the first stresses the relation between institutional reforms and state performance, the second 
underlines the necessity to empower the civil society (Degnbol 1999). Administrative 
decentralisation is often the position taken by central government (Samoff 1990). Starting 
with existing institutional organisation, new decentralisation solutions are developed with 
focus on organisational or administrative aspects. Most often, central government initiates the 
implementation of decentralisation, and it seeks to control its course. Within this approach, 
decentralisation may lead to the transfer of authority. Even though the immediate political 
questions linked to decentralisation are important, they are not studied systematically. 
Consequently, politics remains a secondary theme. Success is measured in terms of 
implementation, and not, for instance, in terms of increased political mobilisation of the local 
population. A problem with this approach is that institutional reforms are described and 
understood in narrow technocratic and administrative terms (Degnbol 1999). The focus on 
making institutions work the right way does not take into account processes and structures in 
society that influence the way in which these institutions work in the first place. 
The political decentralisation perspective holds that decentralisation must begin with an 
increased role for civil society vis-à-vis the state. In practical terms, this means the transfer of 
decision-making power to previously underrepresented and marginalised groups (Samoff 
1990). Empowerment is a key notion within this perspective. It is normally used to describe 
an ideal situation where individuals may gain control of their everyday life, such as work, 
reproduction and access to resources (Hewitt and Smyth 1992). If decentralisation does not 
bring about empowerment or transfer of decision-making power, it is impossible to conclude 
that there has been any real decentralisation. Thus, administrative decentralisation without 
empowerment may be seen as no more than a façade to maintain or strengthen the power of 
central government. 
The analytical distinction between administrative and political decentralisation may clarify 
some elements of the decentralisation debate (Samoff 1990). But as will become clear in the 
following discussion, they represent two idealised perspectives on how to understand 
decentralisation that also raises questions about how to understand politics and how to 
understand the state. While it may be argued that the administrative decentralisation 
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perspective usually focuses on formal political institutions at national level and what is 
usually referred to as government, the political administration perspective sees politics as 
much broader processes and is generally more concerned with questions of governance.
Politics, policy and governance 
In discussing how explanations differ in relation to the underlying conceptualisation of 
politics, Leftwich (2004) points to the difference between the concepts of government, 
governing and governance. While the concept of government only includes the formal 
institutions of government, the concept of governing incorporate a wider understanding of 
politics that take account of institutions other than the government that somehow are involved 
in governing (business organisations and civil society associations for instance). The 
governance notion is even wider and refers to: 
the general patterns and interlocking systems of governing across both public and 
private spheres by which the overall social, economic and political life of a society is 
organised and managed, whether democratically or not, whether there are formal 
institutions or not and whether done by national, international or transnational agencies 
and institutions. In short, in its broadest sense – and it is broad – governance refers to 
the web of formal and informal institutions, rules, norms and expectations which govern 
behaviour in societies and without which the very idea of human society is impossible 
(Leftwich 2004, p. 10, italics in original). 
Studies that understand politics as governing are associated with an institutional approach that 
holds that institutions are important in shaping politics (Leftwich 2004). Institutions may be 
both formal and informal. While the first includes the rules and regulations governing 
organisations (companies, associations, bureaucracies), the latter refers to customs and 
unwritten rules in a broader sense. The distinction between formal and informal institutions is 
similar to that made by Painter (1995) between formal and informal politics: while formal 
politics means the “operation of the constitutional system of government and its publicly 
defined institutions and procedures” (p. 8), informal politics is considered to be everywhere. 
This correspond to Leftwich’s (2004) distinction between arena and process. Politics 
understood in terms of arena have a narrow focus (the state, government institutions and local 
government for instance) and is primarily concerned with formal politics. On the contrary, the 
process perspective on politics does not confine it to particular institutional arenas, but see it 
as a much wider phenomenon that in addition to the formal institutions also occur in “much 
wider range of institutions, activities and groups…beyond or below the state or formal 
institutions of government, and wherever questions of power, control, decision-making and 
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resource allocation between two or more people occur in human society, past or present” 
(Leftwich 2004, p. 14). Consequently, the process perspective focuses mainly on informal 
politics that also occur outside the formal institutions of the state.  
Within more policy-oriented studies, this distinction is summed up in Mackintosh’ (1992) 
distinction between policy as prescription and policy as social process. In the first, which 
corresponds to the administrative decentralisation view, development policies in general are 
considered to be made up of government actions alone. The study of these policies includes 
analyses of government programs and focuses on what the government should and should not 
do (what services to provide for instance). This perspective on public reforms is based on a 
set of assumptions about states’ willingness to undertake changes and that the bureaucracy 
actually seeks to promote development for the population. This approach to policy is largely 
ahistorical because it does not take into account that the government and the state in history 
not always have acted in the public interest. The policy as social process perspective, which 
corresponds to the political decentralisation view, on the other hand, does not take it for 
granted that the state and public institutions a priori act in the interest of the population, but 
focuses rather on the effect of public institution actions in different historical contexts as 
results of social processes. This approach holds that the nature of the policy-making 
institutions matters when it comes to the conceptualisation and implementation of policies. 
This is so because these institutions may themselves develop interests on their own and that 
they may be influenced by other groups in society (lobbying for instance). It is therefore 
necessary to comprehend specific development actions in their context: in a country, a region 
or in a particular historical period. Analysing political actions and public institutions in a 
historical context will facilitate the identification of cumulative patterns of change 
implemented or sustained by central authorities. 
The administrative decentralisation perspective is often the perspective of central 
governments in their elaboration of decentralisation reforms (Samoff 1990). Most attention is 
usually accorded to the institutional aspects of the reform and it is usually anchored within a 
policy as prescription framework. Decentralisation solutions are usually developed on the 
basis of the existing institutional organisation and the main aim is to identify new 
administrative structures. This perspective is misleading according to the political 
decentralisation approach. It is not sufficient to analyse and conceptualise decentralisation 
purely based on administrative and technocratic terms. This is, in my view, relevant in several 
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respects. An important first aspect to consider in this regard is who made the decision to 
decentralise in the first place: was international pressure the most important deciding factor, 
was it the result of domestic popular demand or was central government leading the process? 
This may say something about the legitimacy of the reform. Secondly, it is important to 
determine how the reform was elaborated and who was responsible for this process. If it was 
delegated to a small group of people directly responsible to top national political leaders, the 
result of the process, it is likely to believe, would have been different to a process run through 
the traditional state apparatus (because they may have vested interests in the outcome of the 
reform). This brings up a third important aspect that is related to the overall aim of 
decentralisation: whether there are real power-sharing mechanisms with other political actors 
built into the system or if it is designed to strengthen the control of central political authorities 
is important to consider to see the possible long-term potential and outcome of such a reform. 
It also says something about the possibility of civil society organisations to influence the 
process and the possibility to develop local service delivery and participatory systems. 
Fourthly, the interaction between the decentralised institutions and other social and political 
processes in a local political context is important. Local elite capture for instance will 
undermine any democratic goals the reform may have had and further strengthen the already 
powerful. Finally, processes at national level may also influence the way in which the 
decentralised institutions work in the long run. The transfer of decision-making power and 
economic recourses from ministries to municipal institutions (within health and education for 
instance) may be disrupted by powerful interests within ministries that face the possibility 
losing power.
Both the administrative and political perspectives treat these problems, but they differ 
fundamentally on how to interpret them. Within the administrative perspective success is 
measured as a function of implementation and problems are interpreted as barriers to change. 
These may be, according to Samoff (1990), social and cultural practises, attitudes, lack of 
knowledge or lack of financial resources. Within the political perspective, the main problems 
related to decentralisation are questions of power. Decentralisation cannot be understood as 
implemented by central government without any kind of influence from other societal forces. 
Existing social relations, power structures, and actors’ social, political and economic 
resources are all factors that influence the outcome of such a reform. Different groups in 
society will have different objectives in engaging themselves in the opportunities offered by 
decentralisation and these objectives may be in conflict and seriously alter the intended results 
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of the reform. Rather than being barriers that may be overcome, these problems are possible 
inherent features of any decentralisation reform. As a consequence, the political aspect is 
considered to be more important within the political perspective than within the 
administrative perspective. 
Democratisation and decentralisation 
The distinction between administrative and political decentralisation is also echoed in debates 
on democratisation. Within political studies, two disputing positions on democratisation have 
been identified (Grugel 2002). The minimalist definition sees democratisation as the holding 
of elections, a set of procedures for government, and, in a more inclusive variant, the 
introduction of liberal individual rights. Since this definition does not take into account power 
relations, the author favours a substantive definition; 
democratisation is the introduction and extension of citizenship rights and the creation 
of a democratic state. Another way to think of this is as rights-based or ’substantive’ 
democratisation, in contrast to ’formal’ democratisation. The litmus-test for democracy 
is not whether rights exist on paper but, rather, whether they have real meaning for 
people (Grugel 2002, s. 5).  
The minimalist understanding of democracy was the normative assumption that guided 
studies of democratisation until the mid-1990s (Grugel 2002). Proponents of a substantive 
definition of democracy however, hold that a state cannot be fully democratic unless it has 
legitimacy among the population and that it has real meaning for people. The minimalist 
definition of democratisation may be associated with the administrative decentralisation 
perspective because the main focus is on the formal aspects of democratisation and 
decentralisation respectively. Within this line of argument, it may be said that democratisation 
is attained when there are regular elections, and that decentralisation is successful when local 
government institutions are in place. Within a substantive approach however, which may be 
said to correspond to the political decentralisation view, elections are not enough. This is the 
argument that is made in the 1st paper when discussing democratic consolidation, a central 
theme regarding the survival of the regimes that went through democratic transitions in Africa 
in the early 1990s. Although the institutional approach (focus on formal macro-political 
structures) and the cultural approach (whether or not democracy has any meaning to people) 
are important, they do not fully take into account the historicity of and the mutual 
interdependence between political institutions and political practices that are necessary to 
fully analyse the complexity of democratic consolidation in Africa. In order to avoid the 
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“fallacy of electoralism”, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) draw a distinction between the 
consolidation of democratic rule and the survival of democratic regimes. Their argument is 
that the longer democracy survives (the regular convening of multiparty elections and respect 
of political rights), the likelier is consolidation (institutionalisation of democratic practices). 
This does however not say much about the particular processes and mechanisms that make 
consolidation possible. Likewise, it does not account for cases where consolidation does not 
take place even though the formal democratic macro-political institutions are upheld. Rather, 
it will be more useful to take the distinction between democratic institutions and democratic 
politics made by Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor (2003) as point of departure. Their main 
argument is that the establishment of democratic institutions not necessarily implies the 
spread of democratic politics. In addition, in order to allow for a context-specific analysis of 
democratic consolidation, it is in my view important to focus on the historicity of institutions 
and practices with particular emphasis on institution-building strategies and informal political 
processes.
The following figure summarises the administrative and political decentralisation perspectives 
outlined in this section: 
Mainstream approach Alternative approach 
Decentralisation Administrative decentralisation Political decentralisation 
Theoretical position Revisionist neo-liberalism Post-Marxism 
Policy As prescription As process 
Politics and 
institutions
Formal/arena;  
Government/governing (narrow) 
Informal/process;  
Governing/governance (broad) 
State Neutral actor; 
Seeks the benefit for all citizens 
As social relation; 
Disempowering 
Focus National level;  
Central government;  
The implementation phase 
Local level;
Civil society;  
Empowerment 
Measure of success  The implementation phase; 
Installation of efficient institutions 
Empowerment of civil society through 
democratic local governance 
Main problems Barriers to change;  
Social and cultural practices; 
Attitudes
Relations of power; 
Power concentration; 
Exclusion 
Democracy Minimalist Substantial
Figure 3. Mainstream and alternative approaches to decentralisation. 
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The distinction between administrative and political decentralisation reveals two different 
idealised views on decentralisation. The observation that the administrative perspective 
focuses more on institutional aspects and the political perspective is preoccupied with 
political considerations does however not mean that one or the other should be excluded from 
the analysis. A framework that incorporates both the administrative and political aspects is 
therefore developed in the next section. 
Centralisation and decentralisation within the administrative 
and political sphere: institution-building strategies 
In order to overcome the gap between the administrative-political dichotomy, Hutchcroft 
(2001) calls for a framework that integrates analyses of administrative and political structures. 
While the focus on formal administrative structures within public administration approaches 
ignore informal networks of power and the internal functioning of bureaucracies, the 
proponents of political analyses tend to overlook the territorial dimensions of power and 
authority. Taking the distinction between authority (the formal roles conferred to individuals 
in their official capacities) and power (informal means that diverge from the formal structures 
of authority) as point of departure, he seeks to overcome this gap in two steps. First, he builds 
two separate continua from centralisation to decentralisation within respectively the 
administrative and political spheres. Secondly, he combines these into a matrix that may be 
used to compare different states or variations within states over time (see figure 4 below). 
The centralisation-decentralisation continuum within the administrative sphere builds on the 
traditions of public administration and state formation (Hutchcroft 2001). On the 
centralisation end of the continuum are prefectoral administrative systems that dominated 
under colonial rule, but that may also be found in post-colonial authoritarian regimes. Within 
this system a portion of a country’s territory is delegated to a prefect who represents the 
government and is responsible for field agents in the area. On the decentralised end are 
administrative systems based on strong and autonomous local power centres. 
Attempts to describe centralisation and decentralisation within the political sphere is, 
according to Hutchcroft (2001), to be found in the democratic decentralisation literatures’ 
inclusion of public administration concepts like devolution and deconcentration. However, 
this literature tends to focus on local level democracy to the detriment of the national political 
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system in which local governments are part, and they suppose a strong association between 
decentralisation and democracy. Rather, in a preliminary attempt to describe the political 
structures that are associated with centralisation and decentralisation respectively, he poses a 
series of questions that may be used to place political systems along a continuum. The first 
groups of questions are related to the nature of local politics and local political structures.27 In 
addition to the attention given to local politics, he states, it is equally important to ask a 
second groups of questions related to the territorial character of national politics.28 These 
questions may be used to place political systems along a centralisation-decentralisation axis.  
The second step in Hutchcroft’s framework is the combination of the two continua within the 
administrative and political spheres respectively. Furthermore, the approach developed by 
Hutchcroft may be combined with Boone’s framework for classifying institution-building 
strategies (developed in paper 1) along two axes: the spatial concentration/deconcentration of 
the state apparatus; and the centralisation/devolution of political and economic authority. This 
make it possible not only to describe the relative centralisation and decentralisation within the 
administrative and political spheres respectively, but it also directs attention to the way in 
which political regimes may seek to control local political processes by way of introducing 
administrative and political reforms. To recap Boone’s argument, four different institution-
building strategies may be identified (Boone 2003, p. 360): 
- Power-sharing within a deconcentrated institutional structure where authority is devolved. 
A dense network of state and party-state institutions in rural areas provide the 
infrastructure for devolution of control over state resources and prerogatives to rural elites 
(de facto or de jure); 
- Usurpation within a deconcentrated institutional structure where authority is centralised. 
A dense network of state institutions in rural areas provide infrastructure for state agents 
to micromanage local political processes. It aims at disrupting established local political 
processes and the displacement of rural elites; 
27 The questions he asks are: 1. Are local executives appointed by the centre or elected by popular vote; 2. Are 
there effective mechanisms for popular participation at the local level?; 3. Are there municipal, provincial, state, 
and/or regional legislative bodies with substantial decision-making authority?; and 4. Is there a concentration of 
socioeconomic and/or coercive power in local patrons and bosses?  
28 The questions asked are: 1. Is there a national legislature with significant decision-making authority?; 2. If 
there are effective legislative bodies, de they function within a parliamentary or a presidential system?; 3. Are 
national legislators elected or appointed?; 4. To what extent does the electoral system provide for representation 
of local or regional interests in the national legislature?; 5. Are political parties organised along national or 
local/regional lines, and what is their level of internal cohesion?; and 6. To what extent are administrative 
structures insulated from party patronage? 
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- Administrative occupation within a concentrated institutional structure where authority is 
centralised. State agents govern localities from strategic outposts and are not influenced 
by local elites; 
- Non-incorporation within a concentrated institutional structure where authority is 
devolved. State agents are as distant from rural localities as in the previous strategy, but 
they do not seek to exercise authority locally. Localities are left to their own devices, and 
the state does not seek neither to engage nor impose  
Figure 4 combines the frameworks developed by Hutchcroft and Boone into a single matrix. 
Figure 4. Centralisation and decentralisation within administration and politics 
combined with institution-building strategies. 
The schematic summary over institution-building strategies within both the administrative and 
political spheres in figure 4 constitutes the foundation for the analysis of the historicity of 
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political institutions and practices in Mali in the 1st paper. It directs attention to the changing 
institution-building strategies pursued by the different regimes that have governed in Mali 
with particular focus on local government reforms. As such, it is in line with Hutchcroft’s call 
to carry out comparative historical analysis to place administrative and political systems along 
these continua that also takes into account the capacity of the central government to impose 
their administrative authority. A general analytical note of warning regarding the possibility 
of promoting democratisation by means of decentralisation from Hutchcroft (2001) is to be 
found in regimes that either are found in the bottom right corner of the matrix (it is not 
possible to decentralise without prior centralisation) or were local bosses have considerable 
power. The last point about local power struggles is of particular relevance in the Malian case 
and is discussed in the 3rd paper.
At a more general level, the distinction between administrative and political decentralisation 
is echoed in the debate on state-society relations in Africa. This debate has traditionally been 
dominated by state-centred and society-centred views but in recent years the state-in-society 
approach has gained popularity. In the next section an analytical framework for the study of 
decentralisation in Africa from a state-in-society angle is presented. This perspective runs to a 
certain degree through all the three papers and provide the necessary analytical tools to 
discuss the main purpose of the dissertation.
State, society and politics in Africa – analytical approach 
The institution-building strategies discussed above provide tools to discuss the role of the 
state and the rationale state action in relation to local government and local political actors. 
But as mentioned in the 1st paper, when referring to Bratton and van de Walle’s (1997) 
politico-institutional approach, the formal-legal characteristics of institutions are less 
important than informal political networks and clientelistic relations within political 
institutions in an African context. In particular in times of transition, political actors engage 
themselves in the struggle over the design of institutions and the content of policies to create 
authoritative precedents that institutionalise the rules of the game. It is in this context that the 
neo-patrimonial argument about the internal functioning and the key institutional 
characteristic of the state in Africa comes in. The observation that political institutions and 
practices in Africa have evolved within a neo-patrimonial context directs the focus of analysis 
away from formal political institutions towards informal political relations and state-society 
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interaction. An analytical implication of this observation is that it is necessary to develop an 
approach that focuses on context-specific analyses of state-society relations in Africa. 
Society-centred and state-centred approaches 
The state-in-society approach developed as a response to earlier theories about state-society 
relations. While society-centred approaches explain the functioning of the state as a result of 
social and economic processes, state-centred approaches argue that the state has the necessary 
autonomy and capacity to guide the development of society (Stokke 1999). The two 
dominating paradigms within development literature, modernisation theories and dependency 
theories, even though in opposition to each other, may both be classified as society-centred 
(Vikan 1998). Both explain the form and function of the state from processes in society. 
In the early 1980s, Marxist analyses of postcolonial states and politics where criticised 
(Stokke 1999). Firstly, the neo-liberal tendency criticised the state-led development strategy 
dominating many developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s did not bring about economic 
development. The economic crisis in the 3rd World in the 1980s was explained as a result of 
state intervention in the market. The need to minimise the role of the state in economic 
processes was underlined. Secondly, society-centred analyses were criticised for reducing the 
state and politics to no more than reflections of economic relations in society. Instead of 
seeking economic and structural explanations for underdevelopment, attention was now 
turned to state institutions, especially the bureaucracy (Degnbol 1999). Common to state-
centred perspectives is that the state is seen as the driving force in social and economic 
processes. The state has a large degree of autonomy vis-à-vis forces in the society, and it has 
the capacity to guide the development of society (Stokke 1999). The increased focus on 
institutions is usually associated with historical institutionalism (Peters 2005). The concept of 
path dependency is central to this approach, and is based on the “idea that once institutions 
are formed, they take on a life of their own and drive political processes” (Lecours 2005, p. 
9). The main argument is that choices taken at the time when policies are initiated will have a 
long-term influence over that policy (Peters 2005). Path dependency is, according to Thelen 
(1999), based on two analytical claims. The concept of critical junctures refers to how 
countries come to follow different development paths as a result of the founding moments of 
institutional formation, while the concept of development pathways describe how the 
evolvement of institutions are constrained by past trajectories. Even though historical 
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institutionalism may explain how institutions persist, the focus on path dependency has been 
criticised for not being enable to explain institutional change (Peters 2005).
While society-centred approaches underlined the role of social forces in shaping and 
influencing state structures, the state-centred approaches underlined the need to understand 
internal dynamic processes of the state. However, Degnbol (1999) considers both of these 
perspectives as insufficient: it is not possible to engage an either-or approach to the 
understanding of state-society relations. Many of these theories postulate general, context-
independent relations between the variables in question. Critic is raised against the 
supposition that state or society, a priori, is dominated by the other. For this reason, the 
following discussion will present theories that focus on arenas on state-society interaction. 
The state-in-society approach, developed by Migdal, Kohli and Shue (1994) is an important 
contribution in this regard.
The state-in-society approach 
While Migdal et al. (1994) agree with historical institutionalism that the state has important 
influence of socioeconomic change, they claim that too much emphasis has been accorded the 
state:
Once the state’s importance has been emphasised, therefore, the intellectual attention 
immediately shifts to issues of why states do what they do, under what circumstances 
states are effective, and why states differ in their respective roles and effectiveness. 
These issues, in turn, cannot be discussed satisfactorily without looking at society, at the 
socioeconomic determinants of politics. So, although the important point that “states 
matters” has now been made – and, to repeat, it needed to be made – there is no getting 
around the mutuality of state-society interactions: Societies affect states as much as, or 
possibly more than, states affect societies (Migdal et al. 1994, p. 2). 
As mentioned in the 3rd paper, the state-in-society approach provides a useful theoretical 
framework for the analysis of the local politics of decentralisation. This is so because the 
relative degree of centralisation and decentralisation is not a priori disadvantageous. The 
outcome of decentralisation is, as Samoff (1990) writes, dependent on the situational 
specificity. Consequently, it has to analysed in its context because it is subject to contestations 
within the state as well as different societal movements, networks, as well as formal and 
informal organisations and institutions (Degnbol 1999, Migdal 1994). Patterns of dominance, 
maintenance of status quo and changes that result from decentralisation have, within this 
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approach, to be understood as processes that result from state-society interaction. Migdal et al. 
(1994) specify four central assumption that help to specify the possible processes at work.  
First, the possibilities of states to undertake changes depend on their relations to society. 
States are seldom the only central actors, and are rarely completely autonomous. Their 
relative efficiency has to be understood as the function of the different forms of connections 
in state-society relations. The second point underlines the necessity to disaggregate the state, 
that is, one should not only study central organisations and institutions in the capital and 
socially important groups, but also state-society relations in the periphery. The role of the 
state in society as a whole depends on its contact with other social organisations. The focus on 
the lower levels of the state outside the capital, Kohli and Shue (1994) adds, is useful in 
understanding the distribution of power within the state, and their capacity to define and 
implement policy reforms. Thirdly, not only states, but also social forces, are historical 
contingent (Migdal et al. 1994). Their political capacity is not predetermined, but dependent 
on their position in the social structure. For example, the proletariat or the peasantry cannot be 
said to have predetermined roles. Likewise, civil society does not come into existence in it 
own terms, but is the result of social and political processes. The last assumption underlines 
that state and society might be mutually empowering. Interaction between segments of the 
state and segments of the society may increase the power of both. Even though this is not 
always the case, it illustrates the necessity to avoid the state-society dichotomy and to 
consider the complexity that exists in the relations between them. 
The elaboration of these basic assumptions leads the authors to the definition of an 
anthropological approach to analyse the state. Many common definitions of the state, 
according to Migdal (1994), have a tendency to focus on its bureaucratic characteristics. 
Central questions asked are concerned with its ability to achieve given objectives and to 
implement policy reforms (refer the administrative decentralisation perspective). A dimension 
rarely included in these definitions, is the process leading to the modification of the initial 
objectives of a particular policy. The formulation of state policy is as much the product of its 
relation with groups in society, as it is the result of decisions made by top leaders or the 
legislative process. All this may modify the initial state agenda. This concerns not only its 
social fundament, but also its ability to implement policy reforms. As such, the state-in-
society approach is in line with the policy-as-process argument made by Mackintosh (1992) 
and the political decentralisation perspective. 
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In order to study the policy implementation process, it is important to take into account the 
different levels of the state. An anthropological approach may be undertaken in order to 
achieve this (Migdal 1994). This will direct attention towards the lower levels of the state 
hierarchy, where direct contact with social groups takes place. The political outcome does not 
always need to correspond to the overall interest of the state, but may rather be the result of 
the complex interaction between different state levels and the social pressure experienced on 
each of these levels.  
Theories about state-society relations are well suited for the study of the decentralisation. 
However, they have certain weaknesses. Their level of explanation is thought to be too 
general because they do not take into account the dynamic relations between state and society 
in Africa and everyday political practises are not analysed. The next section expands the state-
in-society framework by incorporating theories about state-society relations in Africa. 
State-society relations in the post-colonial African state 
As pointed out in the 1st paper, Bilgin and Morton (2002) go beyond the state-in-society 
approach when they direct attention to historical and contemporary factors that influences 
state formation. Bayart’s (1991) call for an approach that take into account the political 
trajectory of the state over a longue durée falls within this logic and directs attention to the 
historicity of the state and state-society relations. The explicit focus on state formation in an 
African context in Bayart’s theories complements the theories about state-building strategies 
offered by Hutchcroft and Boone and makes it possible to interpret decentralisation as a part 
of institution-building strategies. Furthermore, the politics-of-the-belly paradigm developed 
by Bayart seeks to shed light on the internal functioning of the African state and the state’s 
relation to and dependence on society. But before discussing Bayart’s theories, it may be 
useful to briefly discuss the concept of neo-patrimonialism.  
The neo-patrimonial state and patrimonial practise 
The concept of the neo-patrimonial state originates from Weber's notion of patrimonialism 
(Médard 1997). It serves as an analytical tool that may clarify some aspects of the internal 
dynamics of the post-colonial state in Africa. Patrimonialism is defined as a form of mix-up 
between the private and public spheres where power is personified rather than 
institutionalised (no division between public servants and their positions). There is 
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furthermore no separation between the political and economic spheres and economic and 
political resources are convertible units and may be traded with each other. Patrimonialism is 
covering a wide range of practises characterising African political life, among these nepotism, 
clientelism, patronage and corruption. According to Médard (1997), however, the African 
state is not patrimonial but patrimonialised and should be labelled neo-patrimonial. The 
concept of patrimonialism describes an ideal model of the state, while the neo-patrimonial 
state is a hybrid form that has developed in a particular context. The prefix neo indicates a 
modern, political hybrid form, and should not be confused with Weber’s ideal type of 
patrimonialism. Within pure patrimonialism, there is no formal separation between the private 
and the public. This separation is formally established within a neo-patrimonial state, but it is 
to a low degree internalised or respected. After independence in Africa, bureaucratic 
organisations grew in number and scope, and were patrimonialised through a de facto
appropriation by civil servants and politicians. Through these processes, the neo-patrimonial 
state emerged, a hybrid form of patrimonialism and bureaucracy. The formal structures of the 
state are bureaucratic, laws exist and civil servants are recruited on the basis of their 
performance. However, the states are not based on rule of law, but following a neo-
patrimonial logic. 
Within a neo-patrimonial logic, public positions are used as personal property. The lack of 
division between the political, the economic and the social implies that the search for wealth, 
power and prestige is governed by the same logic. In a neo-patrimonial state, the access to the 
state is the most important factor for accumulation of economic resources, wealth, and 
political power. As a result, political competition is not solely about political power, but also 
for the access to wealth. Clientelism and patronage are two forms of patrimonial mechanisms 
for economic redistribution and political control (Médard 1997). A client relationship may be 
seen as a relation of personal dependence based on the reciprocal exchange of goods between 
two persons, patron and client, which control different resources. While clientelism is based 
on personal loyalty bonds, patronage is less personified. It can be characterised as a certain 
form of distribution of public resources in exchange of political support. This is a central 
mechanism for African big men to establish and maintain political loyalty bonds. While the 
concept of neo-patrimonialism offers tools to analyse the internal functioning of the state, it 
does not say so much about the mechanisms through which political actors seek to control the 
state. Bayart (1993) offers a more comprehensive framework that locate the struggle for 
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hegemonic control of the state and state-society relations as part of post-colonial state 
formation.   
The politics of the belly and reciprocal assimilation of elites 
Based on criticism of the ahistorical approaches within the dependency and modernisation 
paradigms, Bayart (1993) seeks to reintroduce the historical dynamic of African societies by 
changing the focus of analysis from the state and elites to political actions undertaken by the 
dominated groups. He seeks to clarify the internal functioning of the African state and the 
mutual dependence between the state and the society.  
Bayart’s (1993) notion of the reciprocal assimilation of elites is a scenario that describes the 
construction of the modern African state. The crisis of the African state has intensified the 
struggle for hegemony between social groups. The ideal type scenarios regarding the outcome 
of this struggle are that of conservative modernisation (the already established dominant 
groups maintain their power) and that of social revolution (which brings about the downfall of 
the dominant group and the rise of at least a section of the subordinated group). The scenario 
of the reciprocal assimilation of elites is a compromise between the two ideal types and refers 
to a process where the struggle for political power is due to negotiation, and where 
compromises between regional, political, economic and cultural segments of the elites are 
made (Stokke 1994). 
The central dynamic aspects of the reciprocal assimilation of elite groups, with the 
incorporation of subordinate social groups, are located within political networks.29 Large parts 
of subordinate social groups as well as the political leadership in Africa belong to such 
networks. The solidarity is based on both a horizontal and a vertical axis: ”They link the 
‘lowest of the low’ with the ‘highest of the high’ through the agencies of continuous news, 
requests, gifts and far from disinterested symbolic celebrations” (Bayart 1993, p. 219). This 
system of struggle between different factions is at the heart of postcolonial politics, and is a 
central dynamic aspect that links society to the postcolonial state. A central mechanism 
characterising this linking process is captured in Bayart’s notion of the politics of the belly (la
29 The foundation for the reciprocal assimilation of elites is going on both in civil society and in the political 
society (Bayart 1993). The assimilation is taking place on a number of arenas in the elites’ everyday life; 
funerals, marriages, education institutions, churches, Islamic brotherhoods, and pilgrimage to Mecca. The 
personal relations established in these situations are important for the forming of dominant classes. Within the 
political sphere as well, there exist arenas for assimilation, like political parties, the bureaucracy and through 
elections.
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politique du ventre). According to Tag (1994), this is an attempt from Bayart to create a new 
paradigm for political analysis in Africa. The concept sheds light on the internal functioning 
of the African state and the state’s relation to and dependence on society. It describes a 
process of resource accumulation that takes place through straddling between employment in 
the state and private investments (Bayart 1993). Income generated as a consequence of the 
position in the state is used to finance housing, nourish an extensive social clientele and buy 
luxury goods. The economic fundament of the social division in African states is conditioned 
by the tertiary sector, and its origins can be traced back to the transition between the colonial 
and postcolonial period when the elite in African states gained access to state institutions. The 
conclusion is, according to Bayart (1993, p. 3), that “we now can take it for granted that it is 
their relation to the State which largely enables actors to get rich and dominate the social 
scene”. Thus, the most important source of accumulation of resources for individuals has been 
their relation to the state. Forms of clientelism and patronage are then used to distribute public 
resources in exchange of political support to establish and maintain political loyalty bonds. 
According to Bilgin and Morton (2002, p. 74), the politics of the belly constitutes an 
historicised representation of the post-colonial state, that is “the predatory pursuit … of 
wealth and power that, as a mode of governance, takes historically specific forms appropriate 
to the post-colonial state in Africa”.  
Political actors undertake different strategies in the struggle for hegemony (Bayart 1993). 
There are, however, several reasons to doubt that the struggle will ever reach a stage where 
one group control the state completely. This is linked to the existence of political actions at 
the grass root level that influence the state. Hence, the state is not only an institution that can 
be used by elites to reach their objectives, but is also influenced by the rest of the population. 
The actions of the elites are, however, the most important when it comes to the forming of the 
system as a whole. Furthermore, the most important sources of conflict in Africa are not class 
relations, but rather the struggle between factions that has dominated the political scene since 
independence;
Whether of socialist or capitalist persuasion, dominated by a party or by the army, 
pluralistic or monolithic, all these constitutional formulae – whose attributes are 
furthermore uncertain and changeable – rest upon one common denominator: at bottom, 
the actors organise themselves in factions in order to win or conserve power at the 
various echelons of the social pyramid, and this competition is the very stuff of political 
life (Bayart 1993, p. 211). 
  Theoretical framework
   
71
The struggle between factions is played out within the framework of the state in accordance 
with the logic of the reciprocal assimilation of elites on an everyday basis. Political 
entrepreneurs are hence given the opportunity as leaders of political networks (Stokke 1994). 
Bayart (1993) underlines the flexibility of these networks; they are not based on absolute 
identities, and are constantly changing in time and space.  
Theories about neo-patrimonialism and Bayart’s theory about the assimilation of elite groups 
provide analytical tools that make it possible to consider the role of decentralisation as part of 
wider political projects and processes. Rather than considering only the institutional aspects 
of decentralisation, as is the case within the administrative decentralisation perspective, 
decentralisation is seen as part of hegemonic struggles to control the state. In this way, 
Bayart’s theories complement Hutchcroft and Boone. It allows interpreting the administrative 
and political aspects of decentralisation with particular focus on informal political networks 
and clientelistic relations within political institutions and in state-society relations. 
The geography of decentralisation and state-society relations: 
space, place and scale 
As discussed in the 2nd paper, the elaboration of the decentralisation reform in Mali was based 
on a certain number of underlying assumptions related to both earlier administrative systems 
in Mali as well as local communities. The territorial reorganisation for instance was based on 
the assumption that the administrative structures established during colonialism and later 
reformed during the 1st and 2nd Republic was incongruent with existing local political realities 
and not suited to promote democratic and development. The idea was to replace the existing 
administrative system with viable local spaces rooted in existing social, economic, political, 
cultural and demographic relations that should assure community solidarity and create 
appropriate systems for the decentralised management of local affairs. The notion of local 
community, as understood by the MDRI, constituted the basic building block in the new 
decentralised governance system in Mali.  
This line of argument, forwarded by the MDRI, resembles very much the emergence of the 
community concept in local state restructuring in Britain. According to Raco and Flint (2001), 
local governance reforms under the New Labour government sought to merge traditional local 
democratic representative systems with participative structures based on active citizens and 
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communities. These reforms were based on the observation that the congruence of state 
institutions with particular places and communities were flawed. This was in part caused by 
the undermining of place-based activities by wider spatial economic, social and political 
processes and administrative reforms that focussed on the functionalism of local state 
structures rather than congruence with particular places. Raco and Flint (2001) attribute the 
problems related to community participation to what Taylor calls place-space tensions:
Everywhere, in fact, has the potential for being both place and space; this is what I will 
call place-space tension between the producers of space and the makers of place. This 
concept is the key to using place and space in political geography. When place and 
space constitute a single entity they define a geographically focused contested politics. 
The questions of who defines an institution in spatial terms and who sees it as a place 
opens up a politics of space and place (Taylor 1999, p. 12). 
The distinction between space and place adds a new dimension to the study of 
decentralisation. Taylor’s (1999) thinking about spaces as disenabling and places as enabling 
echoes the distinction between administrative and political decentralisation and opens up for 
political geographies that goes beyond the traditional focus on the state. The notion of space is 
more abstract than that of place and is related to rationality, bureaucracy and the state. States 
as space-producers imposes space on place through top-down political strategies while places 
may constitute centres for bottom-up opposition. Thus, the use of decentralisation as a 
political strategy by regimes to build and maintain hegemonic control over the state is, in the 
terminology of Taylor, a strategy to impose space on place. Administrative spatial state 
organisations and administrative systems are established to assure administrative efficiency 
and the imposition of state authority over places (Raco and Flint 2001). Decentralisation is in 
this regard the result of the creation of functional administrative spaces for service delivery 
and policy-making in which “community interests are identified, defined and institutionalised 
by policy makers in ways that facilitate particular types of decision-making or policy 
implementation” (Raco and Flint 2001, p. 591). Consequently, the concept of community 
represents a way to create place-space relations and spaces of state action through which the 
state may govern the population.  
However, places and communities, which are constructed through social relations over time, 
have particular dynamics that are difficult to capture when focus is directed towards spatial 
functionality: 
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A focus on spatial functionality may be unable to capture the particular dynamics of 
places, thereby making their effective governance more difficult… The construction of 
institutional spaces of local governance is therefore a contestable process, central to any 
examination of the relation between the local state and local communities (Raco and 
Flint 2001, p. 592) 
Based on these observations, the authors conclude that it is the degree of congruence between 
the spaces of governance and the structures that exist within particular places that is decisive 
regarding the tensions in the democratic system and the development of democratic practices. 
In this discussion of space capturing of places, the authors are in line with Mohan and 
Stokke’s (2000) warning against the danger of localism. The lack of focus on local social 
inequalities and power relations do not account for how the local is produced and how it is to 
be understood. This is, in my view, one of the most important critics of reforms based on the 
administrative decentralisation perspective. Administrative decentralisation falls within what 
Taylor (1999) labels traditional state-centred political geography. The conversion of places 
into spaces is inherent to the bureaucratic nature of state practices and is the only way to 
achieve administrative efficiency. Furthermore, this line of argument demonstrates the 
limitations on the part of the state to create local governance structures that are adjusted to 
local political relations.
Taylor advocates a political geography that develops from the tensions between space and 
place on different geographical scales where all tensions have influence on other scales 
because “the same location can be both place or space depending on whose perspective is 
involved” (Taylor 1999, p. 12, italics in original). This bring attention over to the concept of 
scale, and in particular what  Delany and Leitner (1997) calls the “political construction of 
scale”. Geographical scale has traditionally been associated with size or level (Mamadouh, 
Kramsch and Van der Velde 2004). Scale as size refers to the scope of any given scale and 
include on one side the global (as the largest) and the home or body on the other side (as the 
smallest). The underlying assumption is that size matters and that the similar processes that 
take place on different scales differ qualitatively. It is however difficult to delineate the 
boundaries between different scales. Scale as level implies a hierarchical ordering between 
scales that usually distinguishes between the local as the lowest and the global as the highest. 
However, both as size and as level, “scale is seen as social organisation in a bounded area” 
(Mamadouh et al. 2004, p. 457). In contrast to these two understandings, scale as relation
sees scale as mutually constitutive and co-existing: 
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No analysis can be limited to one scale: scales are constructed in relation to each other. 
The material and discursive production and reproduction of different scales are mutually 
constitutive and need to be analysed to understand scale as a process… Extra-local 
relations define the local. The global is part of the local as much as the local is part of 
the global (Mamadouh et al. 2004, p. 457). 
Research employing this understanding of scale is based on the assumption that: 
geographical scale is conceptualised as socially constructed rather than ontologically 
pre-given, and that geographical scales constructed are themselves implicated in the 
construction of social, economic and political processes (Delany and Leitner 1997, p. 
93).
Thus, scale is nothing predetermined that awaits discovery, but is subject to different and 
conflicting ways of framing and defining reality. The political construction of scale is an on-
going and open-ended process that involves more than formal state power. Acknowledging 
the significance of intra-state relations, the authors also direct attention to power, practices 
and scale of action among non-state actors. Thus, a constructivist view draws attention to the 
political construction of scale and actors’ scalar strategies (Mamadouh et al. 2004). In the case 
of decentralisation, focus on scalar strategies directs attention to the construction of new 
levels of governance (the creation of the municipality in Mali for instance), or the 
reconstruction of existing levels (deconcentration within the state for instance). Studies of 
scalar strategies may furthermore be centred on either the construction of a particular scale or 
the scale strategies of an actor. Combined with a particular focus on place, the study of the 
construction of a particular scale may shed light on the processes that take place within a 
limited geographical area and how actors in these areas respond to spatial and scalar strategies 
from above.  
Conclusion
The concepts of space, place and scale bring new dimensions into the discussion of 
decentralisation, institution-building and state-society relations. The combination of Taylor’s 
concept of place-space tensions with the state-in-society approach integrates analytical 
geographical concepts in the study of decentralisation. From the point of view of the state, 
decentralisation constitutes a means to impose spatial functionality on different places 
through the establishment of uniform local government structures based on an administrative 
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decentralisation perspective. However, the degree of space-place conversion is dependent 
upon the institution-building strategy that is chosen. In the case of usurpation, the state micro-
manages local political processes through a dense network of deconcentrated state institutions 
in order to impose its logic locally. If, on the contrary, it is based on non-incorporation, place-
based local political actors are more likely to dominate the local political scene because the 
state is a distant actor that does not seek to impose itself. In the latter cases, place becomes 
more important and may lead to greater spatial variations in local governance structures 
between localities. Place is the variable that influence the outcome of general processes in a 
local context and may, from the point of view of non-state actors, constitute an arena for 
opposition to state imposition of spatial functionality. 
Scale understood as a political construction complements theoretically the anthropology of 
the state approach developed within the state-in-society perspective, and helps analyse 
decentralisation as the result of interacting processes at different scales. The identification of 
the processes leading to the decision to decentralise, as well as the institutions responsible for 
the elaboration of the reform, normally takes place at national level and may provide 
information about the underlying assumptions on which the reform is based and why a reform 
came to be attributed particular institutional characteristics. This allows furthermore to the see 
decentralisation as a result of political strategies at a particular scale and as a process that 
involves scalar strategies from above. Furthermore, decentralisation involves, in the form of 
devolution or deconcentration, a reformation of the administrative and political system at 
multiple scales. When these reforms take place, political actors of different origin and at 
different levels engage themselves actively in order to assure an institutionalisation of the 
system that suits them. An analysis of the outcome of decentralisation in terms of local 
democratic governance directs furthermore attention to the interaction between different 
levels of the state hierarchy and social pressure experienced on each of these levels as a result 
of state-society interaction. This may give insight into the alteration of the initial intentions of 
the reform as conceived by top national political leaders and directs attention to the creation 
and transformation of place-based political processes. Bayart’s notion of political networks, 
the politics of the belly and reciprocal assimilation of elite groups also entail implicit 
assumptions about political processes that take place at different scales and how these 
processes affect each other. Bayart formulates informal mechanisms through which both the 
conversion of places into spaces occurs (assimilation of elite groups) as well as bottom-up 
opposition (revolution).  
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Theoretically, place-based politics is furthermore conditioned by political decisions and 
processes at other scales. Decentralisation reforms based on devolution and deconcentration 
imply the implementation of an institutional framework that affect the nature of place-based 
politics by offering opportunities for certain actors while obstructing those of others. 
Therefore, analysing decentralisation in terms of local democratic governance will necessitate 
the inclusion of the mutual interdependence between political strategies and processes at 
multiple scales. The institution-building strategies discussed by Boone are most concerned 
with states’ institution-building strategies and the nature of the state’s presence locally. It is 
however important to be aware that processes of spatial functionality also occur within local 
administrative units (like a municipality) and is an important part of local politics. The 
question of autochthony discussed in the 3rd paper is important in many African societies in 
relation to access to natural resources. In the case of devolution of authority to municipalities, 
conflicts over natural resources may be created or revitalised and become important stakes 
over which local groups and villages seek to institutionalise their authority.
The overall objective of this chapter has been to develop a theoretical framework that will 
facilitate the discussion of the politics of decentralisation and the outcome of decentralisation 
in terms of local democratic governance. As such, it has contributed to expand the theoretical 
foundation on which the papers are based and it will help to frame the discussion of the main 
case-base conclusions and the theoretical implications of the dissertation in the next chapter.
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Main conclusions: the politics of decentralisation 
The theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter constitutes the point of departure 
for the current discussion of the main conclusions of the dissertation. After a brief discussion 
of the division of labour between the papers with regard to research questions and focus of 
analysis, I draw up the main case-based conclusions based on the analysis in the papers. This 
will be followed by a final discussion of theoretical and analytical implications that may be of 
interest outside the Malian case. 
Research questions and focus of analysis 
The overall purpose of the dissertation has been to examine the politics of the decentralisation 
reform in Mali and the outcome of decentralisation in terms of local democratic governance. 
All three papers put the decentralisation reform at the centre of analysis, but they differ with 
regard to main research questions, focus of analysis and theoretical foundation. At the most 
elementary level, the division of labour between the three papers may be illustrated 
schematically as in figure 5.  
Figure 5. Simplified schematic division of labour between papers. 
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The time axis refers to the major époques in Malian political history and is consequently 
divided into a relative time line that corresponds to regime change. It is divided in this way 
because, as discussed in the 1st paper, local government reforms in Mali correspond by and 
large to regime change and attempts to build and maintain hegemonic control of the state. The 
scale axis is meant to distinguish between political actors and processes at three broadly 
defined levels; national, intermediate and local. This way of defining scale is based on the 
conventional scale as size and scale as level discussed in the previous section and serves to 
descriptively distinguish between the main focus of analysis within each of the papers. But, as 
will be discussed later, it is of more interest for the purpose of the dissertation how 
decentralisation has led to a reconstruction of different governance scales both nationally and 
locally.
The 1st paper is concerned with the historicity of political institutions and practices and how 
changing institution-building strategies is related to a regime’s attempt to build and maintain 
hegemonic control of the state. As such it covers the whole time line from colonialism until 
the implementation of the 3rd Republic. All levels are brought into the analysis, but it is 
mainly concerned with the national and intermediate level. The 2nd paper directs attention to 
the democratic transition and why decentralisation gained such a predominant place in the 
nation-building strategy of the Konaré regime. It is limited in time to the immediate pre-
transition period, the transition itself and the first years of the 3rd Republic. It focuses 
primarily on the intermediate and national level because it is at these levels that the processes 
that led to the fall of Traoré are to be found and it is among these groups that the demands for 
decentralisation was most clearly expressed (from tuareg rebellion and pro-democratic 
movement). The fact that the new regime of the 3rd Republic originated in the pro-democratic 
movement that contributed to the fall of Traoré meant furthermore that it brought the new 
discourse based on anti-Traoré sentiments from an intermediate level in political opposition to 
the centre of national level politics. The gap between the boxes representing the 1st and 2nd
paper in the figure (under the 2nd paper box) indicates a slightly greater concern with local 
political processes in the 1st paper. Paper 3 is first and foremost concerned with 
decentralisation and democratisation in local political contexts and the factors that influence 
the municipality as a governance scale. In time it is limited to the 3rd Republic but discussions 
concerning the future of decentralisation in Mali are also treated. The gap between the boxes 
that represent the 1st and 3rd paper (over the 3rd paper box) indicate that political processes at 
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the national level is of less concern in the latter paper although the influence of national level 
politics on local politics is discussed 
The geography of decentralisation in Mali – case-based 
conclusions
The politics of decentralisation: democratic transition, institution-building and 
hegemony 
As discussed in the papers, the overthrow of Moussa Traoré in 1991 instigated a political 
transition that was characterised by political negotiations over the future political system in 
the country. The transition was managed by a broad-based coalition made up by the military 
coup-makers, the pro-democratic movement in Bamako and representatives from the Tuareg 
rebel movements in northern Mali. The absence of the largely discredited former power 
holders during the transition made it possible to carve out a new political system that was 
based on demands raised during the democratic transition as well as the rebel movements. In 
the vocabulary of Bayart, the overthrow of Traoré and the subsequent transition may be 
labelled a social revolution because parts of the opposition gained hegemonic control over the 
state. The political project of the Konaré regime came to be based on a new ideological 
foundation that centred on democratisation and decentralisation. The demands for 
decentralisation were expressed on numerous arenas during the transition (the National 
Conference and the Estate-General were the most important in this regard) from a wide range 
of actors (civil society organisations, farmer’s organisations, Tuareg rebel movements). The 
nature of the political transition brought opposition and regional demands to the centre of 
national politics and led subsequently to the implementation of multi-party democracy and the 
adoption of the decentralised governance structure. Therefore, the first conclusion based on 
the Malian case is: 
1) Decentralisation came on the political agenda as a result of the particular nature of the 
democratic transition in Mali. Consequently, it has to be understood as the result of 
political processes that took place at a particular time in the political history of the country 
This conclusion directs the primary analysis towards the political processes that led to the 
adoption of the decentralisation reform. As discussed in the 2nd paper, the popular demands 
for decentralisation raised during the transition were captured by the Konaré regime and came 
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to be an important component in his post-transition democratisation project. The way in 
which decentralisation was framed within the wider political discourse on democratisation by 
the regime was a strategy to legitimise the reform. The active construction of the reform as a 
symbol of an idealised pre-colonial decentralised Mali should bridge the gap between state 
and society that had been created under colonialism and during the 1st and 2nd Republic. By 
transferring power to the municipality, which represents continuity with the pre-colonial Mali, 
decentralisation represents the mechanism through which state and society are to be reunited. 
As such, 
2) Decentralisation represented in the official discourse of the Konaré regime the extension 
of democratisation to the entire country 
But as discussed in the 1st paper, local government reforms in Mali have since colonial times 
been an important tool in a regime’s institution-building strategy. The abolishment of the 
canton as an administrative structure by the US-RDA was a strategic choice made by the 
leaders of the 1st Republic (1960-68) to marginalise competing political networks (the chefs
de canton had supported the rival political party PSP) in order to secure their hegemonic 
control of the state. The establishment of a three-tier administrative system governed by 
appointed bureaucrats contributed to expand the state presence locally and was an important 
tool in the regime’s attempt to consolidate its hegemony. Even though the Keita regime based 
their institution-building on usurpation, there are certain continuities with the power-sharing 
model on which the 1999 decentralisation reform is based. The proliferation of political 
practices based on the reciprocal assimilation of elites that developed during both the 1st and 
2nd Republic represents continuity:
3) The hierarchical redistribution of state resources through political networks based on the 
logic of the reciprocal assimilation of elite groups still represents, although within a multi-
party context, a basic strategy to build and maintain hegemonic control of the state 
Local government institution-building represent a mechanism through which regimes have 
sought to build and maintain hegemonic control of the state. Within this line of arguments it is 
clear that a narrow focus on the formal-legal characteristics of decentralisation (which is 
usually the focus of attention within a perspective based on administrative decentralisation) 
do not provide an adequate framework to examine the outcome of decentralisation in terms of 
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democratisation. Rather, as has become clear above, it is more fruitful to focus on the wider 
political context in which decentralisation take place, that is, the “politics of decentralisation”. 
The construction of the municipality as scale of governance – spatial 
functionality 
As mentioned previously, the delegation of the elaboration of the decentralisation reform to 
the MDRI and its attachment directly to the President’s Office assured political control of the 
process from above, and limited the influence on the process from the traditional state 
apparatus. This gave the MDRI quite a large manoeuvring space when it came to the 
elaboration of the institutional design of the reform. The strategy employed by the MDRI, 
discussed most thoroughly in the 2nd paper, may be divided into two main phase that resulted 
in a spatial and scalar reconfiguration of the state. 
The first phase represents an important innovation when it comes to local government reforms 
in Mali because the MDRI sought through this process to design a new politico-administrative 
structure at the local level. The large-scale participatory territorial reorganisation was based 
on the idea that the existing administrative structure was incongruent with the local political 
and social reality. The new system, rooted on community solidarity, should therefore assure 
the creation of homogenous, coherent and functional spaces suitable for local democracy and 
a governance structure that should assure access to services. Nevertheless, the reform sought 
to implement the same institutional structure country-wide with no adaptation to local 
variations. The devolution of authority to the municipalities as well as the deconcentration of 
state agencies during the second phase of the reform followed the same schema country-wide. 
Thus, it may be concluded that 
4) Even though the territorial reorganisation was an attempt to include the dynamics of 
particular places in the construction of the municipality as a scale of governance, the 
institutional design of the decentralised governance structure sought to impose spatial 
functionality
Using geographical terminology, it may be said that the MDRI was the most important space-
producer since it was responsible for the elaboration and the implementation of the reform. 
Nevertheless, the decentralisation reform has, in conjunction with institutional reforms of 
other state agencies, resulted in a scalar reconfiguration of the state in Mali (as discussed in 
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2nd paper). Decentralisation represents a power-sharing model for local governance that has 
marginalised the state as local decision-maker and opened up the local political space for a 
range of new actors to participate. However, as discussed in the 3rd paper, the implementation 
and consolidation of the decentralised governance system has not run as smoothly as 
anticipated by the MDRI. This reveals one of the fundamental problems regarding 
decentralisation in Mali and is related to the way the local political context has been taken 
into account in the design of the reform. This again is caused by a top-down strategy that is 
based on an administrative decentralisation perspective. In short, the imposition of space does 
not match local political logics and has created place-space tensions.  
Decentralisation and local politics: place-space tensions 
The discussion of decentralisation and local politics in the 3rd paper reveals a fundamental 
problem related to the implementation of decentralisation in Mali. The concept of place-space 
tension developed by Taylor (1999) may be used to contextualise some of these challenges. 
The construction of the municipality as a governance scale means that it has become a 
geographically specific entity were space and place meet. The producers of space (those who 
define institutions) are however different from what Taylor (1999) labels the makers of place. 
An analysis of decentralisation from a local point of view (from the makers of place) reveals 
another story than when it is seen from above because it redirects the attention towards 
politics from below and how the municipality has become an arena of contested politics. It 
has become subject to political contestations around the quest for authority and there are 
many actors that are interested in a particular institutionalisation of the municipality. The lack 
of coherence between the institutional design of the reform and local political logics indicates 
that the reform, elaborated and implemented from above (which is difficult to avoid), is based 
on incorrect premises. Consequently, it may be concluded that 
5) The decentralised governance institutions have become embedded in existing local 
political relations and are as such arenas for local struggles over authority and 
institutionalisation
From this point of view, the MDRI has failed to achieve the goal it set out to fulfil during the 
territorial reorganisation. The discussion in the 3rd paper shows that it has not been possible to 
create municipalities that are based on community solidarity. This is so because the MDRI 
failed to realise that community solidarity only exist on the drawing table and that questions 
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of identity and power have been more important for the implementation and consolidation of 
the reform (the question of autochthony for instance).  
Decentralisation and democratisation: state-society relations and politics from 
below
Even though decentralisation in Mali has led to a significant restructuring of the formal 
institutional landscape in the country, it is not possible to discuss the main purpose of the 
dissertation without referring to its political dimensions. The answer to the questions related 
to both why decentralisation was carried through in Mali and how decentralisation took the 
form it has taken can not be separated from the particular political situation in the country 
after the overthrow of Traoré in 1991. However, the political dimensions of decentralisation 
are not only related to the political situation at national level, but constitute an important 
factor to take into account in the discussion of the outcome of decentralisation in terms of 
local democratic governance. It is important to distinguish between processes at different 
levels, how they interact and the consequences for the outcome of the reform in terms of 
democratisation.  
Democratisation on national level should therefore be interpreted as part of wider political 
and institutional strategies employed to build and maintain hegemonic control of the state. 
The expansion of redistributive and clientelistic practices during the 1st and 2nd Republic 
within the logic of the reciprocal assimilation of elites groups were integral parts of the 
functioning of the state and have been reproduced and transformed during the 3rd Republic. 
Therefore, there is a certain degree of continuity in political practices even though the macro-
political regime now is based on formal democratic principles. As such it may be concluded 
that:
6) The reproduction of neo-patrimonial practices and redistribution through political 
networks is not so much a threat to the survival of the formal democratic institutions as it 
is to the democratic content of these institutions 
This means furthermore that as long as there are enough resources, redistribution will 
strengthen the legitimacy of the formal democracy and assure political stability at the national 
level. A crisis in the redistributive system may however undermine the legitimacy of the 
democratic regime. The introduction of macro-political democratic institutions in the early 
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1990s and increased power-sharing through decentralisation should therefore be understood 
as part of and circumscribed by a broader strategy of national political leaders to build and 
maintain political hegemony. This means that decentralisation may be seen as a strategy of 
assimilation by way of granting local and national political networks access to political power 
and resources. This was particularly important with regard to meeting the demands for more 
autonomy raised by the Tuareg rebel movements in Northern Mali. 
The strong link between democracy and decentralisation within the political discourse of the 
Konaré regime represented an ideological break with previous one-party traditions and made 
possible the introduction of a decentralised governance structure. The implementation of the 
municipality after the local elections in 1999 represented the manifestation of the expansion 
of the democratisation process to the local level and it shifted the balance of power locally 
away from state appointed bureaucrats towards elected municipal councillors. But as 
discussed in the 3rd paper, the creation of the municipality as a politico-administrative unit 
during the territorial reorganisation was largely a product of local power struggles rooted in 
local political constellations and identities. Local actors engaged themselves actively during 
this process because it was seen as an opportunity to get access to economic resources and 
political power. In terms of democratisation it may be said that: 
7) Even though national level democratisation has opened up the local political space for a 
range of new actors to participate on a formal basis and influence local decision-making, 
the municipality has in many cases become an arena for political struggle over authority 
and the institutionalisation of local politics 
The reconstruction of the local political space based on existing social and political relations 
and identities may in a long-term perspective undermine the democratic potential of 
decentralisation. Local elite capture may undermine formal participation and lead to a 
situation where influence is canalised through clientelistic networks that may lead to 
exclusion of certain groups. In addition to the politics-from-below arguments presented in the 
3rd paper, the impact of the state on local democratisation is highlighted as important 
throughout the papers. One of the fundamental problems in the conceptualisation of the 
reform on the part of the MDRI is related to the underlying principles on which the territorial 
reorganisation was based. As discussed in the 2nd paper, the overall objective of the territorial 
reorganisation was the creation of municipalities of suitable sizes for the management of local 
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affairs that had legitimacy among those who where to inhabit them. However, the focus on 
“community solidarity” and the creation of “viable local spaces” based on existing social, 
cultural and political relations failed to realise the conflicting nature of political relations at 
the local level (discussed in paper 3). Rather than assuring local community solidarity the 
reform has in many cases intensified and catalysed political tensions locally. Another 
important threat to the future of the municipalities in Mali is the lack of any real devolution 
from the central state. This may undermine local democracy and lead to a dislocation of the 
centre of power away from the municipal institutions towards the state administration 
(recentralisation) or to groups outside the formal political arena (informalisation). Both of 
these processes threaten to undermine the democratic potential of decentralisation in a local 
context in a long-term perspective. Furthermore, this means that formal democratic structures 
may be maintained at the national level (in its minimalist form) at the same time as the state 
undermines democratisation at the local level 
The politics of decentralisation: theoretical implications 
As discussed at the beginning of the theoretical framework, a major assumption within 
international discourses on decentralisation is that it promises (theoretically) to promote 
democratisation and advance development. And the Malian case shows that decentralisation 
has to a certain extent brought about positive changes locally in terms of democratisation. 
Nevertheless, based on the conclusions above, it is clear that an assumed positive link 
between democratisation and decentralisation is too simple. Rather, one of the conclusions 
learned from the Malian case that should constitute the point of departure for any study of 
decentralisation is that: 
1) The outcome of decentralisation in terms of local democratic governance should be 
analysed as a function of state-society relations 
The theoretical framework elaborated in the previous section has been fruitful with regard to 
the examination of the outcome of decentralisation in terms of local democratic governance. 
The theories developed by Boone and Hutchcroft have served to analyse changes in 
institution-building strategies over time within both the administrative and political sphere. 
This has helped to shed light on the mechanisms through which the state has sought to 
structure and control state-society relations. Bayart’s theory about state formation has added a 
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further dimension to the theories about institution-building in an African context. His 
contribution to the analysis of decentralisation is related to his conceptualisation of the 
internal functioning of the African state and how the state seeks to assimilate political 
networks and link the “highest of the high with the lowest of the low”. Bayart’s theories 
frame institution-building strategies within a broader context of state formation and 
hegemonic struggles to control the state in an African context. In this light,
2) Studies of decentralisation should consider the manner in which decentralisation is part of 
institution-building strategies that are employed to build and maintain hegemonic control 
of the state 
This implies that the primary focus of the analysis of decentralisation should be moved away 
from what Bratton and van de Walle (1997) calls the formal-legalistic characteristics of 
institutions toward informal political networks within and around formal political institutions. 
The observation made by Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor (2003) that the establishment of 
democratic institutions not necessarily implies the spread of democratic politics, means 
furthermore that state-society relations based on elite assimilation may well exist within a 
formal macro-democratic regime. Therefore, redistribution through political networks may 
assure the survival of formal democratic regimes because it contributes to political stability. 
However, lack of resources may undermine the legitimacy of the formal-democratic regime 
and as such constitute a threat to democratic consolidation in a long-term perspective. 
Therefore, during periods of changing institution-building strategies, it is necessary to pay 
attention to the ways in which political institutions develop and how political practices are 
transformed and reproduced. 
Democratic consolidation is however not only a question about the functioning of national 
political institutions. The state-in-society approach contributes to an increased understanding 
of democratisation by directing attention to the different levels of the state were social 
pressure is felt and to processes that take place in the periphery (in local contexts). As the 
Malian case shows, the state has a certain autonomy and capacity to impose reforms from 
above. By disaggregating the state, the state-in-society approach however directs the focus of 
attention to the outcome of policy reforms in local political contexts as the function of state-
society relations. This implies that the capacity of the state to undertake change through 
policy reforms is dependent on its relation to society. In local political contexts there are 
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several relations that may alter the initial intentions of a reform. As discussed in the 3rd paper, 
the creation of the municipalities in Mali was based on existing social and political relations 
and what I called “reconstruction from below”. Local identities rooted in the dichotomy 
between new-comers and late-comers were particularly important in this regard. As a result, 
the decentralised institutions have in many areas become embedded in local political relations 
and turned into arenas on which local political struggle over authority take place. This has in 
turn undermined the democratic potential of decentralisation and made the municipality an 
arena for the creation and transformation of patron-client relations. On a more general level, 
this means that non-state actors have considerable influence on the outcome of policy 
reforms. This influence is however uncoordinated and dependent on contextual local political 
and social relations. All in all it may be said that 
3) Decentralisation from above may bring about positive changes locally in terms of 
democratisation, but the outcome of the reform is mediated by state-society relations and 
place-specific conditions 
The observation that the outcome of decentralisation is partly the result of state-society 
relations and the particularity of the local political context means furthermore that there will 
be spatial variations in local governance structures. So even though the formal decentralised 
institutions that are established are the same, the outcome of the reform is mediated by place-
specific characteristics.  
While the state-in-society approach directs attention to the relation between the state and non-
state actors, focus on intra-governmental relations points to how process within the state 
threatens to undermine local democratic governance in a long-term perspective in several 
respects. Opposition to devolution from ministries and the lack of transfer of economic 
resources to the municipalities may render the decentralised institutions empty of any 
significant functions at all. This may lead to both a relative transfer of power locally towards 
the administration (recentralisation) and new informal arenas of decision-making that 
marginalise the role of the municipality (informalisation). The proliferation of clientelistic 
practices locally originating from state-sponsored development schemes may furthermore 
undermine democratisation locally. An implication for other studies of decentralisation based 
on this line of argument is that:  
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4) It is important to consider how processes within the state both at national and local level 
influence the functioning of local government institutions both formally and informally  
In addition to this it is in my view equally important to analyse the relation between 
decentralisation and democratisation from a local point of view. As discussed in the 3rd paper, 
the decentralisation reform has opened up the local political space for a range of new actors to 
engage themselves in local politics. This was the case during the territorial reorganisation but 
still, several years after the implementation of the reform, there are continuous political 
struggles over authority and the institutionalisation of the local political arena. The outcome 
of this process will depend on the social and political place-specific particularities in any 
given context, but there are indications that the process has not generated the desired outcome 
in terms of local democracy and participation. This indicate that
5) An analysis of the outcome of decentralisation in terms of local democratic governance 
should be sensitive to the transformation of place-specific social and political relations 
The above discussion indicates that the idea of an assumed positive correlation between 
decentralisation and democratisation is too simple. The reason why such an idea has 
developed, in my view, is that it is based on an underlying administrative decentralisation 
perspective. Within this perspective, both decentralisation and democratisation are understood 
in narrow technocratic and institutional terms. Rather, as the title of the dissertation indicates, 
it is more fruitful to choose a political angle in the examination of decentralisation in terms of 
democratisation. A political decentralisation perspective directs attention to informal political 
relations, broadly defined governance structures, political processes at multiple scales, the 
political construction of governance scale, institution-building strategies, the internal 
functioning of the African state, and state-society relations.
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Paper 1 The historicity of political institutions 
and practices – democratic consolidation and 
political continuity in Mali 
Democratic consolidation has been at the heart of discussions regarding the survival of the 
regimes that went through democratic transitions in Africa in the early 1990s. Two dominant 
theoretical approaches within the consolidation debate, the institutional and the cultural 
tradition, have made substantive contributions to the understanding of democratic 
consolidation as a “mutually reinforcing processes of institutionalisation (at a macro level) 
and legitimation (at a micro level)” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005, p. 27, italics in 
original). Although this focus on the rules and implementation of macro-political structures 
(the institutional perspective) and on whether or not democracy has any meaning to people 
(the cultural approach) is important, this article will argue that these perspectives do not fully 
take into account the historicity of and the mutual interdependence between political 
institutions and political practices that are necessary to fully analyse the complexity of 
democratic consolidation in Africa. The main argument is that a focus on the historicity of 
institutions and practices with particular emphasis on institution-building strategies and 
informal political processes will allow for a more context-specific analysis of democratic 
consolidation.
Mali constitutes an interesting case when discussing democratic consolidation in an African 
context. The country has come a long way in establishing macro-political democratic 
institutions after its transition to a multiparty political system in 1992. The organisation of 
three legislative and presidential elections (1992, 1997 and 2002) and the implementation of a 
comprehensive decentralisation reform in 1999 have contributed to the portrayal of Mali as a 
democratic success-story both by academics, politicians, NGOs, and international 
development aid donors. The democratisation efforts have been strengthened by continuous 
political commitment to reforms at top national level during the successive regimes since 
1992. Various political reforms have opened up the political space for new actors at both 
national and local level and have reduced state intervention and the abusive powers of state 
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agencies. The country has also experienced a political stability that is qualitatively different 
from its neighbouring countries. Interpreted within the institutional perspective, the 
conclusion that Mali has come quite far in regard to democratic consolidation is thus not very 
controversial.
This article presents an alternative analysis of the democratisation process in Mali. The 
overall argument is that even though Mali has made major achievements in the 
implementation of macro-political democratic structures, continuities in political practices 
undermine the consolidation of these institutions. The article highlights the historicity of and 
the interdependence between political institutions and political practices, starting from the 
French colonial administrative and municipal policies and their effects on the independence 
struggle and indirectly on the development of post-colonial institutions and practices. This 
analysis of the interdependent development of institutions and practices builds the foundation 
for a critical evaluation of current democratic consolidation in Mali. 
Democratic institutions and democratic practices 
Debates on democratic consolidation are, according to Bratton and van de Walle (1997) first 
and foremost about the durability of democracy. Studies of democratic transitions have 
commonly focused on electoral turnovers as a test of democratic consolidation. In order to 
avoid this “fallacy of electoralism”, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) draw a distinction 
between the consolidation of democratic rule and the survival of democratic regimes. Their 
argument is that the longer democracy survives (the regular convening of multiparty elections 
and respect of political rights), the likelier is consolidation (institutionalisation of democratic 
practices). However, the observation that consolidation is likelier the longer a democracy 
survives does not say much about the particular processes and mechanisms that make 
consolidation possible. Likewise, it does not account for cases where consolidation does not 
take place even though the formal democratic macro-political institutions are upheld. This 
position is in line with Harbeson’s (2001) general observation that contemporary 
democratisation theory focuses almost exclusively on horizontal relations at national level. 
His view that local political processes are excluded as important in themselves is echoed in 
Pierre and Peters’ (2000) call to go beyond a sterile view of political institutions and their 
relation to the surrounding society. They argue that the concept of governance should reorient 
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the attention from the formal politico-administrative system at the national level towards more 
informal political processes within the state and in state-society relations at different levels. 
A useful point of departure for such contextual analyses of consolidation is the distinction 
made by Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor (2003) between democratic institutions and democratic 
politics. Their main argument is that the establishment of democratic institutions not 
necessarily implies the spread of democratic politics. This means, for instance, that even 
though democratic political institutions are put in place, as they are in Mali, it does not 
automatically mean that the actual politics and functioning of these institutions are becoming 
more democratic. Reforms of political institutions may affect the range of possible political 
practices that may occur at any time (opening up or closing political space for certain political 
practices) while political practices may influence the internal functioning of the political 
institutions. The spread of undemocratic political practices within formally democratic 
institutions may thus undermine the prospects for consolidation. Bringing informal political 
processes at different levels into the analysis directs attention towards this mutual 
interdependence between political institutions and political practices.  
The democratic transitions in Africa in the early 1990s resulted in the most far-reaching 
transformation of the political organisation of African states since independence. In their 
politico-institutional approach to transition, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) state that they 
are less concerned with the formal-legal characteristics of the institutions as such. Rather, 
they focus on the existence of informal political networks within formal political institutions, 
which they see as particularly relevant where clan and clientelistic relations influence to a 
large degree the bureaucratic functioning of formal-legal institutions. Particularly in phases of 
transition, it is important to focus on political actors that are struggling over the content of 
policies and the design of institutions. They engage in the creation and redesign of institutions 
because they know that “institutions create authoritative precedents that can relieve them of 
the burden of constantly fighting the same old political battles over and over again” (Bratton 
and van de Walle 1997: 42). The authors thus draw attention to the processes and institutions 
internal to existing political regimes and base themselves on the observation that a “country’s 
political prospects derive directly from its own inherited practices” (Bratton and van de Walle 
1997, p. 41). In considering the contribution of these domestic political factors to regime 
transition they direct attention to the “intermediate institutions that shape political strategies, 
the ways institutions structure relations of power among contending groups in society, and 
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especially the focus on the process of politics and policy-making within given institutional 
parameters” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, p. 7, in Bratton and van de Walle 1997, p. 42, 
emphasis in original).  
This is why, according to Bratton and van de Walle (1997), focus on formal political 
institutions within countries where rule of law is weak or non-existent is not very relevant. 
Routine procedures for politics exist, but the most important rules are informal: the “real 
institutions of politics in Africa are the informal relations of loyalty and patronage established 
between “big men” and their personal followers” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, p. 43-44). 
Neopatrimonialism is thus seen as the key institutional characteristic of African regimes: the 
chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage rather than through ideology 
or class. Relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade the formal political and 
administrative system and leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service 
than to acquire personal wealth and status. It is within such neopatrimonial regimes that 
political institutions have evolved in Africa and this shapes both politics and political 
transitions. This leads them to a quite pessimistic conclusion about the prospects for 
democratic consolidation since “current political situations are national permutations on a 
theme of regime change in a context of neopatrimonial continuity” (Bratton and van de Walle 
1997, p. 278). 
The approach advocated by Bratton and van de Walle offers an important framework within 
which to analyse regime transitions in Africa, but their preoccupation with national level 
political institutions and practices downplay other levels of governance. Fortunately, 
alternative studies of institution-building strategies and local responses to these direct 
attentions to other levels of governance than the national. 
Institution-building strategies 
Echoing Bratton and van de Walle’s (1997) concern with the design of institutions, Boone 
(2003) draws attention to administrative and municipal reforms as political tools in a regime’s 
strategy for political control. Thus, any analysis of institution-building strategies and the 
introduction of new governance institutions at the local level pay close attention to the rulers’ 
attempts to build and maintain their political hegemony (Boone 2003). This does not mean 
that ordinary people and rural areas may not benefit from such reforms, but that these benefits 
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largely have to be seen as by-products of broader political processes in which rulers seek to 
assure their political survival.  
The central question in Boone’s analytical framework is the variations that exist in strategies 
vis-à-vis rural societies and the explanatory factors behind these variations. Emphasising the 
degree of centralisation of state political and administrative structures, the willingness of 
regimes to accommodate rural elites and the degree of interventionism, Boone (2003) sets up 
a two-dimensional framework to compare institutional links between core and periphery. The 
spatial dimension, on the one hand, pays attention to how state agencies and institutions are 
arranged within the national space, understood in terms of concentration and deconcentration 
of the governmental apparatus. Within the processural dimension, on the other hand, the de 
facto distribution of authority between central and local actors is subject to closer scrutiny, i.e. 
the degree of devolution.
Institution-building strategies may therefore be classified along two dimensions: the spatial 
concentration/deconcentration of the state apparatus; and the centralisation/devolution of 
political and economic authority. Four different institution-building strategies may be derived 
from this (Boone 2003, p. 360): 
- Power-sharing within a deconcentrated institutional structure where authority is devolved. 
A dense network of state and party-state institutions in rural areas provide the 
infrastructure for devolution of control over state resources and prerogatives to rural elites 
(de facto or de jure); 
- Usurpation within a deconcentrated institutional structure where authority is centralised. 
A dense network of state institutions in rural areas provide infrastructure for state agents 
to micromanage local political processes. It aims at disrupting established local political 
processes and the displacement of rural elites;
- Administrative occupation within a concentrated institutional structure where authority is 
centralised. State agents govern localities from strategic outposts and are not influenced 
by local elites;
- Non-incorporation within a concentrated institutional structure where authority is 
devolved. State agents are as distant from rural localities as in the previous strategy, but 
they do not seek to exercise authority locally. Localities are left to their own devices, and 
the state does not seek neither to engage nor impose 
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Boone’s (2003) main argument is based on the observation that differences in power between 
social actors in rural areas to a large degree offers explanations for differences in institution-
building strategies. Reforms of institutions in the African countryside are thus based on 
political rather than administrative considerations. The results are shaped by struggles within 
rural societies and between rural actors and the state. In a broader sense, the effectiveness of 
reforms is determined largely by the politico-economic context in which the reforms are 
carried out. And this is to a large degree linked to the disjuncture between the functioning of 
formal institution and the real politics of how state agencies and institutions work. 
In addition to these spatial and processural dimensions, I will argue that the addition of a 
temporal dimension will bring added value to the analysis of institution-building strategies. 
As will be elaborated in the Malian case, institutional reforms, which may take place in 
periods of transition, draws attention to the historical legacy of previous institutions and the 
internal practices of these institutions. 
The historicity of political practices 
Bayart’s (1991) calls for a focus on political historicity in Africa and the need to analyse the 
political trajectory of the state over a longue durée. While Bratton and van de Walle provide 
valuable analyses of political actors at the national level and Boone draws attention to the 
institution-building strategies pursued by political regimes and how the result depends on 
power differences among rural actors, none of them are explicit on the historicity of the 
relation between national and local actors and institutions. Likewise, it can be observed that 
the general state-in-society approach directs attention towards the interaction between the 
state and different segments of society in explaining patterns of dominance, maintenance of 
status quo and political changes (Degnbol 1999; Migdal 1994). However, it is necessary to go 
beyond this state-in-society approach to include a “generative conception of the formation of 
state structures in relation to specific historical conditions and contemporary influences” 
(Bilgin and Morton 2002, p. 73, italics in original). Building on Gramsci’s concept of the 
pursuit of hegemony, Bilgin and Morton (2002) thus advocates an approach that focuses on 
its social basis and how social forces relate to the development of states. This underlines the 
necessity of employing a historicised approach that takes into account the particularities of a 
state formation.  
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Bayart (1993) proposes such a method that takes into account the historicity of the modern 
African state by identifying different scenarios of its construction. As a point of departure 
Bayart “formulates the hypothesis that the postcolonial African state is characterised by a 
hegemonic crises and hence, an intensified struggle for hegemony by different social groups” 
(Stokke 1994, p. 126, italics in original). This hegemonic struggle seeks a relatively stable 
balance of power between these groups and their regional or ethnic counterparts and can 
follow different scenarios. Two ideal types exist according to Bayart (1993, p. 119): “firstly 
that of conservative modernisation whereby already established groups maintain their 
power… - and secondly, that of social revolution, which brings about the downfall of the 
dominant group and the rise of at least a section of the subordinated group”. In actual 
historical situations however, compromises are made between these two ideal types. An 
intermediate scenario is thus identified as the reciprocal assimilation of elites. It refers to a 
process where political power is negotiated and achieved through compromises between 
regional, political, economical and cultural segments of the elites (Stokke 1994). The struggle 
between factions is played out within the framework of the state in accordance with the logic 
of the reciprocal assimilation of elites. Within this system, political entrepreneurs are given 
the opportunity as leaders of political networks (Bayart 1991; Stokke 1994). 
The central dynamic aspects of the reciprocal assimilation of elite groups, with the 
incorporation of subordinate social groups, are located within political networks. Large parts 
of subordinate social groups as well as the political leadership in Africa belong to such 
networks. The solidarity is based on both a horizontal and a vertical axis: ”They link the 
‘lowest of the low’ with the ‘highest of the high’ through the agencies of continuous news, 
requests, gifts and far from disinterested symbolic celebrations” (Bayart 1989, p. 211). This 
system of struggle between different factions is at the heart of postcolonial politics, and is a 
central dynamic aspect that links society to the postcolonial state. A central mechanism 
characterising this linking process is captured in Bayart’s notion of the politics of the belly.
This concept sheds light on the internal functioning of the African state and the state’s 
relation to and dependence on society. The politics of the belly describe a process of resource 
accumulation which takes place through straddling between employment in the state and 
private investments (Hetland 2000). Forms of clientelism and patronage are then used to 
distribute public resources in exchange of political support used in order to establish and 
maintain political loyalty bonds. According to Bilgin and Morton (2002, p. 74), the politics of 
the belly constitute thus the historicised representation of the post-colonial state, i.e. “the 
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predatory pursuit … of wealth and power that, as a mode of governance, takes historically 
specific forms appropriate to the post-colonial state in Africa”.  
Based on these brief theoretical remarks, the remaining sections of the article examine the 
democratisation process in Mali. The main argument here is that political institutions and 
practices are the result of particular historical trajectories. The historicity of the mutual 
interdependence between institutions and practices provide the basic framework within which 
to interpret current efforts of democratisation. Here it can be observed that institution-building 
based on usurpation has constituted the basic hegemonic strategy to control the postcolonial 
state in Mali until the democratic transition in the early 1990s. Through reforms of 
administrative and municipal structures, political leaders have sought to extend state control 
locally and to build support from political networks based on the reciprocal assimilation of 
elites. The administrative reforms based on usurpation undertaken by the leaders of the 1st
Republic for instance, were rooted in hegemonic struggles to control the postcolonial state 
and were conditioned by French colonial administrative policy. These institution-building 
strategies opened up the political space for the expansion of corrupt and clientelistic practices 
that influenced the internal functioning of the post-colonial state. Within the current 
multiparty and decentralised context, the reproduction and transformation of these practices 
do not pose so much a threat to the maintenance of a minimalist democracy as to the 
democratic content of these institutions.  
Colonialism and the rise of political networks 
Administrative and municipal institutions have played an important role in the political 
history of independent Mali as national political leaders have sought to build and maintain 
their hegemony. The struggle to control state power was institutionalised before independence 
through the political parties Union Soudanais – Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (US-
RDA), backed by bureaucrats and merchants, and Parti Soudanais Progressiste (PSP), mainly 
supported by rural elites rising to power during the colonial period. US-RDA established itself 
as the dominant political party and gained control over the Malian state at independence under 
the presidency of Modibo Keita. The administrative and municipal reforms undertaken by 
US-RDA during late colonialism and the 1st Republic (1960-68) sought to marginalise rural 
elites by abolishing the local administrative structure set up by French colonial authorities. 
The canton and the tribus on which France had based their indirect rule were replaced by a 
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three-tier administrative system giving more power to the representatives of the central state. 
The tendency after independence was thus, in Boone’s terminology, a move away from a 
system mainly based on non-incorporation to a larger degree of usurpation. The struggle 
between US-RDA and the PSP and the subsequent development of post-colonial institutions 
and practices was to a large degree pre-conditioned by French colonial policy.
French colonial authorities in West Africa built their rule in rural areas to a large degree on 
various forms of pre-existing political structures. Among these were successive feudal 
empires in the immediate pre-colonial period that, according to Lange (2000), was the result 
of large invasions from the 17th to the 19th century. Other less state-like political structures 
during the pre-colonial period included, according to Meillassoux (1970), independent 
villages loosely assembled into chiefdoms. French indirect rule in both chiefdoms and 
empires was gradually institutionalised through the creation of administrative units named 
cantons. As leaders of these structures they either reinstated local aristocratic families 
marginalised as a result of the conquest of the Muslim reformer El Haj Umar in the middle of 
the 19th century or handed power to soldiers that had served in the French armies. In areas 
predominantly inhabited by nomads, the tribus was the equivalent administrative structure to 
the canton in sedentary areas (Sow 1989). While the canton was subdivided into villages, the 
tribus was composed of nomadic fractions based on kinship. On a higher administrative level, 
the canton and the tribus were regrouped in subdivisions or in administrative posts, which on 
their side made up the cercle, the highest administrative level during colonialism.  
The policy of assimilation during early colonisation led, according to Conklin (1997), to a 
concentration of power in French hands and the reduction of the power of rural elites. A 
policy shift during the 1920s towards association meant that French colonial power put more 
weight on working through indigenous political structures. This change from administrative 
occupation to non-incorporation as institution-building strategy was rooted in calls for 
equality with French citizens by African soldiers serving during World War I as well as 
French civilising ideas. The policy of association offered local elites new opportunities for 
accumulation of power and wealth (Conklin 1997). They were for insistence granted access to 
agricultural technology and capital resources with the aim of introducing new farming 
methods. Corruption and excessive labour demands became widespread among the 2200 
canton chiefs in French West Africa. But as long as they collected taxes and delivered labour 
demanded by the local French commandant, they operated quite independently.
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In contrast to rural areas, French authorities established a range of new municipal institutions 
in the largest urban settlements, of which there were only 13 at independence and 19 in 1991 
(Sow, pers. comm.30). Through the successive establishment of these urban institutions, the 
autonomy of locally elected authorities increased (Traoré 1991), and hence also the degree of 
power-sharing. Consultative organs played a certain role in the commune mixte (1918-1947) 
and the commune de moyen exercise (1947-1960). With the establishment of the commune de 
plein exercise after the municipal reform in 1955, the municipal council was accorded 
increased autonomy vis-à-vis the colonial administration particularly in budgeting and in tax-
raising activities. 
Although the French policy of association involved the transfer of a limited portion of 
authority, the administrative and municipal system established during colonialism reflected 
the colonial authorities’ aim of maintaining political control (Sow 1989; Conklin 1997). This 
colonial administrative and municipal policy altered the existing local power structures, but 
existing pre-colonial clientelistic relations continued, according to Lange (2000), to form the 
underlying networks of political relations. Particularly in rural areas, French policy gave 
opportunities to certain groups (the canton and tribus chiefs) at the expense of others 
(Meillassoux 1970). At the time of independence the social structures in rural areas were 
divided into competing local families: those who held canton chieftaincy and served as 
instruments of the colonial power and those excluded from such power. French administrative 
policy based on non-incorporation thus created the necessary political space for local political 
networks to maintain a certain degree of autonomy to uphold their power base. In the towns, 
particularly in Bamako, the merchants and the bureaucracy (government employees, business 
clerks, medical personnel, and trade unionists recruited) gained strength. These urban groups 
later came to play an important role in national-regional coalition-building as part of the 
struggle to gain political hegemony. 
Usurpation and assimilation: the redistributive quest for 
hegemony during the 1st Republic 
The hegemonic struggle between US-RDA and PSP to control the postcolonial state thus 
reflected transformations taking place during the colonial period. The US-RDA strategy was 
30 National Director, Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security, 18 September 1998. 
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based on assimilation through coalition-building as well as administrative and municipal 
reforms that at the same time sought to marginalise competing networks while extending state 
control locally.
PSP, enjoying the support of both the colonial administration and the canton chiefs in French 
Sudan, had been the dominant political party until the elections in 1957 (Diarrah 1986; 
Conklin 1997). The non-intervention strategy of the colonial administration during the 1957 
elections was an important factor in determining the decline of the PSP. US-RDA, on the 
other hand, given its hostility to the French administration, had been active in forging 
extensive support networks, among others with merchants and bureaucrats (Martin 1976). 
Furthermore, the success of US-RDA also has to be attributed to its efforts to incorporate 
existing regional coalitions in core areas of the country that already had long traditions of 
state-building based on cultural assimilation of other ethnic groups. Zolberg’s (1967) 
observation that the growth of the party was linked to its successful integration of historical 
regions centred on towns such as Segou, Timbuktu and Mopti underlined the important 
assimilation strategy that underpinned the post-colonial state. The post-colonial state thus 
took the form of a “confederacy of regions represented by ambassadors at the centre” 
(Zolberg 1967: 460). In Bamako, for instance, the 11 local branches of the US-RDA were 
organised around wards that used to be ethnically homogenous, underlining the territorial 
basis of political life in these neighbourhoods. The nation-building strategy of the 1st republic 
combined the territorial federalism aspect with the ancient tradition of previous nation-
building experiences and the urban traditions of old cities, within a Marxist-Leninist discourse 
emphasising assimilation of ethnic groups. According to Wolpin (1975), the success of Keita 
was thus based on the fact that they managed to incorporate occupational and trade unions as 
well as ethnic and regional power-brokers into their party to a larger degree than did PSP.  
After its electoral victory in 1957, US-RDA sought the double objective of marginalising 
competing political networks and extending the reach of the state (Diarrah, 1986). On national 
level this led to the creation of a nationalised economic sector and the strengthening of the 
administration’s planning capacity (Meillassoux 1970; Hall, Magassa, Ba and Hodsen 1991). 
The steps taken to marginalise competing networks were particularly visible in the party’s 
administrative reforms. After the disappearance of French West Africa as a political entity 
between 1956 and 1960, US-RDA gained control over the Territorial Assembly (Diarrah 
1986). While French colonial policy to a large degree was based on non-incorporation, the 
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US-RDA based itself on usurpation as their main institution-building strategy. This led to the 
abolishment of the canton and tribus as administrative units, which consequently, led to the 
marginalisation of the political supporters of PSP. 
The colonial administrative structure was replaced by a three-tier administrative system; 6 
regions (Kayes, Bamako, Sikasso, Ségou, Mopti and Gao) were organised into 42 cercles
which, on their part, were further subdivided into arrondissements (Sécréteriat général de la 
presidence de la république 1987; Imperato 1987; Sow 1989). The replacement of the canton 
/tribus chiefs with state appointed bureaucrats within the arrondissement led, according to 
Sow (1989), to an extension of the presence of state structures locally and to a reduction in the 
influence of local elites on the state apparatus. This three-tier system, with certain 
modifications, constituted the basic administrative structure until the implementation of the 
decentralisation reform in 1999. 
The institutional set-up in rural areas was designed to extend the state presence locally and 
was an important tool in the regime’s attempt to consolidate its hegemony. The function of 
the leader of the circumscription (at all three levels; the gouverneur de région, the 
commandant de cercle and the chef d’arrondissement) represented, generally, an extension of 
a system based on maintenance of public order, the resolution of conflicts and tax collection 
(Sow 1989). In the urban municipalities on the other hand, redistributive and clientelistic 
practices rooted in the institutional set-up of the state increased as the result of the regime’s 
need to maintain its political hegemony. The strong political support for the Keita regime in 
urban areas led to the inclusion of the mayors into the dominant political network at national 
level through patron-client relations (Wolpin 1975; Traoré, pers. comm.31). In addition to 
holding the position as mayors, they were also members of the National Assembly and 
secretary-generals of the local sections of the party. Throughout the 1st Republic, patronage 
was redistributed both regionally and ethnically in order to upheld political support. 
Economic resources were canalised to local power brokers and further down to large parts of 
the urban population. Corruption among public servants, in the form of speculation in real 
estate, investments in taxi enterprises, and illegal activities in foreign and domestic trade as 
well as other forms of corruption related to their administrative occupancy, was accepted by 
the regime based on its need for political support to uphold its hegemony. 
31 Association Avenir – Espace – Sociétés, Observatoire de Foncier au Mali, 27 September 1998 and 4 February 
1999. 
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The marginalisation of competing political networks through administrative reforms and the 
assimilation of elite groups through redistribution of state resources in exchange for political 
support led to the development of a regime where clientelistic practices within the formal 
institutions of the state came to be dominant. This strategy to consolidate the regime’s 
hegemony was successful as long as there were enough resources to redistribute. But as soon 
as the regime ran into economic problems, hegemonic challenges from competing networks 
came to the surface. This provided the basis for the military takeover on November 19 1968, 
which enjoyed widespread popular support (Smith 1998). While being a dramatic regime 
change, there was a large degree of continuity between the regime of Keita and that of 
Moussa Traoré (1968-1991) regarding institution-building strategies and redistributive 
practices.
The 2nd republic – reciprocal assimilation and cooptation 
within the one-party state 
Usurpation constituted an important institution-building to maintain political hegemony 
during the Traoré regime, as the regime sought to enhance its influence locally by 
strengthening the role of existing administrative structures, through party structures and by 
co-opting other organisations. Redistribution of resources through political networks 
constituted a prime strategy to maintain political hegemony.  
In the first phase of his regime, lasting until 1979, Traoré ruled through the military 
committee Comité Militaire de Libération National (CMLN) (Makalou and Diarrah 1995; 
Smith 1998). The regime sought to control other political forces by banning political parties 
and by seizing control over organisations in society (e.g. women’s, student’s, farmer’s 
organisations). During this phase, and later also during the 2nd phase (from 1979), when a 
gradual transition to civilian rule started with the creation of the political party Union
Démocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM), the regime assured its domination at all 
administrative levels through the party structure; in the villages (committees), the 
arrondissement (sub-section), the district (section), and at the national level (the Central 
Executive Bureau).  
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According to Fay (1995), the nature and mode of power exercise from independence to 1979 
was based on the principles of redistribution of state controlled resources at the expense of 
merchants and the peasantry. This systematic pillaging of the state sector, in Fay’s words 
(1995), formed the basis for hierarchical redistribution through political networks targeting 
important segments of the population and religious groups. Overlapping administrative, 
political, religious and commercial clientelistic networks stretched from the national to the 
local level and structured large parts of society around personalised power and wealth. Of 
particular importance in strengthening the clientelistic networks of CMLN members was, 
according to Smith (1998), the diversions of international aid that took place in relation to the 
droughts in the early 1970s. Important funds were diverted for personal and political use, 
symbolised by the “Palaces of drought” built in Bamako during this period.  
In addition to the above-mentioned strategies, another important institutional reform sought to 
increase state control at the local level. The decentralisation reform of 1977 was 
institutionalised at the local level through the establishment of two distinct structures (Sow 
1989; République du Mali 1992; ag Hairy, pers. comm.32). The partly elected village/fraction 
councils were formally responsible for the development plan of their circumscription while 
appointed state employees from various technical services and other relevant public instances 
made up the development committees, with the responsibility of planning and implementing 
development projects. Even though this reform was a step towards institutionalising the 
participation of the population in local affairs, the political situation during Traoré’s regime 
did not favour any real power-sharing mechanisms with actors outside the state apparatus 
(Sow 1989; Diarra, pers. comm.33; Traoré, pers. comm.; ould Ganfou, pers. comm.34). The 
public servants in the development committees exercised considerable influence over the 
councils based on their thorough knowledge of the administrative system and their loyalty to 
central state authorities (ag Hairy, pers. comm.). In addition, the councils were presided over 
and strongly influenced by the chef d’arrondissement (Hall et al. 1991). Rather than 
increasing participation the reform thus led to an extension of the role of state institutions 
locally.
32 Former chef d’arrondissement, commandant de cercle, gouverneur de région and ambassador, 25 November 
1998. 
33 Deputy manager, Mission de Décentralisation et Reformes Institutionnelles, 7 Septembre 1998. 
34 Head of Provisional Municipal Office, Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security, 11 February 1999. 
He is currently minister in the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Local Communities. 
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As a result of the redistribution strategy, particularly to urban-based elites, the Traoré regime 
managed initially to maintain a certain degree of political stability. This is why the democratic 
changes of the 1990s could not stem from other causes than the crisis in the redistributive 
clientelistic system itself. According to Makalou and Diarrah (1995) the economic crises led 
to the growth of a broad pro-democratic movement in the capital Bamako from the late 1980s. 
Hegemonic crisis, transition and democratisation 
The redistribution crises of the Traoré regime spurred counter-hegemonic mobilisation on two 
fronts. The pro-democratic movement in Bamako based its opposition to Traoré on demands 
for democracy while the rebel movements in Northern Mali based themselves on accusations 
of negligence of these regions and demands for increased self-government. After several days 
of popular upheavals in Bamako, the crises culminated in the coup d’état led by the lieutenant 
Amadou Toumani Touré on March 26 1991. ADEMA (Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali), 
one of the key organisations in the pro-democratic movement, gained an absolute majority in 
the National Assembly, and its leader, Alpha Oumar Konaré, was elected president. The 
extensive democratic reforms that were undertaken in Mali after the legislative and 
presidential elections on June 8 1992 can to a large degree be attributed to the nature of this 
transition.
First, according to Nzouankeu (1993), Mali is the only country in Africa where a violent 
upheaval led to the downfall of the regime prior to the democratic transition period. Thus 
there was no firm opposition to reforms from the old elite of the previous regime. This created 
the necessary political space for a new political discourse negating the old regime and made it 
possible to embark upon extensive reforms of the macro-political structures (Vengroff 1993). 
Secondly, the broad-based composition of the interim regime provided legitimacy to the 
transition period. Most notably, the anti-Traoré coalition integrated the coup-makers in 
collaboration with the pro-democratic and rebel movements, assured the interim government 
during the political transition.
The anti-Traoré character of the interim government made it politically necessary and 
possible to elaborate a new political course in Mali. The National Conference organised in 
August 1991 was the most important arena in this regard. It was a forum for negotiation 
between a range of political groups that included national and regional representatives of 
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political parties, religious interests, student and worker organisations and other civil society 
organisations. The recommendations for increased democratisation in the final document of 
the conference resulted in the elaboration of a new electoral code and the adoption of a new 
constitution (République du Mali 1991). Decentralisation, forwarded as a demand during the 
conference, became the single most important element in the political project of ADEMA and 
Konaré in the early 1990s. It came to be seen not only as the extension of democratisation to 
the local level, but also as the basic building bloc in the new approach to development. This 
led to a number of macro-political reforms that included the introduction of a multi-party 
system, reforms of state institutions and the implementation of a decentralised government 
system. The implementation of the decentralisation reform in 1999 implied a change in 
institution-building strategy from usurpation during the Keita and Traoré regime towards a 
system based on larger degrees of power-sharing during the 3rd Republic. 
In addition to the above-mentioned internal political events in Mali, the international political 
context was favourable for democratisation. International discourses emanating from financial 
institutions like the World Bank and the IMF stressing political reforms and good governance 
provided the context in which the transition in Mali developed (Berramdane 1999). For Mali 
in particular, and West Africa in general, alterations in French foreign policy in the early 
1990s marked the beginning of this new era. This was clearly expressed by demands for 
democratisation made by François Mitterand in his speech at the 16th Franco-African Summit 
at la Baule in 1990. 
The democratic transition thus led to reforms of the institutional macro-structures at both 
national and local level. But even though the rules of the game have changed, there are signs 
that political practices embedded in previous regimes are reproduced. Assimilation of 
competing political networks at the national level for instance still plays an important role in 
maintaining hegemony. And even though decentralisation has led to power-sharing, the 
reform may be interpreted as an attempt to co-opt local political networks. My main 
argument, however, is that network politics do not so much threaten the survival of the 
democratic institutions as the democratic content of these institutions. As long as there are 
enough resources to distribute, redistribution will provide legitimacy to the formal democratic 
system. It is in period of redistributive crises that the democratic system will be endangered. 
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Reciprocal assimilation in a multiparty context 
During the 1992 elections, ADEMA won a clear majority in the National Assembly (73 of 
115 seats) while their leader, Alpha Oumar Konaré, won the second round of the presidential 
elections with 69 % of the votes (Clark 2000). Konaré was re-elected in 1997 while ADEMA 
again gained a majority in the National Assembly (129 of 147 seats) (Sveinall and Hardeberg 
1997). The overthrow of Traoré and the ADEMA electoral victory in 1992 can, in Bayart’s 
terminology, be interpreted as the rise to power of a competing political network. The 
ADEMA, which was one of the core organisations in the pro-democratic movement and a 
leading force in the transition period, was based on an anti-Traoré platform and gained 
legitimacy as a result of the National Conference. The ADEMA mobilised widespread 
support in both rural and urban areas even before it became a political party (Clark 2000), 
which implies that the strength of the National Conference and ADEMA was rooted in a 
broad-based political coalition that came to dominate politics in the 1990s. A main strategy to 
maintain this hegemony was the inclusion of various interest groups into government. This 
was an active policy even though ADEMA was a majority party during the first 10 years of 
the 3rd Republic.
The strategy of assimilation pursued by ADEMA resulted in a broad-based composition of the 
first government in 1992. In addition to ADEMA, ministers from three other parties as well as 
three independent candidates made up the government (Sveinall and Hardeberg 1997). This 
active assimilation of other parties was also evident in the second government formed after 
student rebellions in 1993. In addition to the 10 ministers from ADEMA, 9 ministers came 
from other parties and two were independent. This assimilation strategy has of course not 
been unproblematic. After the creation of the government of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in 1994, 
opposition parties withdrew from government. In this new government 8 ministers were 
chosen from ADEMA, while 8 were independent. According to Sveinall and Hardeberg 
(1997), the opposition boycott of the 1997 elections was rooted in conflicts over the biased 
balance of power between the branches of government in favour of the prime minister. The 
inauguration of the Ibrahim Boubacar Keita government in February 1994 was interpreted as 
a strategy that sought the marginalisation of opposition parties, particularly since Keita also 
was the leader of ADEMA. The opposition parties withdrew their ministers leading to a 
government composed of 8 ministers from ADEMA and 8 independent ministers. During a 
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seminar35 organised in February 1995 with participants from the ten leading parties and the 
entire National Assembly, the composition of the Keita government led to criticism of 
centralisation of power as a strategy to strengthen the power base of the party and Konaré.
A closer analysis of the relation between the executive (the presidency and the government), 
legislative (the National Assembly) and judiciary branches of the state underline the 
democratic deficit of these institutions. Formally, the constitutional system in Mali is semi-
presidential, meaning that the prime minister, who is head of government, is accountable to 
the 147-member National Assembly (Economist Intelligent Unit 2002). The president, 
restricted to two consecutive terms, nominates the prime minister and can dissolve the 
parliament. But according to Amundsen (2000), the parliament and judiciary system are 
dominated by a highly centralised political executive. This asymmetric power relation is 
reinforced by the president’s dominance within the executive and these institutions’ lack of 
capacity to fulfil their democratic functions (Smith 1998; Smith 2001).  
The changes brought about by the 2002 legislative and presidential elections led some authors 
to argue that the balance of power between the National Assembly and the Presidency became 
more balanced (Economist Intelligent Union, 2002). The reason was that ADEMA’s 
dominance in the National Assembly ended due to an internal split up. In addition, Amadou 
Toumani Touré, the interim president during the transition in 1991-92, was elected president 
as an independent candidate. However, according to Issa N’Diaye (pers. comm.36), the 
National Assembly remains weak since it has not been possible to establish a majority 
coalition between the three main political groups. The lack of a functioning opposition to the 
president in the National Assembly may, according to Issa N’Diaye, be explained by the 
incompatibilities between the main parliamentary parties. RPM (Rassemblement pour le 
Mali) for instance was created by the former Prime Minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keita after he 
broke out of ADEMA, while PARENA (Parti pour le renouveau national) was created as a 
spin-off party from CNID (Congrès national d'initiative démocratique), on of the key parties 
in the pro-democratic movements. In more analytical terms, Amundsen (2000) points to 
serious weaknesses in the very nature of the party system in Mali. His general conclusion that 
the political parties in Mali are inadequately organised and characterised by internal divisions 
35 Seminar named ”days of reflections” organised by Centre for Research on Democracy and Development 
(CERDES) on 4 and 5 February. 
36 Forum Civique, 10 April 2003. 
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are symptomatic of parties dominated by people with strong political ambitions. In general, he 
states, the political parties are characterised by a weak social basis, strong personal ambitions 
and organisations dependent on individual party presidents. The 72 political parties in Mali 
(as of 2000) are largely characterised by informal mechanisms of neo-patrimonialism and 
clientelism, rent-seeking and personalised politics, endangering the institutionalisation of 
distinct party programmes and consolidated party organisations. 
Furthermore, according to a study made by Koni Expertise (2001), the lack of capacity of the 
National Assembly to govern itself undermines its parliamentary role37 as a control instance 
vis-à-vis the government38. In addition to the executive dominance over the judiciary, there 
have been, according to US Department of State (US Department of State 2002), several 
reports of corruption in the courts. Issa N’Diaye (pers. comm.) explains this by widespread 
clientelistic practices within the judiciary system. A politician interviewed in 2003 for 
instance revealed that he had been approached by high-ranking members in the judiciary 
system and offered the opportunity to influence the 2002 election results fraudulently.
Decentralisation, cooptation and local politics 
The importance accorded to decentralisation within the political project of the Konaré regime 
represents on the one hand an institutional rupture with the 1st and 2nd Republic. On the other 
hand, however, this change from usurpation to power-sharing also represents continuity in the 
sense that it is part of an attempt to build and maintain political hegemony.  
From an institutional perspective the reform has led to transformations of the local political 
arena. After the 1999 local elections, 682 new rural municipalities were established. Some 
basic administrative functions, like birth and death certificates and election registration, were 
automatically transferred to the municipalities. Elaborate plans are also made for the transfer 
of more substantial functions and decision-making power, but only limited deliberation within 
37 Few legislative initiatives come from the National Assembly; insubstantial plenary debates caused by 
deficiencies in the functionality of the permanent commissions supposed to review law propositions (lack of 
appropriate rules of functioning for instance); feeble routines for assuring the quality of documents adopted by 
the National Assembly (laws are not systematically followed by publications in the Journal Officiel du Compte 
Rendu; there are examples that laws adopted by the National Assembly are very late for promulgation). 
38 Do not pose written questions to members of government because they will be published in the Journal 
Officiel; commissions established for controlling the administration do not have sufficient resources to carry out 
their functions, and their recommendations are seldom applied in a systematic manner; the National Assembly 
do not have resources to verify if adopted laws are applied. 
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the health, education and rural development sectors are currently placed within the 
prerogative of the municipality. However, the extensive financial and technical support 
structures that are established have made it possible for most municipalities to elaborate their 
own budgets and development plans. The conclusions from a study on “Popular views of the 
legitimacy of the state in Mali” carried out by Bratton, Coulibaly and Machado (2002) show 
that Malians in general find it easier to get access to municipal councillors than the former 
state-appointed administrators to solve problems strengthens the observation that 
decentralisation has led to increased democratisation locally. 
Parallel to the implementation of the decentralised government system, reforms of various 
state agencies have been carried out in order to make them institutionally compatible to the 
decentralised units. The transformation of the three-tier administrative structure set up during 
the Keita regime into a control and support structure at municipal, district and regional level, 
has moved decision-making power away from the state towards the decentralised units. The 
role of the previous chef d’arrondissement, now renamed sous-prefet, has been reduced to an 
assisting function of the previous commandant de cercle. The commandant, now labelled 
prefet, fulfil the most important function in the administrative structure. Located at the district 
level the prefet is responsible for both controlling the budgets and development plans of the 
municipalities as well as coordinating requested support from the state technical service to the 
municipalities.
The conclusion that decentralisation has led to increased local democracy is however 
problematic. First, even though the shift to power-sharing as institution-building strategy was 
conditioned by the political nature of the transition, the control functions accorded to the 
administration for instance may in the long run re-establish the state as prime centre for 
decision-making. Likewise, political processes at the national level threaten to undermine the 
content of decentralisation. This is particularly related to the lack of transfer of decision-
making power and resources from the state to the municipal level. Even though the functions 
that are to be transferred are in theory very extensive, only a limited range of decision-making 
power and resources have been transferred. This is clearly demonstrated by the problems at 
the national political level regarding the reforms in the health and education sectors. The only 
prerogative of the mayor is, according to Anaye Niangaly39, the mayor of Koro in the Mopti 
39 Interviewed on 30 October 2003. 
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region, limited to signing contracts with teachers and health staff. Furthermore, the limited 
reforms of the deconcentrated units of the finance ministry represent one of the most 
important bottlenecks in the functioning of the decentralised system in the sense that it 
threatens the revenue potential of the decentralised units40. The finance ministry, responsible 
for tax collection, payment of waged to both state and municipal employees, has by no means 
the necessary capacity to fulfil their role due to limited resources and inefficient organisation. 
In the cercle of Koro in the Mopti region for instance there are only two employees that are 
responsible for all these operations. 
Secondly, the extension of the local political space does not automatically assure 
democratisation locally. The experiences from the first 5 years of decentralisation revealed 
tendencies of increased politicisation of local relations particularly in election time41. In 
northern Mali for instance, local elites have to a large degree captured the municipal councils 
and in this process marginalised the state administration. Prior to the 1999 local elections, 
there were examples of political mobilisation carried out by local elites. One common strategy 
to mobilise was based on exchange of economic benefits (payment of taxes for instance) for 
votes. There were also examples that conflicts over natural resources became an integrated 
part of municipal politics. In one case, two chefs de fraction in one municipality, although in 
conflict with each other over the management of forest resources, were elected as municipal 
councillors for the same political party. In other municipalities the reform has been interpreted 
as a restoration of the power of the elites that where marginalised by the Keita and Traoré 
regimes, i.e. the old canton chiefs. The importance of getting access to the decentralised 
institutions, and hence to political power and economic resources, from the point of view of 
local elites, has thus in certain areas led to the cementation and extension of already existing 
clientelistic power structures and the exclusion of the poorest segments of the society. Based 
on the above description it is clear that decentralisation has to be analysed as part of a 
political strategy to maintain hegemony from national political leaders. Power-sharing as 
institution-building strategy may open up the political space locally but is also a part of a 
wider political project to maintain political hegemony based on assimilation of local political 
networks by granting them access to political and economic resources. Rather than increased 
democratisation, the result of decentralisation may be increased clientelism and corruption 
40 Issoutiana Abdoulaye Maïga, 1st Assistant of the préfet in the Koro cercle, interviewed 29 October 2003. 
41 These observations are based on fieldwork in the Gourma district in 1998 and in the Koro and Bankass 
districts in 2003. 
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locally. It is this reproduction of political practices, although within a new institutional 
framework, that represents continuity with the 1st and 2nd Republic. In the long run this 
development threatens to undermine the content of democratisation.  
Conclusion: democratic transition but politics as usual? 
The democratic transition in Mali in the early 1990s resulted in extensive political and 
institutional reforms. Today, more than a decade after the transition, there are tendencies that 
the democratic content of these institutions and the decentralised government system are 
undermined by the reproduction of clientelistic and redistributive practices. These practices 
were embedded in the de facto functioning of state institutions of the 1st and 2nd Republic and 
are ultimately the result of strategies to build and maintain political hegemony. These 
strategies date back to the hegemonic struggle between US-RDA and PSP in the immediate 
pre-independent era. The US-RDA hegemonic strategy sought to both marginalise and 
assimilate competing networks and extend state presence locally based on usurpation as 
institution-building strategy. The need for political support led to redistribution through 
political networks to maintain hegemony. Despite the introduction of macro-political 
democratic institution in the early 1990s, the basic mechanisms to build and maintain 
hegemony based on redistribution and assimilation are reproduced. However, this is not a 
one-way process. The implementation of democratic institutions has also contributed to a 
transformation of current political practices by changing the rules of the game. At the national 
level for instance, the multi-party system has opened up the political space for a wide range of 
political actors. Locally, in Bayarts’ terms, the political space has opened up and given 
opportunities for more political networks to enter the political arena and participate in 
struggles for power and influence. But again, these reforms for decentralisation and power-
sharing must be understood as part of and circumscribed by a broader strategy of national 
political leaders to build and maintain political hegemony by way of granting local political 
networks access to political power and resources.
The survival of the democratic regime at the national level is thus dependent upon political 
stability based on assimilation of competing political networks and clientelistic redistribution 
of resources. Based on this conclusion it is clear that consolidation, as understood in the 
institutional perspective, does not fully take into account the historicity of and the mutual 
interdependence between political institutions and political practices. The reproduction of 
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neo-patrimonial practices and redistribution through political networks is not so much a threat 
to the survival of the formal democratic institutions as it is to the democratic content of these 
institutions. In fact, as long as there are enough resources within this system, redistribution 
will strengthen the legitimacy of the formal democracy. A crisis in the redistributive system 
may, however, as was the case when both the 1st and 2nd Republic was overthrown, undermine 
the legitimacy of the democratic regime.  
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Paper 2 The politics of decentralisation in Mali: 
the democratic potential of decentralisation 
The Malian experience in democratisation has by many been characterised as a success-story. 
In the Map of Freedom published by the Freedom House from 2005 for instance, Mali is one 
of only ten countries in Africa that are classified as free.42 The 2002 presidential and 
legislative elections were also regarded by the Freedom House to have been free and fair. 
These were the third round of elections since 1992 and for the first time in Malian history one 
elected president replaced another. In addition to the relative stability of the macro-political 
democratic regime, the decentralisation reform that was introduced in 1999 has brought about 
extensive reforms of the state. The establishment of new decentralised governance institutions 
at municipal, cercle (district) and regional level throughout the country has shifted the balance 
of power locally away from appointed state bureaucrats towards elected councillors. 
Decentralisation in Mali has thus opened the local political space for a range of new groups to 
participate in local political affairs and to exercise their influence. It thus seems that the 
introduction of decentralisation in Mali has initiated processes of democratisation locally. 
Originally, decentralisation entered the political agenda as a result of popular demands during 
the democratic transition the country underwent in the early 1990s. Later, it came to form a 
major pillar in the post-transition democratisation project of the Konaré regime and led 
ultimately to extensive reforms of the state. Based on these observations, the first question 
examined in this article is why and how decentralisation became a political project for the 
Konaré regime. Secondly it is also relevant to ask today, some 15 years after the transition 
and well into the second mandate of the decentralised institutions, what the democratic 
potential of decentralisation is in Mali in a long-term perspective. 
In order to answer the first question it is necessary to direct attention to the nature of the 
democratic transition in the early 1990s. Decentralisation came originally on the political 
agenda as a result of popular demands during the transition that started after Moussa Traoré, 
42 According to their web-site, the Freedom House “measures freedom according to two broad categories: 
political rights and civil liberties… Each country is assigned a numerical rating…on a scale of 1 to 7. A rating of 
1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the least amount of freedom”. In their 2005 report, Mali is 
accorded a rating of 2 in both political rights and civil liberties (Source: www.freedomhouse-org – downloaded 
18 March 2006). 
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president in Mali since 1968, was overthrown in a military coup d’état led by Amadou 
Toumani Touré on 26 March 1991. The overthrow of Traoré prior to the transition opened the 
political arena for the anti-Traoré coalition made up by the military coup-makers, the pro-
democratic movement in Bamako as well as the Tuareg rebel movements in Northern Mali, to 
carry out the transition without the presence of previous power-holders. It culminated in the 
rise to power of the opposition when the political party ADEMA won an absolute majority in 
the National Assembly and its leader, Alpha Oumar Konaré, was elected president of the 3rd
Malian Republic43 on June 8 1992. Decentralisation in Mali thus became an element of a 
comprehensive political reform during a period of regime transition. In the post-transition 
political project of the Konaré regime, decentralisation came to constitute a major component 
in the democratisation process. At the 37th anniversary of independence on 22 September 
1997, Konaré expressed the aim of the reform like this: 
I think I may say that for Mali, the last large reform at the end of this century is the 
decentralisation… [It] remains the greatest political justification of democratisation, 
[and] the 701 municipalities of Mali [constitute] as many forums and laboratories to the 
services of democracy and development (MDRI, 1998a: 12). 
For the Konaré regime decentralisation came to serve two functions. Since it had based its 
opposition to Traoré on claims for democracy, the portrayal of decentralisation as an 
extension of the democratisation process served to build legitimacy for the new regime. At the 
same time it was an important strategy to maintain its alliances with the other groups from the 
pro-democratic movement and in particular the rebel movements. Decentralisation thus came 
to be closely connected to democratisation as a strategy for the new regime to consolidate its 
power. However, the political commitment to decentralisation does not assure enhanced local 
democracy in the long run. In order to answer the second question it is thus necessary to 
change the focus to the present and bring into the analysis processes that may undermine the 
democratic potential of decentralisation. Of particular importance in the Malian case are 
institutional bottlenecks that undermine any real devolution to the decentralised institutions 
but also politisation of local relations that lead to the exclusion of the poorest segments of the 
population and the proliferation of clientelistic relations. But before entering this discussion, 
let me turn to the democratic transition Mali underwent in the early 1990s.
43 The post-colonial political history of Mali is usually divided according to regime change: the 1st Republic 
refers to the regime of Modibo Keita (1960 – 1968); the 2nd Republic refers to the regime of Moussa Traoré 
(1968 – 1991); the 3rd Republic refers to the period following the overthrow of Traoré (1991 – ). 
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Democratic transition and demands for decentralisation 
The democratic transition in Mali coincides in time with similar experiences in many other 
African countries. According to Grugel (2002) it is difficult to establish a common pattern to 
explain democratic transitions in Africa given the diversity of regime types on the continent. 
Nevertheless she concludes that “African politics…are in a state of flux, in which elements of 
locally supported democratisation projects are visible alongside externally driven 
experiments, chiefly in electoralist democracy, without these succeeding in establishing 
themselves as the only, or even the dominant, trend” (Grugel 2002, p. 172).  
According to Berramdane (1999), the process of democratisation in Africa was the result of 
the combined effects of external pressure and internal dynamics. For Francophone Africa in 
particular, Francois Mitterrand’s speech on the need for democratisation in Africa at the 16th
Franco-African Summit at la Baule in 1990 marked the beginning of this new era. The end of 
the cold war undermined the prospects of upholding authoritarian regimes based on socialist 
ideals and paved the way for demands for democratisation. At the core of this new doctrine 
were conditionalities based on the World Bank’s “good governance” agenda. Demands for 
good governance, in which democracy is defined as one of the components, became a 
conditionality for access to aid by important actors in the international donor community 
during the 1990s  (IMF, European Union, France, Germany, USA and Japan). Geopolitical 
changes and demands made by international financial institutions thus had a major impact on 
the transformation of African states from the early 1990s. In several countries this resulted in 
the introduction of decentralisation reforms that now are, according to Ouedraogo (2003), an 
integrated part of development policy in Africa. However, explaining decentralisation by only 
referring to external pressure downplays the importance that internal political processes play 
for the possible outcomes of such reforms.  
In Mali, the demands for decentralisation were expressed on numerous occasions during the 
transition, and were most clearly expressed at the National Conference in August 1991. 
According to Nzouankeu (1993), National Conferences played a vital role in the democratic 
transitions in many African countries. Mali, according to him, was the only country in Africa 
where a violent upheaval led to the downfall of the regime prior to the transition period. This 
meant that the interim regime did not have to enter political negotiations with groups 
presumably interested in maintaining status quo. Traoré had been arrested on March 26 by a 
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group of army officers led by lieutenant-colonel Amadou Toumani Touré after several days of 
popular upheavals that were initially met by severe responses from security forces that 
resulted in several deaths and wounded (Nzouankeu 1993; Djime 1997). Traoré’s promise to 
embark upon political liberalisation within the single party Union Démocratique du Peuple 
Malien (UDPM) did not ease the situation and led him into political isolation that culminated 
in the coup d’état. The absence of Traoré during the transition thus created the necessary 
political space for the opposition groups to form an interim regime. In addition to the military 
coup-makers, this interim regime included what in Mali is usually referred to as the pro-
democratic movement in Bamako and members from the Tuareg rebellion movements in the 
Northern parts of the country. The interim regime was thus rooted in a broad-based military-
civilian anti-Traoré coalition and was institutionalised in the Comité de Transition pour le 
Salut du Peuple (CTSP). This composition of the CTSP gave both legitimacy to the transition 
and created the necessary political space for demands for decentralisation to emerge.  
The National Conference organised from July 29 to August 12 1991 was the most important 
arena for the discussion of the future political course of Mali during the transition period. It is 
true that the CTSP, responsible for the conference, had limited the formal mandate of the 
conference to include the elaboration and adoption of a charter for the political parties, a new 
electoral code and a new constitution (Nzouankeu, 1993). These texts had already been 
prepared by the transition government prior to the conference and were not subject to much 
debate. Nevertheless, the National Conference represented an important event for the 
subsequent democratisation process in Mali. First, according to the proceedings from the 
conference (République du Mali 1991), the participants represented a wide variety of 
interests. More than 1800 participants from different institutions and organisations were 
present. This included representatives of the interim regime, the ministries, ambassadors, 
governors, the army, Malians living abroad, labour organisations, cooperatives, political 
parties and civil society organisations (the largest group with 467 participants). Secondly, the 
conference was an arena were the anti-Traoré discontentment that had developed prior to the 
coup d’état came to expression. This was evident already in the foreword of the final 
document from the conference:  
In the night between the 25 and 26 Mars 1991 the Malian people… succeeded in 
liberating itself after 23 years of dictatorship: that of the unique party, the Union 
Démocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM), which had become deaf to the transformation 
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of the Malian society and insensitive to the essential needs of the population 
(République du Mali, 1991: 7).  
Political demands for decentralisation were clearly expressed at the very beginning of the 
“recommendations for the state of the nation”. Based on a general analysis of the current state 
of affairs, which revealed a quite critical view on the previous regime44, the Conference 
recommended the abolishment of the current administrative system based on the argument 
that it was not compatible with the new multiparty democratic Mali45. Furthermore, the 
fundamental principles of decentralisation were also included in the draft constitution 
elaborated at the conference. In addition to the National Conference, 300 farmers gathered at 
an Estates-General46 organised in December 1991 also raised demands for decentralisation, in 
particular with regard to land tenure and natural resource management to rural communities 
(Bingen, 1994). Several of these demands were later incorporated in the governments Rural 
Development Schema. The Tuareg rebellion in Northern Mali contributed also indirectly to 
put decentralisation on the agenda. Gaining momentum around the same time as the 
emergence of the pro-democratic movement in Bamako, the rebellion reduced the possibilities 
of the Traoré regime to stay in power. The Pacte National47, the peace agreement, signed with 
the rebel movements accorded the Northern parts of the country some autonomy (Poulton and 
ag Youssouf 1998). It was made politically acceptable in the rest of the country because of the 
regimes plans to embark upon decentralisation. Later, according to ag Hairy (1998, pers. 
comm.48), decentralisation came to replace elements of the Pacte National since many of the 
former rebel movements saw a greater interest in this reform. It meant, among other things, 
the establishment of a new administrative region (the Kidal region) were only local cadres 
could be employed in the part of the country where the rebellion originated. 
44 The main arguments were: inefficacity of current administration; the incompetence of administrators and their 
loyalty towards the party and political leaders; widespread corruption; the necessity to implement decentralised 
developmental system; the incompatibility between the neo-colonial administrative system and the interests of 
the population; an administrative system that have only led to increased centralisation of power (République du 
Mali, 1991: 133). 
45 Among the concrete recommendations was: the redefinition of the role of the administration; the devolution of 
competencies to decentralised institutions; a redefinition of the local community concept, the local governance 
structure and deconcentrated state structures based on the new democratic context (République du Mali, 1991: 
133). 
46 Etats Généraux du Monde Rural. 
47 The Pacte National was signed 11 April 1992 with the Mouvements et Front Unifiés de l’Azawad, the rebel 
movements umbrella organisation (Poulton and ag Youssouf, 1998). 
48 Interview with M. ag Hairy 25 November 1998. 
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The criticism raised against the centralised post-colonial state from a wide range of different 
political, socio-economic and regional groups in Mali during the democratic transition thus 
led to a convergence around demands for decentralisation. The absence of the former regime 
in the transition meant furthermore that the political space was opened up for such demands to 
gain a pre-dominant place in the discussion of the future political course of Mali. These 
demands were appropriated by the Konaré regime once in power and came to form a major 
pillar in the post-transition democratisation project. However, in order to analyse how 
decentralisation became a political project in Mali it is necessary to direct attention to the 
politics of decentralisation. This also provides the background to understand the nature of the 
particular institutional reforms that have been carried through in Mali and to analyse the 
prospects for the democratic potential of decentralisation in a long-term perspective.  
The politics of decentralisation 
In a recent review of decentralisation literature, Kulipossa states that the “current appeal of 
decentralisation has been rooted in its potential benefits” (2004, p. 768, italics in original). 
When it comes to the relation between decentralisation and democracy, the conclusions of the 
literature on the theme remain uncertain. The idea of a possible positive link between the two 
is, according to Kulipossa (2004), first and foremost based on the idea that decentralisation 
has the potential to foster democracy. However, the diversity of regimes that have undertaken 
decentralisation suggests that there is no immediate link with democracy. According to 
Manor, decentralisation 
is being… attempted in an astonishing diversity of developing and transitional 
countries…by democracies (both mature and emergent) and autocracies, by regimes 
making the transition to democracy and by others seeking to avoid that transition (1999, 
p. 1). 
This diversity suggests, according to Manor (1999), that the factors and motives influencing 
decisions to decentralise varies between countries. In order to explain why regimes seek to 
engage in decentralisation it is necessary to look “at the thinking of leaders within the 
governments of developing countries” (Manor 1999, p. 30, italics in original). Following these 
recommendations, it is necessary to ask why decentralisation came on the political agenda in 
the first place and why decentralisation came to be so important in the democratic project of 
the Konaré regime in the post-transition phase. This may clarify the role decentralisation 
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played in the political project of Konaré, but it does not say anything about the concrete 
political and administrative reforms that resulted from this. As Boone (2003) states, there are 
often large discrepancies between reform rhetoric and the administrative and political benefits 
of such reforms. It is therefore necessary to focus on what she calls “the politics of 
decentralisation”. This, I will argue, directs attention to how the regime managed to carry 
through these reforms as well as the concrete institutional reforms that resulted from this. In 
order to analyse the politics of decentralisation in Mali it is necessary to bring the Mission de 
décentralisation et réformes institutionnelles (MDRI) into the analysis. The MDRI was an 
independent state agency directly attached to the presidency and responsible for the 
elaboration of the institutional aspects of the reform. More important, it also played a 
predominant role in framing decentralisation as a part of the democratisation process in Mali.  
Olowu (2001) observes that decentralisation policies in Africa, and particularly the relation 
between democratisation and local government, remain poorly analysed. This is also in line 
with Kulipossa’s (2004) conclusion that a potential positive link between decentralisation and 
democracy has to be subject to empirical scrutiny. In order to answer the second question in 
this article it is thus necessary to change the perspective. Of relevance in this regard are first 
the inherent weaknesses of the institutional reforms crafted by the MDRI and the effects of 
national level processes on the decentralised institutions (institutional bottlenecks that 
undermine any real devolution). Secondly, the interaction between the decentralised 
institutions and local political processes and the consequences for ordinary people 
(politisation and proliferation of clientelism and exclusion) is of relevance. To make sense of 
these potential problems related to the democratic potential of decentralisation it may be 
useful to take as point of departure Samoff’s (1990) analytical distinction between 
administrative and political decentralisation.
Within administrative decentralisation, the main preoccupation is the design of institutions. 
The point of departure is, according to Samoff (1990), normally an analysis of existing 
institutional organisation, followed by a subsequent search for alternative decentralisation 
solutions. This approach has been criticised for its ahistorical comprehension of institutions 
(Boone 1998) because it does not consider how institutions develop in particular contexts and 
it frames the description of institutional reforms in Africa in narrow technocratic and 
administrative terms. Administrative decentralisation is often the position taken by central 
government (Samoff 1990) which initiates the conceptualisation and implementation of 
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decentralisation reforms, and seeks to control its course. Within this approach, 
decentralisation may lead to the transfer of some authority. And even though the immediate 
political questions linked to decentralisation are important, they are not taken into 
consideration systematically. Success is measured in terms of implementation, and not, for 
instance, in increased political mobilisation of the local population. Within the perspective of 
political decentralisation on the other hand, the effects of policy and political reforms are 
understood as the result of social processes. This approach directs attention towards the 
importance of understanding institutional changes in its historical, social and political context. 
Decentralisation cannot be understood as implemented by central government without any 
kind of influence from other societal forces. In addition to the institutions responsible for 
policy elaboration and implementation, it is important to consider which factors that led to the 
particular institutional set-up of a particular reform. Decentralisation in this sense is thus not 
only about the institutional division of labour between various branches of the state, but as 
much about the relation to the surrounding society. This approach directs attention to the 
interaction between the decentralised governance institutions and broader processes of 
political change.
Popular demands captured 
As noted above, the demands for decentralisation that were articulated during the transition 
came to form the major pillar in the post-transition democratic project of the Konaré regime. 
In order to go one step further in the analysis of the democratic potential of decentralisation it 
is necessary to consider how the Konaré regime sought to control the elaboration of the 
reform. The analysis of this “politics of decentralisation” provides both the necessary 
background to understand the nature of the institutional reforms that resulted from this 
process as well as a point of reference for the discussion of the democratic potential of 
decentralisation. Of central importance in the elaboration and implementation of 
decentralisation in Mali was the Mission de décentralisation et réformes institutionnelles
(MDRI).49
The MDRI was established in 1993 with the mandate to elaborate, conceptualise and 
implement the decentralisation reform. Initially, its initial five-member team was given a one-
49 The MDRI was originally named Mission de decentralisation.
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year mandate, and, according to Diarra (1998, pers. comm.)50, the first mission was to explore 
the possibilities to carry out such a reform. Based on its first report, its mandate was 
prolonged and its area of responsibility was expanded to include institutional reforms in 
general. In addition to the responsibility for the elaboration of the necessary judicial and 
technical dispositions for the decentralised governance system, the MDRI was also an 
important agent for the regime for the justification of the decentralisation reform as an 
extension of the democratisation process. According to Sy for instance, the first leader of the 
MDRI, the democratisation project in Mali:  
comprise an ambitious reform program for territorial decentralisation […] Rising from 
the recommendations of the National Conference…this reform seek to deepen the multi-
party democracy by adapting the administration to the objective of a new development 
framework based on the preoccupations, resources and know-how of the local 
population. In order to concretise this political will, the government has instituted an ad 
hoc structure named Mission de Décentralisation with the overall goal of assisting the 
implementation of the decentralisation reform by defining the legal framework and 
determining the conditions of its feasibility (MDRI, 1997a: 4, my translation). 
The MDRI was set up as a semi-autonomous agency with institutional independence from the 
traditional state apparatus. It was attached initially to the prime ministers office, but was later 
placed directly under the presidency. This gave the MDRI the necessary manoeuvring space 
to fulfil its mandate and it assured that particular interests in the traditional state apparatus 
could not influence the process.51 The institutional independence accorded to the MDRI was 
thus a strategic choice made by the regime leaders to assure that the reform was carried 
through. It also meant that the elaboration and implementation of the reform was controlled 
from top national political level. To use the terminology of Samoff (1990), it may be said that 
decentralisation in Mali was predominantly elaborated within the perspective of 
administrative decentralisation. The whole process was controlled from central state 
authorities, and the main concern of the MDRI in the elaboration of the reform was the 
institutional aspects.
This is evident in the extensive preparatory work made by the MDRI prior to the 
implementation of the reform in 1999. A large array of judicial and technical dispositions, 
50 Deputy manager of the MDRI, interview on 7 September 1998. 
51 Of particular importance in this regard was its independence from the Ministère d’Administration Territorial,
the ministry responsible for state administration locally. This ministry had wide-spread power locally through its 
deconcentrated structure within the three-tier administrative systems on regional, cercle (district) and 
arrondissement levels. 
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mainly in the form of laws, was developed for the decentralised government system.52 A large 
amount of work on the part of the MDRI also concerned the institutional design of both the 
decentralised governance institutions as well its institutional relations with both local 
branches of state agencies and central state authorities. In this process, as will become clearer 
later, several important political issues were not sufficiently taken into account. This was for 
instance evident in the large-scale participatory territorial reorganisation of local level 
politico-administrative boundaries that was carried through by the MDRI in 1995-96. Also 
when it comes to the functioning of the decentralised institutions important political questions 
are not resolved within the institutional design of the reform. 
The way in which the elaboration of the reform was organised made it possible for the MDRI 
to carry through extensive reforms. This refers first and foremost to the new division of labour 
between the newly established decentralised institutions, the local branches of line ministries 
and central state authorities. It involves both aspects of what in the decentralisation literature 
is referred to as devolution and deconcentration. Devolution in Mali refers to the transfer of 
competencies to the decentralised institutions that started after the local elections in 1999, 
while deconcentration refers to reforms of state institutions, and in particular the local 
branches of these institutions, to make them institutionally adapted to the basic principles of 
the decentralised governance structure. The overall result of these reforms has been both a 
spatial (reform of local political-administrative boundaries) and scalar (new division of 
labour) reconfiguration of the state in Mali. But in order to discuss the reconfiguration of the 
state power in Mali and the inherent (political) problems in the decentralised governance 
structure, it is necessary to first direct attention to the role decentralisation played as a nation-
building strategy for the Konaré regime. 
Decentralisation as nation-building 
The way in which decentralisation was conceptualised and framed within the wider political 
debate on democratisation in Mali legitimised the institutional reforms that were undertaken. 
Of particular importance in this regard was the active construction of the decentralisation 
52 The two most important texts in this regard are first the law 93-008 “déterminant les condition de la libre 
administration des collectivités territoriales” defining the fundamental principles of the decentralisation reform, 
and, secondly, the law 95-034 “portant code des collectivités territoriales en République du Mali” delineating 
more precisely the different aspects of the decentralisation reform, for instance the responsibilities of the 
municipalities. 
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reform as a symbol of an idealised pre-colonial decentralised Mali. Through a reinterpretation 
of Malian political and cultural history, colonialism was portrayed as the beginning of an era 
that separated state and society. This division was further widened by the post-colonial state 
during the 1st and 2nd Republic. The main objective of decentralisation, within this logic, has 
been to initiate a process where the power of the state is reduced and transferred back to 
society. The transfer of power to the municipality, the incarnation of pre-colonial Mali and the 
most important arena in the new power-sharing schema, is the mechanism through which the 
division between state and society introduced by colonialism is to be overcome.  
This argument is echoed in de Jorio’s (2003) article “Narratives of the nation and democracy 
in Mali”. Her analysis focuses on how Modibo Keita, the first president of Mali (1960-1968), 
has come to be a major reference point in attempts to construct national narratives of the new 
democratic Mali around funding fathers and key figures in Malian history. The “valorisation 
of the national and local cultural heritage” (de Jorio 2003, p. 832) was expressed through both 
a number of cultural festivals, exhibits and conferences on Mali’s cultural heritage as well as 
the construction of a several monuments. Within this narrative, I will argue, decentralisation 
is represented as the revitalisation of the values and organisation principles of the pre-colonial 
Mali and constitutes the fundament on which to build the new democratic Mali. The MDRI 
has in its strategy actively constructed decentralisation as an extension of democratisation 
with reference to a historical and idealised decentralised Mali. In the MDRI publication 
“Framework for a new democratisation and development dynamic”53 (MDRI 1998a), the pre-
colonial history of the ancient empires and kingdoms in Mali is presented as the point of 
reference for the history of the current decentralisation reform. Particularly the cultural 
continuity between contemporary Mali and the pre-colonial Mali is underlined:
Institutional development thus begins with the society itself and its history […] It is in 
this sense that some introductory elements of Malian history, public institutional 
reforms and decentralisation are presented […] In brief, to better understand the cultural 
heritage which give sense to what Mali undertakes and that forms the identity of the 
nation (MDRI 1998a, p. 7, my translation). 
Existing proverbs and metaphors dating back to the Ghana Empire54 are interpreted as signs 
of some of the basic principles of the decentralised administration and power exercise of this 
53 Cadre d’une nouvelle dynamique de démocratisation et de développement. 
54 8th – 12th century (The Times Concise Atlas of World History, 4th ed., 1992). 
Paper 2 The politics of decentralisation in Mali 
132
empire. Furthermore, the Mali Empire55 is presented as the “cultural, social and political 
foundation of Mali today” (MDRI 1998a, p. 8, my translation). It is interesting to note that the 
concepts employed in the brief description of the organisation of this empire reflect 
contemporary democratisation and decentralisation vocabulary: the “constitution” of the 
Mandé people; “la libre administration” of the independent states within the federation of 
Manden; “the real participation in general life of all the elements of civil society thanks to its 
organisation based on linage, activity and age”. References to other empires, for instance the 
Songhoï empire (15th to 16th century); the Ségou empire (early 18th century to 1861) and the 
Toukouleur (1861-1890), also serve as important points of reference for the current 
decentralisation project.
The representation of the historical empires of Mali as the forerunner to and justification for 
the current decentralisation reform by the political leaders of the 3rd Republic and the MDRI 
echoes Rawson’s (2000, p. 266) observation that Malian scholars and policymakers argue that 
the “empowerment of localities will restore an equilibrium long recognised in Malian 
administrative patterns”. Among the precedents for decentralisation in Mali are the autonomy 
given to gold-producing areas by Ghanaian kings, the division of labour within the caste 
system of Mande society (securing rights and autonomy to customary trade speciality), 
mechanisms within Sudanic courts limiting autocratic tendencies, as well as the role religious 
judges and Islam played as a countervailing force against the centralisation of power.
In addition, according to Rawson (2000), the Bambara (or Ségou) empire founded by Biton 
Coulibaly in the Ségou region in the 16th century is often referred to as a model for the 
decentralisation of state power. There are however controversies around this aspect of the 
Biton model. Person see this as the creation of an “egalitarian ideology of the society” (Person 
in Rawson 2000, p. 267) while Roberts interpret this as a rise of an oppressing authoritarian 
regime and increased slavery. Of most interest to us here, however, is the way in which this 
empire is represented as an idealised model for the current decentralisation efforts. According 
to MDRI (1998), the Bambara Empire is built on the administrative, social and political 
organisation of both the Ghana and Mali empires. The link to the present is evident both when 
it comes to the administrative heritage of these empires but also when it comes to the socio-
ethnic heritage. The Bambara Empire was composed of micro-states that again were divided 
55 12th – 15th century (The Times Concise Atlas of World History, 4th ed., 1992). 
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into villages (Massadougou) led by elected Massas. These micro-states are the origin of the 
geo-ethnic composition of Mali today, and correspond, in certain areas, to the 
arrondissements in place until 1999.  
Colonisation is in this historical reinterpretation presented as an interrupting historical force 
that led to the progressive alienation of traditional mechanisms and references: 
[The establishment of a] hierarchical, centralised and bureaucratic administration by the 
colonial state provoked a serious cultural, social and economic rupture within already 
weakened societies. Under the colonial administration, citizens […] became 
“administrated natives” (MDRI 1998a, p. 9, my translation).  
The post-colonial state represents in this line of argument nothing more than the continuation 
of the colonial authoritative state model. The post-colonial authorities turned the state into an 
instrument for elite enrichment and the consolidation of their power, a strategy that further 
deepened the division between the state and the Malian society. In the current decentralisation 
project it is society that represents continuity with pre-colonial Mali. Increasingly alienated, 
society has sought to replace the state through the creation of associations, cooperatives and 
health centres, and by way of developing an important informal economic sector. The 
“évènements” of 26 March 1991, leading to the overthrow of Traoré, and the subsequent 
political transition, is thus presented as events that liberated society from an oppressing state 
and ended the “government system built around the unique party and the centralised, 
authoritarian and corrupt state” (MDRI 1998a, p. 11, my translation). In this context, 
decentralisation is supposed to be the mechanism through which state and society are to be 
reunited. Decentralisation thus implies a shift in power away from the state towards a 
revitalised society that participates in their local communities institutionalised within the 
municipality. It is along this line of argument that Konaré, at the beginning of the 1992 
presidential election campaign, proposed “decentralisation laws creating territorial 
decentralised communities [that will serve] as living places for the recomposition of the social 
tissue where local identities will express themselves, negotiate local development projects, 
and construct new terms for civic participation” (République du Mali 1997, p. 7, my 
translation). It is based on this logic that the territorial reorganisation was deemed necessary 
by the MDRI. The creation of legitimate viable local communities should guarantee that the 
functionality of the decentralised institutions in a long-term perspective.  
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Decentralisation: the spatial and scalar reconfiguration of the 
state
The territorial reorganisation initiated in 1993 resulted in the creation of 682 new rural 
municipalities country-wide in 199656 (MDRI 1998a). It was organised as a large-scale 
participatory process that, in the words of MDRI (1994), was based on the idea that the 
creation of homogenous, coherent and functional spaces should lead to a territorial 
organisation suitable for local governance and access to services. The creation of legitimate 
viable local communities was seen as a precondition for the successful devolution of authority 
to the decentralised institutions.  
Spatial reconfiguration – viable local communities 
The political rationale behind the territorial reorganisation can be traced to the role 
decentralisation played in the nation-building strategy of the Konaré regime. This led to the 
conclusion, within the MDRI, that the administrative structures established during 
colonialism, and later reinforced by the post-colonial state, were incongruent with existing 
local political realities and the demands implicit in a decentralised governance system 
established to foster development. This meant that the arrondissement, the basic 
administrative structure instituted by the leaders of the 1st Republic in the immediate pre-
independent period, should be replaced by viable local “spaces for the decentralised 
management of power regarding questions of local interest” (MDRI 1994, p. 5, my 
translation). The general objective of the creation of these “viable local spaces” was, as 
written in the MDRI publication “Guide de découpage territorial”, to: 
contribute to set up a new governance framework that allows rooting the values and 
institutions of all democratic societies: the participation of the population in 
“governance”, democratisation of the administration and the promotion of local 
development (MDRI 1994, p. 5, my translation). 
In order to assure “viability” of the new decentralised units that had legitimacy among those 
who were to inhabit them, a large-scale participatory territorial reorganisation57 was 
organised. It led to the establishment of new politico-administrative units locally in the form 
of municipalities.58 The basic idea was that villages and nomadic fractions themselves should 
56 19 urban municipalities existed at the time of the territorial reorganisation. Since then, two more have been 
created, leaving the current number of municipalities at 703. 
57 Also often referred to as the “découpage” or “cutting up” in English. 
58 This resulted in the passing of the law 96-059 in the National Assembly and the creation of 682 municipalities. 
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engage in a negotiation process and decide the composition of the new municipalities, i.e. 
which villages and fractions should belong to the municipality. This meant that it was not 
territory in itself, but social membership in a village or a fraction that was the point of 
departure for the process. In Mali, outside the family sphere, the village in sedentary areas and 
the fraction among the nomadic population constitute the basic social and political 
organisation. In theory, it was the representatives of these units, i.e. the village and fraction 
chiefs, that should engage in the negotiation process. The boundaries between the 
municipalities should therefore in general follow the boundaries between villages and 
fractions.59 The territorial composition of the decentralised units at cercle and regional level 
has, in a later stage, been outlined on the basis of these results. The whole process thus 
sought, at least in theory, to take local realities as the point of departure. This was reflected in 
the pre-defined criteria set up by the MDRI.60
These criteria were meant to assure that existing social, economic, political, cultural, spatial 
and demographic variables were taken into account in the delimitation of the municipality. 
The “community solidarity” and the “geographical and spatial” criteria for instance were 
meant to assure that the social, cultural and economic affinities between villages that had 
developed during pre-colonial, colonial and more recently were taken into account. This 
included the incorporation of demographic variables, such as genres de vie (sedentary or 
nomadic population), population density, and population movement (transhumance). The 
importance of these affinities was also evident in the criteria regarding the choice of 
community centre (the chef-lieu), the village to be host of the municipal council and other 
basic social infrastructure. This village should have a certain historical and social status in the 
municipality in order to assure its legitimacy. For instance, it should be a mother-village (i.e. 
the first village established in an area and from which other villages have been established) or 
a village with a long-term established chieftaincy. 
In addition to these sociological considerations, a certain number of quantitative criteria were 
included in order to assure a minimum population size in each municipality (15 to 25 villages 
and 10 000 to 25 000 inhabitant were indicated), to assure accessibility for the population to 
59 In fact, the exact boundaries between municipalities have for various reasons still not been defined in the sense 
that they have been drawn on a map. 
60 In short, there where five main categories of criteria: 1. Socio-cultural – respect of community solidarity; 2. 
Demographic – minimum population level; 3. Distance and accessibility to municipal centre; 4. Economic 
viability and capacity to assure services; and 5. Geographical and spatial criteria. 
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the municipal centre, to assure economic viability (capacity to provide the necessary 
economic, social and cultural services and to finance development), estimations of the 
presence and general level of resources in a future municipality (to guide the regrouping of 
villages in order to avoid the creation of municipalities without any resources). Furthermore, 
geographical and spatial criteria should be taken into account. These ranged from the already 
existing administrative structures and functional entities, agro-ecological systems and the 
spatial organisations of communities.  
The overall goal of the territorial reorganisation was thus the creation of municipalities of a 
suitable size for the management of local affairs that had legitimacy among those who were to 
inhabit them. The reform of the politico-administrative boundaries at the local level was thus 
presented, by the MDRI, as a necessary precondition for the devolution of authority to the 
decentralised institutions. Devolution was however only one of several politico-administrative 
reforms undertaken in Mali. Reforms of the role of the local branches of state agencies to 
make them institutionally adapted to the decentralised governance system were also important 
in the scalar reconfiguration of state power. 
Scalar reconfiguration of the state – devolution and deconcentration 
Devolution in Mali refers first and foremost to the transfer of competencies, i.e. the 
responsibility to assure specific functions and decision-making power, to the decentralised 
institutions. The MDRI publication “La stratégie des transferts de compétence”, underlines 
the importance of this principle: “in order to go from a formal decentralisation to a real 
decentralisation, it is necessary to confer to the local community the concrete prerogatives in 
matters that concerns local affairs” (MDRI 1997b, p. 4). 
Two types of processes are defined by the MDRI regarding the transfer of competencies. The 
first concerns competencies that, because of their nature, were automatically transferred after 
the local elections in 1999. These included administrative tasks related to marital status, 
censuses, archives and documentation and public hygiene. On the other side, the transfer of 
more complex and important functions are subject to the principle of progressive transfer and 
demands extensive preparation on the part of the authorities. In the above-mentioned MDRI 
publication, a 32-page list of possible functions to transfer to the municipalities from 6 line 
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ministries was identified.61 Other competencies to be transferred are extensive and include 
general functions62 and sector specific functions within the areas of education63, health64, and 
transport and public work (MDRI 1998b)65. This step-by-step approach to devolution is based 
on the need to assure that decentralised institutions have the necessary capacity to fulfil these 
functions before the competence is transferred. Another basic principle employed to assure 
this capacity is related to the transfer of sufficient economic resources to assure that the 
functions are fulfilled.  
In addition to the introduction of local government institutions, reforms of other state agencies 
have been carried out, or are underway. These reforms concerns most state agencies with a 
local presence and seek to make them institutionally fit the decentralised system. Of particular 
importance in this regard has been the reform of the state administration. The three-tier 
administrative system was implemented as part of the strategy of the leaders of the first 
Malian Republic (1960-68) to secure their hegemonic control over the post-colonial state. The 
system sought to marginalise the local elites instituted by French colonial authorities in their 
system of indirect rule, the canton chiefs, and extend the reach of the state locally. Appointed 
bureaucrats came to exercise extensive administrative and political power as the 
representatives of the central state at arrondissement, cercle and regional level in rural areas. 
This highly centralised system was at the centre of the critic of the post-colonial state that was 
expressed at the National Conference in 1991, and has consequently been stripped of its 
previous prerogatives. From being the most important decision-making institution at local 
level prior to decentralisation reform, the administration has now been assigned a tutelary 
function vis-à-vis local government. This means, first, that the administration is supposed to 
control the legality of the activities and deliberations taken by the elected councils at 
municipal, cercle and regional level (the budget, the establishment of communal enterprises, 
town or country planning, fixation of communal taxes and loans for instance) (MDRI 1998b). 
In exceptional cases, the tutelage might also be directed towards the deliberating organs 
61 The following ministries were included: Ministry of Health, Solidarity and Old People; Ministry of Public 
Work and Transport; Ministry of Urbanism and Habitat; Ministry of Rural Development and Environment; 
Ministry of Mines, Energy and Hydraulics; and the Ministry of Primary Education. 
62 Such as the elaboration of the economic, social and cultural development plan, the municipal budget, 
municipal services, natural resource management, administrative police, socio-economic infrastructure and 
environment 
63 Pre-scholar education, alphabetisation and primary education 
64 Dispensaries, maternity centres, community health centres and cleansing 
65 Road infrastructure, municipal communication and public transport, urban and rural hydraulic work as well as 
sport, art and culture 
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themselves. If the mayor and the municipal council no longer are capable of assuming their 
responsibility, measures of suspension, dismissal or dissolution might be undertaken. In this 
case the council is replaced by a special delegation of seven members appointed in Conseil de 
Ministre. The system is organised in such a way that the Ministry of Territorial 
Administration and Local Collectives (MATCL) assures the tutelage on the Regional 
Assembly, the High Commissionaire  (former governor) assure the same functions vis-à-vis 
the cercle councils, while the préfet (former commandant de cercle) at the cercle level assure 
tutelage vis-à-vis the municipality. The sous-préfet (former chef d’arrondissement) however, 
does not have any control function. Their role is to report irregularities that might occur in the 
municipality to the préfet. Secondly, the state is responsible for giving the decentralised units 
support and advice. This support is organised by the administration, and the responsibility of 
the delegated representative of the state on each administrative level. The state is hence 
obliged to put its technical services at the disposition of the local government.
Based on the discussion of the spatial and scalar reconfiguration of the state in Mali it is 
apparent that the MDRI has sought to take the local political space as point of departure in 
their elaboration of the decentralisation reform. It may thus be said that their strategy in this 
respect has been based on a top-down approach to bottom-up decentralisation. Through the 
territorial reorganisation it sought to create viable local political spaces in the form of 
municipalities. Based on the results of this process, the politico-administrative boundaries on 
cercle and regional levels were delineated. Local elections also take the municipality as point 
of departure. Only municipal councillors are elected by universal suffrage, while the members 
of the cercle council and the regional assembly are elected indirectly among the municipal 
councillors. When it comes to devolution, the municipality is, at least in theory, the 
decentralised unit with most responsibility. But even though the MDRI has sought to take the 
local political space as point of departure in its elaboration of the decentralisation reform, it 
now seems that the reform has entered an impasse.  
The democratic potential of decentralisation 
The conclusion that decentralisation has entered an impasse are based on the observation that 
the process of devolution to local governments has not come very far. In addition, the reform 
has in many areas led to increased politisation of local relations and the proliferation of 
clientelism and exclusion of the poorest segments of the population. This, I will argue, is 
             Paper 2 The politics of decentralisation in Mali  
139
partly caused by deficiencies in the institutional design of the reform as it was conceptualised 
by the MDRI. In several respects the elaboration of the reform in Mali coincides with the 
administrative decentralisation approach. Even though decentralisation came on the political 
agenda as a result of popular demands during the democratic transition, the elaboration and 
implementation of the reform was controlled by the MDRI. While the MDRI sought to take 
the local political space as their point of departure, the reform was still conceptualised from 
the centre with a predominant focus on the institutional design. The preoccupation with the 
institutional aspects of the reform meant that important political considerations related to the 
functioning of the reform in a long-term perspective have not been sufficiently taken into 
account. In particular, the way in which the decentralised institutions interact with and 
influence local political relations are of crucial importance. In combination with institutional 
bottlenecks at both national and local level the prospects for the democratic potential of 
decentralisation seem less optimistic now than before.  
Institutional bottlenecks – no real devolution 
One of the most pressing institutional bottlenecks related to the implementation of the 
decentralisation reform today is the lack of substantial devolution of authority and functions 
to the local governments. According to ag Ibrahim (2001, pers. comm.)66, the president of the 
Regional Assembly in the Timbuktu region, devolution had started only timidly in this region 
in 2001. Within the education sector for instance, the decentralised institutions on municipal, 
cercle and regional level had only been given the authority to sign contracts with teachers. In 
addition there has been some very limited devolution in the areas of health and rural 
development. In an interview with Nyangaly (2003, pers. comm.)67, the mayor of the 
municipality of Koro in the Mopti region, it was stated that the process of devolution had still 
not come any further since 2001. The government itself summarises the problem in their 
PRSP report from 2003: 
Despite the efforts made to implement this policy [i.e. the decentralisation reform], its 
true impact on living conditions of the population is not yet evident. This is due to the 
weak financial and technical capabilities of the communities, the inadequacy of the 
level of transfers of skills and funds from the State, and the lack of involvement of the 
people in decision-making processes at the local level (République du Mali 2003, p. 
24).
66 Interview on 27 June 2001.
67 Interview on 30 October 2003. 
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The lack of devolution may undermine the whole rationale of the reform as it has been 
conceptualised by the authorities of the 3rd Republic. In a recent report from SNV, a 
Netherlands-based international development organisation, Hilhorst and Baltissen (2004) 
attribute the lack of devolution to cautiousness on the part of the ministries responsible for the 
process. One of the reasons forwarded is uncertainty regarding the capacity of the 
decentralised institutions to fulfil the functions that are to be devolved. In this situation the 
dissolution of the MDRI and the delegation of the responsibility of devolution to sector-
specific ministries may actually make this process even more difficult. Devolution implies 
that the ministries will loose power and influence due to reduced budgets, thus providing an 
impetus for administrative control and recentralisation rather than devolution.  
In addition to problems regarding real devolution of power, the limited capacity of the local 
branches of the finance ministry represents another important bottleneck that may undermine 
the functioning of the decentralised government system.68 Being responsible for tax 
collection, paying wages to state and municipal employees, book-keeping for the 
municipalities and a range of other functions, these offices at the cercle level have by no 
means the capacity to fulfil their role. In the Koro cercle for instance, the local section of the 
finance ministry only had two employees that should cover all 16 municipalities. In order to 
pay wages or other expenses (both for the state and the municipalities) they had to travel to 
the regional capital Mopti to get access to cash, leaving little time to conduct other activities.
This means that although decentralisation occupies an important place in the political project 
of the 3rd Republic, the actual devolution of power and the lack of capacity of local state 
agencies represent presently one important challenge for the functioning of the decentralised 
system.  
Politisation of local relations – clientelism and exclusion 
The implementation of new governance institutions locally has in several municipalities led to 
increased polarisation between groups and politisation of local relations in the form of 
proliferation of clientelistic relations and exclusion of marginalised groups from the formal 
political arena. Previously, the local formal political arena was quite narrow in scope, and the 
local appointed bureaucrats at the arrondissement and cercle level were to a large degree the 
de facto decision-makers, while the village and fraction leaders only played a minor 
68 Interview with state employee in the Koro cercle in November 2003. 
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consultancy role. With the implementation of the decentralisation reform, the local political 
arena has opened up to a range of new actors that previously did not have access to political 
institutions. This has led to increased contestation locally and has intensified political 
struggles around access to the municipal institutions. 
Even during the territorial reorganisation there were signs that decentralisation reform 
introduced new political stakes locally. In Northern Mali for instance, in the municipality of 
Gossi, the politico-administrative boundaries was not changed during the territorial 
reorganisation.69 This meant that the municipality of Gossi corresponded to the former 
arrondissement of Gossi in its composition. The reason for this may be attributed to the 
relative position of the nomadic fractions that traditionally had ownership to the land in the 
area. These groups had economically been marginalised by outsiders moving to the largest 
village in the municipality (the village of Gossi). If the arrondissement of Gossi had been 
divided into several municipalities these groups would lose political access to the most 
important economic centre in the area. Numerically, however, they outnumber the outsiders. 
By assuring that the arrondissement was not divided into several municipalities they managed 
to assure at least access to the municipal council after the elections. Furthermore, prior to the 
local elections in 1999 several leaders of nomadic fractions sought to increase the size of their 
nomadic fractions in order to assure votes in the upcoming election. Families were promised 
that their tax were to be covered if they registered as members of the fraction and voted 
accordingly.  
Being elected to municipal councils have also been seen as a possibility by local elite groups 
to restore the power they previously possessed (for instance prior to independence). In a 
municipality in the Mopti region, the chef de village in the most influential village in the 
municipality was elected mayor70. The politico-administrative boundary of the new 
municipality corresponds to the colonial canton in place in the area during French colonial 
rule where the father of the current mayor was chef the canton. The introduction of the 
decentralisation reform has been used as a strategy to revitalise the power the family 
previously possessed. Being elected mayor, he has thus strengthened his position vis-à-vis 
other chefs de village in the municipality. In yet other municipalities, conflict between 
69 These observations are based on fieldwork in 1998-99 
70 These observations are based on fieldwork in 2003 
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different villages over for instance the choice of village as chef-lieu has led to a political 
impasse and a non-functioning municipality.  
The role of the chef de village/fraction in the decentralised governance system is maybe one 
of the largest political challenges to the reform today. The MDRI defined them as instances to 
be consulted in the matters of the municipality (for instance in the elaboration of the budget). 
Normally the chef de village or other authorities at village level is responsible for the 
distribution of access to agricultural land. In the decentralised governance system however, it 
is the mayor who is formally responsible for the natural resource management. In cases where 
a chef de village is elected mayor in a municipality this may create conflicts with chefs de 
village in other villages over who actually decides in conflict situation. Furthermore, a 
dividing line in local politics is related to the distinction between what is called autochthonous 
(first-arrivers) and allochthonous (late-arrivers). This division is of particularly importance in 
relation to local systems of owner-ship and access to land. In situations of contestation over 
access to natural resources the tension between these groups may intensify and result in the 
exclusion of late-comers to natural resources. Rather than assuring increased local democracy, 
decentralisation may thus lead to increased exclusion of the poorest segments of the 
populations (remote and marginalised villages, women, youth, and civil society organisations) 
and the proliferation of clientelism.  
Conclusion: empty decentralised units - recentralisation and 
informalisation
The introduction of the decentralisation reform in Mali shifted the balance of power away 
from appointed state bureaucrats towards elected municipal councillors and opened up the 
local political space for a range of new groups to participate in local affairs. Decentralisation 
came originally on the political agenda as a result of wide-spread popular demands during the 
democratic transition the country underwent in the early 1990s. The absence of the former 
Traoré regime from the transition paved the way for a broad-based anti-Traoré interim regime 
made up by the military coup-makers, the pro-democratic movement in the capital Bamako 
and the Tuareg rebel movements in Northern Mali. The transition culminated in the rise to 
power of the opposition when the political party ADEMA won a majority in the National 
Assembly and its leader, Alpha Oumar Konaré, was elected president. The demands for 
decentralisation were appropriated by the Konaré regime once in power and came to 
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constitute a major pillar in his post-transition democratisation project. The reform was 
actively constructed as a revitalisation of an idealised pre-colonial decentralised Mali and a 
mechanism through which to overcome the separation of state and society that had started at 
the onset of colonialism. The institutional autonomy accorded to the Mission de 
décentralisation et réformes institutionelles (MDRI) by the Konaré regime made it possible to 
carry through extensive spatial and scalar reconfiguration of the state in Mali.
Today, some 15 years after the democratic transition and well into the second mandate of the 
decentralised institutions, there are however signs that the reform has entered an impasse and 
that the democratic potential of decentralisation is undermined. Institutional bottlenecks 
threaten to undermine any real devolution to local government. Furthermore, increased 
political struggles and contestations around access to and control over the decentralised 
institutions locally have led to increased politisation of local relations and the proliferation of 
clientelism and exclusion of the poorest segments of the population. These developments may 
lead to a dislocation of the centre of power away from the municipal institutions. There are 
two possible scenarios. First, recentralisation in favour of the state administration is a likely 
outcome. The state administration, which has been marginalised as the result of the 
introduction of the decentralisation reform, may regain some of its former power. Its control 
function vis-à-vis the decentralised institutions may be used as a strategy to limit the space of 
action of the elected municipal council, the cercle council and the Regional Assembly. 
Secondly, the institutional void created by inoperative decentralised institutions may shift the 
centre of power towards groups outside the formal political arena. This may in turn lead to 
increased informalisation of politics at the local level and further exclusion of already 
politically marginalised groups. 
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Paper 3 Decentralisation and territorial 
reorganisation in Mali: power and the 
institutionalisation of local politics 
Decentralisation became increasingly popular in many developing countries in the 1990s. It is 
often seen as a solution to many of the problems that the public sector in Africa is faced with 
(Smoke 2003). Even though there is limited evidence that support the actual benefits of 
decentralisation, it is still popular among policy makers. This is so because discourses on 
institutional reforms towards decentralisation hold the promise of both substantive democracy 
and relevant development. However, these discourses have had a tendency to essentialise and 
romanticise local communities and downplay questions of exploitation, inequality and 
dominance (Mohan and Stokke 2000). Decentralisation is not a guarantee for participation 
and power-sharing. It may be used strategically to increase the control of national political 
authorities or it may lead to local elite capture (Smoke 2003). According to Harriss, Stokke 
and Törnquist (2004) there are few critical studies that focus on the outcomes of 
decentralisation, and when they do, local politics is often downplayed. What are needed, they 
state, are analyses of “the conjunction of discourses and institutions that define political 
spaces and the political practices of actors operating within these spaces…” (Harriss et al. 
2004, p. 3). This is in line with Ouedraogo’s (2003) observation that the local political space 
is already occupied by a complex institutional structure. The ways in which existing local 
institutions respond to the new decentralised institutions have so far not been given enough 
attention in the literature. 
In Mali, 682 new municipalities were created when the decentralisation reform was 
introduced after the local elections in 1999. In an African context it has been described as a 
successful case. Part of the reason for this may be ascribed to the positive image of the 
democratic transition the country underwent in the early 1990s and the subsequent 
democratisation efforts. The overthrow of Moussa Traoré, president since 1968, in the early 
1990s led the way for the introduction of a multi-party democratic system that still is 
relatively stable. Alpha Oumar Konaré, a prominent figure in the pro-democratic movement 
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that contributed to overthrow Traoré and the first democratically elected president in Malian 
history, gave decentralisation an important role in the new regime’s democratic nation-
building project after the 1992 presidential and legislative elections. The commitment to 
decentralisation from the regime was evident as it delegated the overall responsibility of the 
conceptualisation and implementation of the reform to the Mission de décentralisation et 
réformes institutionnelles (MDRI). Set up as a semi-independent state agency outside the 
traditional state apparatus and directly attached to the President’s Office, the process run by 
the MDRI resulted in the establishment of a decentralised governance system that in its design 
is more inclusive than previous politico-administrative systems in the country. It has 
transferred decision-making power from the state administration towards the municipality at 
the local level and reduced the abusive practices of the state towards the population. 
However, an explicit focus on the outcome of decentralisation in local political contexts is 
largely ignored both on a policy level in Mali and within the often positive accounts on 
decentralisation and democratisation in the country. Based on a case study of the 
decentralisation reform in Mali, this article examines the introduction of municipal 
institutions in local political contexts. The discussion follows chronologically the two main 
phases of the reform. First, I direct attention to the large-scale participatory territorial 
reorganisation carried through by the MDRI in the mid-1990s. The territorial reorganisation 
was based on the idea that the politico-administrative structures inherited from previous 
regimes were inappropriate for the present decentralised context and the objective was to 
reconstruct the local politico-administrative structure in order to establish functional, 
legitimate and viable local circumscriptions suitable for local democratic governance. In order 
to reach this goal, village and nomadic community leaders in an area were mobilised to 
participate in negotiations over the composition of the new municipalities. Secondly, I discuss 
the major challenges in the institutionalisation of the decentralised governance structure that 
began after the implementation of the reform in 1999. Natural resource management serves as 
an entry point to this discussion. Institutionally, a three-tier governance structure was 
established on municipal, cercle (district) and regional levels during this phase. Each of these 
levels is defined as a “collectivité territorial” and consequently defined as groups of people 
that are geographically located at a defined part of the national territory (MDRI 1998a). It is, 
within Malian laws, given a judicial personality (meaning that it may make relatively 
autonomous decisions), financial autonomy and the power of free administration (it is not 
attached hierarchically to the central state administration). The design of the “collectivité 
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territorial” in Mali is thus in line with Manor’s (1995) definition of what is required to 
achieve devolution, namely that the local government is partly independent of central state 
authorities and democratically elected. 
The article is based on fieldwork in the municipality of Gossi in the Timbuktu region and in 
the Koro and Bankass cercles in the Mopti region. The first fieldwork was carried out in the 
capital Bamako, the regional capital Timbuktu and the then future municipality of Gossi in 
the Timbuktu region in 1998-1999 (6 months). This provided me with information on the 
democratic transition and the role of decentralisation in national political processes as well as 
the territorial reorganisation and the preparation for the implementation of the reform in a 
regional and a local context. It was based on a series of interviews with high ranked officials 
within the MDRI and government departments, politicians and researchers, as well as public 
servants, politicians and community leaders in Timbuktu and Gossi. The second fieldwork 
was carried out with the assistance of CARE Mali in the cercles of Koro and Bankass in the 
Mopti region in 2003 (2 months) and provided me with observations on the 
institutionalisation of the decentralisation reform. Interviews have also been conducted as part 
of other missions to Mali; in 2001 as part of an internship for CARE Mali in the Cercle de 
Diré in the Timbuktu region, and in 2002 and 2005 as part of consultancy for the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). 
The theoretical framework presented in the next section directs attention to the importance of 
both state-society interactions as well as local political processes for the analysis of the local 
politics of decentralisation. Since the long-term outcome of decentralisation is dependent on a 
number of processes that take place on several interlinked levels, focus is first and foremost 
directed to the interface between the introduction of a politico-administrative reform from 
above and the responses to the new local decentralised institutions from below. 
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Figure 6. Map of Mali including places referred to in the article. 
Local politics and decentralisation 
Decentralisation has become a key element in state reforms in West Africa since the 1980s 
(Ouedraogo 2003). According to Gaudusson and Médard (2001), decentralisation emerged as 
a response to the crisis of the neopatrimonial African state caused by the economic problems 
of the 1980s. The neopatrimonial state, founded on particularist distribution (patronage and 
clientelism), represented an efficient way of political control, but was dependent on enough 
resources to be distributed. The solution to the crises of the state that emanated from 
institutions such as the World Bank has sought to depatrimonialise the state by strengthening 
civil society, and through privatisation, decentralisation, public sector reforms and 
democratisation. This has resulted in reduced state authority in favour of market liberalisation 
(de-statisation) and has brought about a scalar reconfiguration of state power in favour of 
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regionalisation and localisation (de-nationalisation) (Harriss et al. 2004). The increased 
interest in decentralisation among both academics and within development agencies build 
furthermore on the “common assumption […] that mutually enabling relations between 
decentralised state institutions, local business and civil associations will generate economic 
growth, poverty alleviation and good governance’(Harriss et al. 2004, p. 3). The assumptions 
made by donors have however had a tendency to ignore what Lemarchand (1998, p. 10) calls 
the “hidden face of decentralisation”. Rather than focussing on the introduction of good 
governance, attention should be directed to what he calls politics from below, that is that of 
rural clienteles, brotherhood networks, village authorities, development brokers and 
intermediaries, because decentralisation has become a part of the local political game.  
The institutionalisation of the local political space takes place on several interlinked levels 
and includes both local and non-local actors. In his analysis of local power in the town of Dori 
in Burkina Faso, Lund (2001) argues that it is necessary to move beyond the local context in 
order to understand local politics. Rather than focussing on the vertical dimensions of state 
and society, attention should be directed to the way in which power is produced and 
maintained and in particular the processes that connect different geographical levels and 
zones of authority. The distinction between local and non-local actors may therefore blur 
important dimensions in an analysis of the local politics of decentralisation. The state for 
instance may be defined as a non-local actor, but its local agencies and employees often 
function de facto as influential local agents. Likewise, there are many local actors that are part 
of extra-local networks. This implies that local politics is the result of complex and changing 
interactions between actors and institutions at different levels. As Samoff writes:  
decentralisation is a programme for specifying who is to rule in particular settings. 
Therefore, to make sense of its forms and consequences in particular settings we need to 
understand decentralisation as a political initiative, as a fundamental political process, 
and consequently as a site for political struggle (1990, p. 519). 
Decentralisation thus raises question about power and about who rules in a particular society. 
This means that the relative degree of centralisation and decentralisation is not 
disadvantageous per se but must be determined in any concrete context. This ‘situational 
specificity’ of decentralisation means that success is specific to each situation and has to refer 
to its goals (empowerment for instance) and to the transformation of power structures 
(Samoff, 1990). Since decentralisation is a political process, the decentralised institutions are, 
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even when relatively institutionalised, likely to be subject to contestations. The outcome of 
decentralisation is thus not given and may, according to Slater (1989), as well increase the 
dominance of the already powerful as it may bring about increased democratisation. This is 
similar to the point made by Cooke and Khotari (2001) when they talk about the “tyranny of 
participation” and the lack of attention given to the complexity of power relations on the part 
of participatory development proponents. Even though they do not refer explicitly to 
decentralisation, their point is relevant since it, at least in the form of devolution, involve 
some level participation with local government institutions.  
The state-in-society approach provides a useful theoretical framework for the analysis of the 
local politics of decentralisation. Within this approach, patterns of dominance, maintenance of 
status quo and changes are understood as processes that result from state-society interaction. 
It directs attention to structures within the state and different societal movements and 
networks, as well as formal and informal organisations (Migdal 1994; Degnbol 1999). The 
theory assumes that a state’s possibility to undertake change is dependent on its relation to 
society (Kohli and Shue 1994). The disaggregation of the state brings the lower levels of the 
state and state-society relations in peripheral rural areas into the analysis. The approach 
furthermore assumes that social forces are historically contingent and that their political 
capacity is not predetermined. The interaction between segments of the state and segments of 
the society is complex. This implies the possibility that state and society might both be 
mutually empowering and exclusive. Rather than focussing on the capacity of the state to 
implement policy it is more fruitful to focus on the process leading to the modification of the 
initial objectives of a policy reform (Migdal 1994). The formulation of state policy is as much 
a product of its relation to groups in society as a result of decisions made by top leaders or the 
legislative process. By directing attention towards the lower levels of the state hierarchy, 
where direct contact with social groups takes place, it is clear that the political outcome is the 
result of the complex interaction between the different state levels and the social pressure 
experienced on each of these levels.  
Furthermore, Hagberg’s (2004) call for an analysis of decentralisation in practice points to 
three particular dimensions relevant for the political state-society analysis of decentralisation 
in this article. The power dimension directs attention to how decentralisation affects the 
distribution and exercise of power within society. It refers to the degree of devolution to local 
governments, the legitimacy of local governments and the relation between local governments 
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and other local institutions. The livelihood aspect, and in particular access to and management 
of natural resources, highlights the decentralised institutions’ capacity to support and 
strengthen access to social infrastructure. A question that rest to be solved in Mali in this 
regard is the division of labour between the decentralised institutions, the prerogatives of 
village-based management systems and the role of the state. The cultural meaning dimension 
directs attention to how decentralisation is interpreted locally. Decentralisation may, 
according to Hagberg “enable a re-appropriation not only of local resources but also of local 
cultural identities and values” (2004, p. 8). These dimensions will run through the following 
discussion.
Territorial reorganisation in Mali: the reconstruction of the 
local political space from below 
The result of the territorial reorganisation in Mali should be understood as a function of two 
overriding processes. First, the strategic decisions made by central authorities in the 
elaboration of the reform have influenced its outcome. Even though the decision to 
decentralise grew out of the internal political constellations in Mali at the time of the 
transition, the decentralisation process has been an exercise in social, political and spatial 
engineering from above. The process was controlled from the centre through the MDRI, 
which elaborated the necessary juridical framework, designed the institutional set-up of the 
decentralised governance system and directed its implementation. Secondly, and most 
important for the current discussion, the outcome of the territorial reorganisation was to a 
large degree influenced by particular local political constellation and processes. During the 
territorial reorganisation, at least from the local perspective, it was unclear what kind of 
institution the municipality would become in the future. The political competition around the 
composition of the new decentralised institutions that resulted form the territorial 
reorganisaiton may be explained by the anticipation among local actors regarding the transfer 
of economic resources from the state as well as the possibility to gain political power locally. 
The positioning is related to the role the state has played since independence as a source of 
accumulation of capital (Hetland 2000). As a strategy to maintain hegemonic control of the 
post-colonial state, the political leaders of both the 1st and 2nd Malian Republic sought to 
assimilate competing political networks through clientelistic redistribution of resources. Even 
though the centralised one-party state now is replaced by a multi-party system and a 
decentralised governance structure, redistribution is still a dominant governance mode.  
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The local responses to the territorial reorganisation differed between localities since it was 
introduced in very different socio-historical contexts characterised by different forms of 
solidarity and power relations (Fay 2000). Local power centres range from lineage to village 
chieftaincies dating back to pre-colonial and colonial times or are of more recent origin. This 
was particularly evident, according to Fay, in the “diversity in the social, historical and 
geographical reconstructions on which the different municipalities were created” (2000, p. 
123).
First-comers and late-comers 
The notion of autochthony has recently become an important dimension in questions of 
belonging in Africa (Geschiere 2005). Autochthony implies claims that the first-settled people 
in an area have superior rights based on rootedness to the territory than people that has moved 
in at a later stage. In a West African context, claims of belonging from the first-comers groups 
is the most wide-spread strategy to legitimate land rights (Lentz 2006). Furthermore, the 
division between first and late-comers has in recent years increasingly been brought onto the 
political, economic and social arena. The fear of being outnumbered in local elections on the 
part of the first-comers is real in many areas, and the discourse of autochthony may be used to 
legitimise control over natural resources. On a political level, the support to localist 
movements has for many regimes become a strategy to divide the opposition in a multi-party 
context and for development agencies it is a part of the focus on decentralisation and support 
for NGOs (Geschiere 2005). In a local context, autochthony may entail processes of exclusion 
of the late-comers. In Mali the question of autochthony was a concern in several areas during 
the territorial reorganisation and has had an upsurge as a power asset in local politics during 
the territorial reorganisation and after the introduction of the decentralisation reform. This is 
however not just a question of first-comers vs. late-comers. As Nijenhuis (2001) shows in her 
study of increased political conflict in a village in Southern Mali, decentralisation created 
increased conflict between two autochthonous groups that both used the reform strategically 
to restore their local power positions (a young educated farmer on one side and village elders 
on the other). But even though the conflict has led to division in the village around the two 
groups, the marginalised are the migrants that settled in the area later and that ‘find 
themselves being chased off their borrowed fields for choosing the wrong side’ (Nijenhuis 
2003, p. 69). Decentralisation has in this case increased the level of conflict among the 
autochthon population in the area. However, the manner in which territorial reorganisation 
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has influenced local social and political relations differ. This is in line with Lentz’ observation 
that the way in which the “relations between ‘autochthons’ and immigrants actually develops, 
depends not only on local configurations of power, but also the larger political context” 
(2006, p. 20).
Alliances and conflict in Gossi 
The division between first and late-comers became a central dimension in the territorial 
reorganisation in the former Arrondissment de Gossi. The leaders of the autochthonous 
nomadic fractions71 in the area engaged themselves actively during the process in order to 
assure that it was transformed entirely into the Municipality of Gossi. The autochthons have 
from the colonial times been seen as the proprietors of the area around Gossi. These groups 
have little or no property in the village, which is today dominated by traders. During the 
territorial reorganisation, several groups in Gossi wanted to split the arrondissement into three 
municipalities, with municipal centres (chef-lieu) in respectively Gossi (the village), N'Daki 
and Ebang Malane. However, the autochthons of Gossi refused this solution because they 
feared to lose control and consequently being dominated by the late-comers. The alliance 
during the territorial reorganisation between the first-comers in the municipality was however 
relatively fragile and temporary. Prior to the local elections in 1999, there was widespread 
political mobilisation among various groups in the area to strengthen their political support as 
part of a strategy to gain access to the future municipal institutions. Because it is necessary to 
be registered in a municipality in order to vote there, at least two fractions were registered in 
Gossi, more precisely Kel Antessar-Gossi and Oulad Driss. These fractions had lived there for 
a long time, but had previously been administratively registered in other places. The leader of 
the Kel-Antessar fraction, originally coming from the area around Goundam, was actively 
recruiting new members prior to the 1999 elections by way of entering new patron-client 
relations with families (paid their taxes) to increase the demographic importance of the 
fraction as a means to recruit votes. The autochthonous population in Gossi thus initially went 
into an alliance to impede the break-up of the arrondissement into several municipalities. A 
conflict between an autochthonous fraction and a fraction that is made up of late-comers 
illustrate furthermore new conflict lines. Both of these fractions live in the same area of the 
municipality and have for some time been in a conflict over the use of forest resources. After 
71 A fraction is composed of several families and is led by a chef de fraction. The fraction is a flexible social 
structure and might regroup people of different ethnic origin. The chef de fraction have, as the chef de village,
administrative tasks (in relation to censuses and tax payment for instance) and is to be consulted in important 
municipal affairs (the elaboration of the development plan and the budget). 
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the local elections in 1999, this conflict was brought onto the municipal arena as the leaders 
of both fractions were elected members of the municipal council for the same political party.  
Similar patterns are found in other parts of the country. In a municipality72 in the Cercle de 
Goundam in the Timbuktu region, Giuffrida (2005) demonstrates how the failure of 
development projects within the framework of decentralisation has at the same time 
reproduced poverty and generated conflicts between groups over the control of development 
aid. Likewise, in his study of the village of Zégoua73, Béridogo (1998) shows how the 
creation of the Municipality of Zégoua was subject to intense struggle during the territorial 
reorganisation and increased the tension between first and late-comers. Historically, different 
lineages have always combated to gain control over the village of Zégoua. This is also the 
case now, when the current power holders try to conserve their position based on a strategy 
consisting of fighting the late-comers. 
As a general tendency in Northern Mali, Muphta ag Hairy74 observes that the territorial 
reorganisation in many cases was used strategically to assure that certain people were elected 
mayor:  
During the découpage [the term usually used to refer to the territorial reorganisation] 
there were some inauspicious initiatives. Sometimes I got the impression that the 
municipalities were created for already known mayors. And in order for a person to be 
elected mayor, it was necessary that the municipality was comprised exclusively of 
people that supports him… I think that there are some places that I have not been, but I 
know that almost everywhere they knew already who would become mayor and the 
municipality was carved out in order for this person to become mayor 
This was, according to ag Hairy, for instance the case in the city of Goundam.75 In other 
municipalities people who have had important positions earlier (chef de tribus or chef de 
canton during colonialism) or other political entrepreneurs that have sought power have used 
the territorial reorganisation strategically to create local power centres to assure control and 
influence over the municipal institutions. The creation of municipalities based on the 
72 She does not name the municipality in her article 
73 It is located in the Cercle de Zegoua in the Sikasso region, some 500 km south of the capital Bamako near the 
border to Ivory Coast. 
74 Interview on 25 November 1998, previous Chef d’Arrondissement, Commendant de Cercle, Gouverneur de 
Koulikoro and Malian ambassador to Egypt. 
75 Goundam is located in the Cercle de Goundam in the Timbuktu region, 100 km west of the city of Timbuktu. 
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revitalisation of political entities that had been marginalised under previous regimes was the 
case in several localities in Mali.   
Local elite capture and the revitalisation of the canton 
The territorial reorganisation opened up the opportunity for groups to revitalise political 
entities that had been marginalised as a result of politico-administrative reforms during 
French colonialism or post-colonial one-party rule. Cissé (1999) observed several attempts in 
the Mopti region to revitalise the canton during the territorial reorganisation. The canton was 
a colonial administrative structure that had been abolished by the leaders of the 1st Malian 
Republic under the presidency of Modibo Keita.
The creation of the Municipality of Tori in the Cercle de Bankass was rooted in the desire by 
certain groups to revitalise the former canton of Tori. This canton was established during 
French colonial rule and the father of the current mayor was chef de canton until 1960. As the 
cantons were abolished by the Keita regime the family was deprived of its former power. The 
territorial reorganisation represented an opportunity to restore its former position. Their 
success during the territorial reorganisation was based on their position locally. They are 
considered to be the proprietors of the land (they are the first-comers) and, consequently, 
people who have moved into the area later are dependent on them to get access to land. Being 
proprietor of land was an important power asset that governed the territorial reorganisation in 
this municipality. It was difficult for others to oppose the process because they were 
dependent on the autochthones to get access to land. Furthermore, the election of the current 
mayor has resulted in increased local elite capture in other areas. In addition to being mayor, 
he is also chef de village in the village that serves as municipal centre, school director, and 
president of other local associations. Several of the municipal councillors also occupy central 
positions in these associations. One of the reasons they have succeeded is that the family has 
managed to stay united and thus blocked the opportunity for other groups to get access to the 
municipal arena. Fay (2000) finds the same underlying logic in his study of the territorial 
reorganisation in the Cercle de Tenenkou in the western part of Mopti region. The cercle is 
composed of nine rural and one urban municipality. Political and territorial legitimacy with 
roots in pre-colonial or colonial political organisation was the basic principle on which the 
new municipalities were created in this area. Some of the municipalities resemble the former 
arrondissements but only in cases when the arrondissements themselves corresponded to 
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either the pre-colonial janyeeli76 or to the old cantons. Other municipalities were purely 
reconstructions of the pre-colonial jenyeeli.  
Conflicts and fragmentation of political relations 
As the discussion above shows, the creation of the municipalities was the result of existing 
local political relations that in some cases dated back to even the pre-colonial period. 
Furthermore, as the Tori example demonstrates, the territorial reorganisation has in some 
areas given groups the opportunity to gain power and monopolise local political institutions. 
The opportunities created by the process has furthermore created a manoeuvring space that in 
many places has increased local conflicts and led to fragmentation of political relations.  
One expression of this was conflicts over the location of the chef-lieu (municipal centre) that 
resulted from political competition between different groups during the territorial 
reorganisation. This became a major conflict line in one municipality in the Cercle de Koro in 
the Mopti region.77 In pre-colonial time, village A used to be relatively weak compared to 
village B. Its position locally was however strengthened when it was made administrative 
centre under French colonial rule and further when it was made chef-lieu during the territorial 
reorganisation. The mayor elected in 1999 however came from village B and because he saw 
this as a possibility to restore the position of this village, he refused to move to the chef-lieu 
in village A. The mayor has been removed from his position by the administration, but 
continues to represent the municipality officially on his own initiative. At the source of this 
conflict are people that for a period of time have lived elsewhere, often in Bamako, and 
returned to their home-place (called resortissants). According to one informant, tensions 
between resortissants are common in Mali and are often at the source of conflicts. Often, they 
seek to create a political career with their home-place as point of departure. In this particular 
case, the conflict has led to a total blockage in the functioning of the municipality. Djiré 
(2004) find a similar case in his study of local governance in Sanankoroba.78 Because of 
disagreement over the location of the chef-lieu, some of the villages chose to become part of 
another municipality.  
76 In pre-colonial time the area corresponding to the Cercle de Tenenkou was organised in a chieftaincy (called 
Diallo-Dicko) subdivided into some 20 areas of power in a confederacy (Fay 2000). 
77 Information based on fieldwork in Koro in 2003. 
78 Sanankoroba is located some 30 km south of the capital Bamako in the Cercle de Kati in the Koulikoro region. 
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The creation of very small municipalities, as Cissé (1999) observed in the Mopti region, may 
also be seen as an expression of the fragmentation of local politics. The desire expressed by 
many villages to create municipalities made up of only a small number of villages was a 
common difficulty encountered during the territorial reorganisation. As the citation below 
indicates, this may in certain cases be attributed to economic relations. In an information 
meeting held prior to the territorial reorganisation, one chef de village expressed his concern 
on the matter: 
Here, in Falaco, we have been decentralised for a long time. We are two villages 
(Falaco and N’Golocorola) and 23 hamlets. Together, we have built three classrooms, a 
maternity, an animal husbandry, lodging for our teachers, for the midwife and for the 
nurse… Apart from the husbandry agent, we pay them all without the support from the 
government represented in Fana [an arrondissement] or the chef d’arrondissement who 
only comes to us to collect the taxes of which we benefit nothing. If we join another 
municipality, they [the other villages] will only benefit for free from the efforts we have 
generated during many years. All in all, we are sufficient. We, Falaco and N’Golocorola 
and our 23 hamlets, we do not join anyone. In the union that has always been between 
us, we will create our own municipality (Diarra, Freyss, de Noray, Sarambounou, 
Sidibé, Sissoko, Soumaré and Tobéré 1996, p. 154, my translation). 
Koné (1997), in his study of the creation of micro-municipalities in the Sikasso region, 
ascribes this to the political and economic history of the localities in question on one side, and 
the interpretation of the criteria of reorganisation on the other. According to the demographic 
criteria set by the MDRI (a minimum of 10 000 inhabitants in each municipality), the Cercle
de Sikasso should consist of 10 municipalities. At the end of the reorganisation however, the 
cercle counted 42 new municipalities. He explains this on the basis of solidarity between 
villages born out of a common recent history as well as present common interests. The micro-
municipalities seemed to regenerate former socio-political realities prevailing in the area. 
With the introduction of colonial administration, and later during the post-colonial period, 
certain villages were given the status as administrative centres, and were thus considered as 
villages of supremacy. During the territorial reorganisation in the 1990s, villages saw thus the 
possibility of regaining some of their independence by establishing themselves as 
administrative centres. Because of this, several villages refused to be part of a municipality 
where a neighbouring village was proposed as chef-lieu based on historical and economic 
reasons. In other cases, possible municipalities were split up because villages could not agree 
on the location of the chef-lieu.
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To sum up, the outcome of the territorial reorganisation was to a large degree the function of 
local political struggles. The process has had and will continue to have long-term impact upon 
the functioning and the institutionalisation of the decentralised governance system because 
the municipalities have become important new arenas for struggle over local political 
leadership and authority. This is so despite the limited devolution of formal decision-making 
power from the state to the municipal authorities. It is to the institutionalisation of the 
decentralised governance system that the discussion now turns. 
Decentralisation: transformation and the institutionalisation of 
local politics 
The introduction of new decentralised governance structures in Mali has brought new stakes 
onto the local political arena. Even though the new system is currently in the process 
institutionalisation, it is not clear what it will look like in the future. As the following 
discussion will show, it involves both local and non-local actors with different interests and 
takes place on several interlinked levels. In the official discourse of the authorities, the 
decentralised governance system in 1999 represents an important arena for local development: 
The decentralisation reform launched by the 3rd Republic is a vast societal project. Its 
administrative and institutional dimensions are not more than supportive of a much 
more ambitious political ‘building site’ that seek to deepen the democratisation process 
to the local level countrywide, to give the parole and the power back to the citizens, to 
create the favourable framework for the renaissance of local initiatives which are 
considered as the engine in the new approach to development (MDRIb 1998, p. 14, my 
translation).
The territorial reorganisation, as it has been conceptualised by the MDRI, was intended to 
result in the creation of legitimate politico-administrative local units that would serve as 
arenas for local development. The pre-defined criteria elaborated by the MDRI should assure 
“community solidarity” within the municipality by including social, political, cultural, spatial 
and demographic relations and affinities between villages and/or other social groups (MDRI 
1994). The MDRI has thus sought to create an arena for local development initiatives and 
service provision. It is in this regard that the state has devolved the responsibility for the 
elaboration of local budgets and development programs to the municipality.79 Even though 
79 In article 4 in law no. 93-008 ‘Regulating the conditions for the free administration of the territorial 
collectives’ (déterminant les conditions de la libre administration des collectivités territoriales), the role of the 
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limited decision-making power is transferred at this moment, the municipality is in the future 
supposed to assure a large range of functions that previously was the responsibility of the 
state.
However, as has already been indicated in the previous section, the territorial reorganisation 
resulted in many localities in the creation and revitalisation of local conflicts between groups 
of different origin. This means that the local political space has not yet been institutionalised 
in line with the explicit goals of the reform as they were expressed by national political 
authorities and codified by the MDRI. Rather, the local political space is in a process of 
transformation and is in various degrees filled with local power structures. Within the area of 
natural resource management, a crucial area in people’s everyday life in rural areas, it remains 
unclear what the role of the municipality, the state and village authorities will be in the future. 
Not only local social and political relations, but also the state also plays a part in the 
institutionalisation of local politics. The degree of devolution from central state authorities, 
the role of the state administration as a control instance vis-à-vis the municipalities and the 
role of other state agencies locally are furthermore subject to changing political orientations 
nationally.
The municipality as local political arena – natural resource management 
Local management of natural resource has become a crucial issue in contemporary Africa 
(Bertrand 1998). Historically, natural resource management (NRM) in Mali has been the 
domain of the state and was prior to 1991 characterised by authoritarian and repressive 
practices on the part of the state Forest Service (Benjaminsen 1998; Winter 2000). The 1986 
forest code only allowed centralised state control of the forest resources. The post-colonial 
forest policy in Mali is a legacy from French colonial rule, and the centralised state authority 
over natural resources, designed to benefit the colonisers, continued under post-colonial rule 
until the 1990s (Becker 2001). In line with the new decentralised context in Mali, a new 
natural resource management law has opened up for new management systems that break 
with the previous repressive system. The new forest law adopted in 1995 (law 95-003) was 
designed as a guiding law that leaves room for local regulations (Winter 2000). But even 
though the forest law has left room for local management of forest resources, a major problem 
has been that it does not specify how local management should be organised.  
CT in local development is explicitly mentioned: The CT have as mission the conceptualisation, programming 
and implementation of economic, social and cultural development activities of regional and local interest 
(Primature de la République du Mali 1996). 
Paper 3 Decentralisation and territorial reorganisation in Mali 
162
Decentralisation has nevertheless opened up the possibility for co-management arrangements 
that include both local village institutions and the municipality (Benjaminsen 1997). 
However, the creation of municipal domains does not solve the judicial problems related to 
land areas under customary control (Lavigne Delville 2002). Village and fraction councils are 
for instance supposed to be consulted regarding the use of land but how this is to be done has 
not been specified. Nonetheless, there is an opening in the law for municipal councils to 
create local conventions for the management of natural resources.  
There have been recent attempts to set up local natural resource management systems in Mali. 
In the municipality of Koro in the Mopti region, a Local Convention on forest management 
for the Ségué forest was deliberated in the municipal council in 2002 (Municipality of Koro 
2002). The forest of Ségué plays, according to the Convention, an important role in the local 
economy. It is inhabited by a variety of stakeholders representing different ethnic groups 
(McLain and Sankaré 1993).80 Ownership and use right of the forest among the villages is 
based on the principle of time of settlement (refer discussion of autochthony above). This 
means that the village of Gakou, the first village to be established in the forest, has stronger 
claims than villages that have settled later. Some of the pastoralists groups as well as non-
resident gatherers have in addition developed use rights to the forest. However, the 
exploitation of the forest by commercial wood-cutters has created conflicts. This may partly 
be caused by the legal status of the forest in Malian laws. The state through the Forest Service
has had a monopoly of forest management, while the forest users have only enjoyed use 
rights. The villages have thus not had any means to sanction the use of the forest by the 
commercial wood-cutters. 
The Convention is set up as a co-management scheme that implies that certain aspects of 
forest management authority are delegated from the mayor to local management associations 
called Ogokana. The Ogokana used to be an old Dogon village institution, the purpose of 
which included both the management of natural resources as well as the resolution of social 
conflicts (Benjaminsen 2000). These institutions were however considerably weakened by the 
centralisation of forest management by the state. Since 1991 there have been attempts to 
80 The authors identify multiple groups of forest users: sedentary agriculturalists, sedentary agro-pastoralists, 
semi-sedentary (agro) pastoralists, transhumant pastoralists, non-resident wood-cutters and non-resident 
gatherers. 
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revitalise the Ogokana institutions facilitated by the international NGO CARE. These 
institutions, of which there are 19 according to the Convention, are among other things 
responsible for the surveillance of the Ségué forest in cooperation with the state agency 
Service local de conservation de la nature81 (SLCN) in Koro.
As of late 2003 however, several of the agreements in the Convention were not fulfilled. 
Meetings between the mayor and the associations that were planned to solve irregularities in 
forest management had not taken place. According to article 11 in the Convention the mayor 
should convene the forest users prior to each dry season to determine the movement of 
animals, but the mayor had not done this. The rural market places for wood should assure 
income for forest dwellers but has been sabotaged by people from the city of Koro that go 
elsewhere to collect wood.  
The problems related to the convention may be explained by several factors. One explanation 
is related to lack of representation. Out of the 23 municipal councillors in Koro, only two are 
from the forest villages. This means that the decisions taken in the council regarding the forest 
of Ségué have not much legitimacy. Lack of legitimacy is furthermore illustrated by another 
event. One hamlet in the forest had on its own initiative begun to dig a well and had to hire 
expensive specialists at their own expense to dig through rock. Normally the digging of wells 
is the responsibility of the municipality, but the hamlet did not ask the mayor for assistance 
based on the argument that the budgeting and the elaboration of the municipal development 
plan would take too long time. Furthermore, they do not pay taxes anymore because they do 
not see what they can benefit from it. But they also underlined that the decentralisation reform 
had had positive effects. It is much easier to get in touch with the municipal councillors than 
the former state appointed administrators since “they are much closer to us than the 
administration”. The councillors also take on the role as intermediaries when they need to get 
in touch with the administration or other state agencies.  
An explanation related to inter-village relations in the area also seems plausible. It may be 
argued that the mayor does not intervene in NRM questions involving other villages in the 
municipality since this is normally the domain of the chef de village. Intervening in other 
village chiefs’ domain may be a source of inter-village conflict that is not open for municipal 
81 The previous State Forest Service. 
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intervention. The current position of village chiefs has also been subject to transformations 
since colonialism (Ribot 1999). Under French colonial rule and until the early 1990s chiefs 
were made part of the state administrations. Their double loyalty towards both the population 
and to the state has undermined their representativeness. Regular elections of village chiefs by 
universal suffrage may increase their legitimacy, but their principle role is still as 
administrative appointees.  
The lack of intervention may also be explained by the current political situation within the 
village of Koro (the chef-lieu in the municipality) in which the mayor is himself autochthon. 
In his account of the history of the city of Koro, the mayor refers explicitly to his family’s 
position as the founders82 and, consequently, their customary rights to village land: “We are 
the autochthones. The proprietors of the land – that is us”. However, within the village there 
are numerous power centres. According to one informant, the chef de village is stronger than 
the mayor and controls him to a certain degree. Furthermore, according to another informant, 
the chef de terre position is more important. Responsible for customary management and 
distribution of village land in a life-time position, he normally stays outside the political life 
of the municipality. The chef de village on the other side, having administrative 
responsibilities, involves himself more in politics. He is responsible for “administrative 
management” and is an “intermediary between the chef de terre and the administrative 
authority”. 
This analysis points towards the conclusion that municipal politics in Koro is to a certain 
degree governed by informal political relations (that is political relations outside the formal 
prerogatives of the municipality). This aspect was also evident in other domains. Social and 
kinship relations were explicitly referred to as a rationale for political practice in an interview 
with the mayor of Koro. In the case of taxing for instance people often refuse to pay: 
Before, the tax was collected with force. Since June 6 [1999], the municipality has 
arrived. Now, it is the children of the land that manage [local affairs]. We may not 
appeal to the security forces to make people pay. We can’t put people in prison. We 
have been elected in the ballots. The people say that ‘the mayor, he is our cousin, our 
parent. We are not afraid of him, so we do not pay the taxes’. The mayor can not be as 
the state, he may not force the people to pay. People do not pay the taxes – the past has 
tired them out (Anaye Niangaly, Mayor of Koro, interview on 30 October 2003) 
82 The village was originally founded by a hunter named Anaye that had fours sons. The four families that are 
considered to be the founders of the city descend from the sons of Anaye. 
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In the neighbouring Cercle de Bankass there has been a similar attempt to that in Koro. In 
1992 the NGO SOS Sahel established a participatory forest management system in the Samori 
forest in the municipality of Baye. One of the main challenges regarding forest management 
here, according to Kassibo (2005), is that the forest is subject to several institutional systems 
that make management complex and a potential source of conflict. Among the main actors are 
the state technical services (the SLCN), the revitalised local management associations (called 
ton) as well as elected municipal councillors. A major problem in the management of the 
forest is the difficulty to establish fields of discretionary power at the local level. One of the 
main reasons for this is the lack of delegation of power and transfer of land from the state to 
the decentralised institutions.  
One major obstacle to the establishment of functional co-management structures is the 
number of different stakeholders in forest management with different interests and the lack of 
institutionalisation of clearly defined roles. A key challenge in setting up participatory NRM 
systems is thus, according to Ribot (1999), to make local authorities downwardly accountable 
and empowered as decision-making bodies. These challenges however only reflect a more 
fundamental dilemma regarding decentralisation in Mali. Even though it is set up to promote 
local management of natural resources and thus promote local development, there has hardly 
been any devolution of authority and participation is very limited. The struggle between 
stakeholders over the institutionalisation of NRM in a particular local context may rather 
result in the exclusion of groups with already weak use rights (pastoralists for instance) and 
the concentration of power with certain groups (groups of autochthones for instance). If this is 
the case, the municipality becomes an institution that cements or even strengthens local power 
relations.
The ambivalent role of the state – devolution, clientelism and recentralisation 
The implementation of the decentralised governance institutions in Mali is currently at a stage 
characterised by struggles over the institutionalisation of the municipality as a local political 
arena. This does however not mean that non-local actors are without influence. The role of the 
state is of particular importance in this regard. In line with the state-in-society approach it is 
important to turn the attention to different levels of the state. Decisions at national level, both 
political and administratively, are of course one aspect that is of interest here. But also the 
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way in which local branches of the state operates within the local political context affects the 
institutionalisation of the municipality as local political arena. 
Intra-governmental relations still remain to be clearly defined within the new organisation of 
the state apparatus. The degree of devolution to the decentralised institutions and the degree 
of control retained at the centre is a particularly important question regarding the future of 
decentralisation in Mali. On one side, decentralisation was from the onset a strategy to 
minimise the abusive powers of the state at the local level. But at the same time, there are 
legitimate concerns from the state that decentralisation may lead to the growth and 
proliferation of local despotism (as discussed in the previous sections of this article). Finding 
the balance between the degree of devolution and the degree of central control directs the 
attention to the ambivalent role of the state in local politics. Reforms of the state apparatus 
that have accompanied decentralisation in Mali have reduced the abusive practices of the state 
at the local level. The marginalisation of the state administration vis-à-vis the municipality is 
of particular importance in this regard. But even though the state is in the process of 
devolving decision-making power and specific functions to the municipality, the outcome of 
this process is very uncertain. This is particularly so since the transfer of competencies is 
subject to a strategy based on progressive devolution. This leaves room for the state agencies, 
and in particular line ministries, that loose power as a result of devolution to counteract the 
process.
The state administration was previously the highest administrative and political authority at 
the local level. It was set up by the leaders of the 1st Malian Republic in the 1960s with the 
primary goal of extending the reach of the state to the local level and to marginalise the 
influence of canton chiefs on the state apparatus. The state administration has been reformed 
and fulfils now principally a tutelary role, that is it functions first and foremost as a control 
instance vis-à-vis the decentralised institutions. This means that the préfet at cercle level is 
responsible to control the legality of decisions and official documents of the municipal 
council a posteriori (MDRIa 1998).83 But even though the state administration has been 
marginalised, it is possible to foresee scenarios that the pendulum will swing back in favour 
of the administration. A recentralisation of this sort will depend on a number of factors. The 
powers invested in the state administration may be used strategically to limit the space of 
83 In certain areas this control is conducted a priori: municipal budget, the creation of municipal enterprises, tax 
setting and municipal loans (MDRI 1998a). 
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manoeuvre of the decentralised institutions at municipal, cercle and regional level. During the 
time of fieldwork in 2003 there were no reports that the administration actually uses its formal 
power to do this (but it undermines decentralisation in many cases by not fulfilling its 
obligation in various fields). A change in policy direction at national level may in the future 
revitalise the strength of the administration at the expense of the decentralised institutions. 
The de facto lack of devolution may from the point of view of the state be legitimised as a 
strategy to counteract local despotism. But at the same time it contributes to preserve the 
power of the state and undermine the authority of the municipal council. This may lead to a 
hollowing out of the decentralised institutions and shift the locus of power locally relatively 
towards arenas outside the municipal arena. This implies a development towards increased 
informalisation of local political processes and decisions and paves the way for an even larger 
degree of elite politics and political practices based on clientelism. 
Recentralisation may therefore lead to informalisation of local politics. But it is also possible 
to argue that the state contributes more directly to the proliferation of clientelistic political 
practices at the local level. After the democratic transition in the early 1990s, decentralisation 
came to constitute an important element of the political strategy of the Konaré regime to build 
and maintain hegemonic control of the state. While the regimes of Keita and Traoré sought to 
control the state and local political coalitions by extending the reach of the state locally, the 
Konaré regime based its strategy on power-sharing. This has given local actors access to 
resources they previously were cut off from and thus the possibility for resource 
accumulation. In its efforts to promote local development the state has, in collaboration with 
international donors, established a nation-wide fund, the Agence Nationale d’Investissement 
des Collectivités Territoriales (ANICT)84, to finance municipal development activities. A 
major problem that has emerged regarding the ANICT fund is related to the proliferation of 
certain practices regarding the process of application for development projects. In many cases 
the municipality does not have the necessary financial means to pay their 20 % share that the 
ANICT demands. There have been reports that private contractors in many cases have paid 
the share of the municipality and in return demanded to carry through the projects. This state 
financed program thus gives local groups the possibility for corruption and the establishment 
of clientelistic practices. This has clear parallels to the mode of governance that characterised 
the previous one-party regimes of Keita and Traoré in which the redistribution of resources 
84 The financing of the ANICT is a joint project of the Malian state and its development partners. Its budget for 
2001-2004 was approximately 30 billion FCFA (46 M Euros) of which the Malian state contributed 10 %. 
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through political networks was the dominant strategy to maintain the hegemonic control of 
the state. There are some differences however. While the resources previously were 
redistributed through the party in power, they are now canalised to the municipalities and 
public-private alliances. The redistribution through political networks thus takes on new 
forms. Even though it is not an intended strategy, decentralisation has become a mechanism to 
assimilate local leaders into national political networks. In this way, the current democratic 
regime represents continuity with the previous regime and demonstrates the state’s inability to 
escape from the neo-patrimonial trap. 
This example is symptomatic of an inherent problem in the decentralised governance structure 
in Mali. The way in which the local political context is taken into account in the design of 
decentralisation has not solved the fundamental problems that the reform was meant to 
address in the first place. In commenting on the problems that the decentralisation reform has 
met (the conflicts discussed above), Noël Diarra, the previous deputy manager of the MDRI, 
interpreted this as initial implementation problems that will disappear when people have 
understood what decentralisation is about. This interpretation has two flaws. First, based on a 
too strong belief in the potential of laws and administrative change from above, it represents a 
technocratic interpretation of what is required to bring about administrative and political 
change. Secondly, it treats the local political problems that have surfaced as secondary and 
reminiscent of a pre-modern political culture that eventually will disappear. Contrary, as the 
discussion in this article suggest, the municipality is more and more becoming an integrated 
and embedded part of the local political institutional landscape. 
Based on the above discussion, and measured against the objectives of the reform, it is 
unlikely that the decentralisation reform will become the democratic institution it was meant 
to be. An important deficit in the participatory model in Mali is, according to Zobel (2004), 
that participatory structures at the village level have not been taken into account in the 
elaboration of the reform. The absence of institutionalised forums between village 
associations and linage councils undermine the integration of villages in the municipal organs 
and may lead to a concentration of decision-making at the municipal level. 
This does not mean however that it has been a failure. Compared to the previous local 
governance system led by state appointed bureaucrats with few democratic arenas and 
characterised by abusive practices from local state agencies, the new decentralised 
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governance system has opened up the local political space for new groups to participate. The 
marginalisation of the state administration at the expense of the municipality has furthermore, 
at least for now, led to a relative strengthening of the decentralised institutions. Furthermore, 
in a study of the popular views of the legitimacy of the state in Mali, Bratton et al. (2002) find 
that it is easier for people to get access to municipal councillors than state appointed 
administrators. This was also expressed by the inhabitants in the Ségué forest in the Koro case 
referred to above. Interpreted in terms of participation and influence the reform has 
contributed to positive changes. A question that remains open however is the form of 
participation that this system supports. Based on the discussion in this article, it is possible to 
conclude that influence and participation will take place outside the formal democratic 
channels and rather be canalised through existing informal channels based on clientelistic 
political relations.  
Conclusion: local politics of institutionalisation 
The current decentralisation reform is only one in a series of administrative and political 
reforms that has been carried out since colonialism. All of these reforms have redefined the 
relative opening or closure of the local political space and hence the possibilities for local 
groups to participate in decision-making. The establishment of cantons as an administrative 
structure during French indirect rule ceded relatively much manoeuvring space to local canton 
chiefs. This space was subject to closure from the post-colonial state and replaced by a three-
tier administrative system that was an important tool in the hands of the national political 
leaders in their strategy to build and maintain hegemonic control of the state. After the 
democratic transition in the early 1990s and the introduction of the current decentralisation 
reform, the local political space has again been opened up for political entrepreneurship and 
competition. 
Local actors engaged themselves initially in the territorial reorganisation because there was an 
opportunity to get access to economic resources and formal power. It gave rise to political 
competition around the composition of the new municipalities and was ultimately also a 
struggle about political leadership. Today, several years after the first local elections in 1999, 
the new decentralised governance structure is still in the process of institutionalisation. Within 
the area of natural resource management for instance it remains unclear what the role of the 
municipality, the state and village authorities will be in the future. Some attempts to establish 
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local management systems have been carried out, but they have not been successful so far. 
This may to a large degree be explained by the political nature of decentralisation. Rather than 
being a neutral service delivery agency, the municipality has become an arena for political 
struggle between various groups over the leadership and the institutionalisation of the local 
political arena. The decentralised institutions have thus become embedded in already existing 
political and social relations and have become part of local politics. Tendencies towards the 
proliferation of informal political relations within these local institutions threaten to 
undermine the municipality as an arena of development and may further marginalise the 
already poor. 
The institutionalisation of the municipality as a local political arena depends also on national 
political processes. The degree of devolution from central state authorities and the transfer of 
economic resources are important factors in this regard. Changes in the prerogatives of the 
state administration as a control instance vis-à-vis the municipalities may lead to a more 
important role of the state as a local actor and, in the long term, recentralisation. The 
marginalisation of the municipality may also bring about increased informalisation of local 
politics and pave the way for an even larger degree of elite politics and clientelistic practices. 
The overall outcome of the decentralisation reform in a long-term perspective is however not 
clear. On one side it points towards an increased institutional complexity at the local level that 
is filled with power relations. On the other side, it is easier for ordinary people to get access to 
the municipal institutions than was the case before. The level of participation and influence 
has augmented, but maybe not in the way that was anticipated. Rather than based on 
democratic principles, it seems that decentralisation has created new spaces for participation 
based on clientelistic power relations. Even though this is the case, the municipality is 
nevertheless more in touch with the needs of citizens than the upwardly accountable 
administration used to be. 
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